Key Points and Summary – An analysis of the five worst weapon systems in U.S. Army history reveals a pattern of massive cost overruns, technological overreach, and comical failures.
-The list includes the $18 billion Future Combat System that “set the Army back a generation”; the $7 billion RAH-66 Comanche helicopter that became too heavy to fly effectively; the M247 Sergeant York anti-aircraft gun that shot at trees; the overweight XM2001 Crusader howitzer; and the tiny V40 “golf ball grenade” that was too weak to be useful in combat.
-These programs serve as legendary cautionary tales of military procurement gone wrong.
5 U.S. Army Combat Systems That Should Never Have Been Built
Some U.S. Army weapon systems just never worked right. Perhaps they were too ambitious or technologically advanced for their era, or maybe they were too expensive – either they were deemed a waste of funds, or the government simply ran out of money. Some systems experienced schedule-slips and delays. The doomed platforms were planned to be built but were either too impracticable to construct, or were never produced in numbers.
These are some of the worst weapon systems planned for the U.S. Army.
The Future Combat System
The Future Combat System (FCS) was an immense failure. It wasted $18 billion. The FCS was supposed to build a brand new network of ground vehicles. It was meant to create a revolution in military affairs between 2003 to 2009. The vehicles were going to be connected by a murky system known as “Blue Force Tracking.” This was designed to use GPS, but it proved clunky and ineffective.
The FCS intended to launch a series of new platforms, including a reconnaissance and surveillance vehicle, a mounted combat system, a non-line-of-sight cannon and mortar, a recovery and maintenance vehicle, an infantry carrier vehicle, a medical vehicle, and a command and control vehicle. All would be led by a fleet of autonomous drones. Most of the platforms were cancelled or stalled in the defense acquisitions process.
“The FCS program was such a massive failure and a missed opportunity for Army modernization,” said Todd Harrison, a budget expert with the Center for Strategic and International Studies, according to Defense News. “I think this program single-handedly set the Army back a generation in vehicle technology.”
The RAH-66 Comanche Helicopter
The RAH-66 Comanche was supposed to be an armed two-seat reconnaissance helicopter. It was designed to replace Vietnam War-era aircraft such as the UH-1 Huey utility helicopter, the AH-1 Cobra attack helicopter, and the OH-6 Light Observation Helicopter. In other words, the Army thought it would be an effective fighter against enemy aircraft while also engaging in ground strikes and collecting intelligence.
The U.S. Army allocated $2.8 billion to build six prototypes, but costs ballooned. The service also wanted the Comanche to have stealth attributes, which made the prototypes more difficult to build.
The birds’ bullet-resistant armor made them way too heavy for fast travel. The software was faulty. The three-barrel cannon didn’t work right. Nobody could figure out the targeting system. By the time engineers tried to reduce the weight, it was too late to make the needed changes. The Army wanted to procure more than 1,200 Comanches, but only two prototypes were built. It spent a total of $7 billion and 20 years on the program before canceling it in 2003.
The M247 Sergeant York
In the 1970s, helicopters were becoming a standard part of militaries the world over. The Army was worried that the Soviets were producing huge, powerful gunships loaded to the gills with armaments, and it wanted a self-propelled tracked anti-aircraft system to address this threat. The Soviets were also perfecting the use of “pop-up maneuvers,” during which attack helicopters would spring up from cover, fire missiles, and then dip back down to ground-skimming heights.
The Army put out an elaborate request for proposals, and several defense contractors pounced at the opportunity to supply a new anti-helicopter system. The most popular prototype, from General Dynamics and Ford, was chosen and christened as the M247 Sergeant York.
Problems arose quickly. The tracking radar would mistake trees for helicopters. Electronic countermeasures failed. The turret leaked hydraulic fluid. The M247 also had a tendency to engage targets behind it instead of in front. The vehicle was too slow to integrate with the M1 Abrams and the Bradley Fighting Vehicle.
The M247 failed one combat test after another. Only 50 were ever built, and the Department of Defense cancelled the program in 1985 after Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger deemed it terribly ineffective.
The XM2001 Crusader
When the U.S. Army reckoned its M109 Paladin self-propelled 155 mm howitzer was getting old, the service sought new field artillery that could strike modern threats at longer range. An innovative artillery beast was needed to fire rapidly and keep up with the Future Combat System.
The Crusader was supposed to launch 10 rounds per minute, which would be faster than any gun the Army ever made. The Crusader was designed to have a range of 25 miles, and a tailored ammunition resupply vehicle would enable the system to keep up its rapid rate of fire. But the gun could not fire precision-guided shells. The liquid propellant system would catch on fire. The automated loading system was faulty.
The Crusader and its resupply vehicle became heavier as the systems developed, reaching 43 tons and 36 tons respectively, so questions arose about how the gun and replenishment system would arrive at the battlefield. The Army suspected by the late 1990s that the system would not meet its requirements. After 9/11 happened, and the service’s focus turned to counter-terror and counter-insurgency, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld killed the program in 2002.
The V40 Mini-Grenade
This weapon makes our list because it was so small, inexpensive, and easy to produce that it should have been a great success during the Vietnam War. How could you mess up a hand grenade?
The Army Special Forces used this munition to clear rooms or other small areas. The V40 was dubbed the “golf ball grenade” for its light 4.8-ounce weight and tiny 4-centimeter diameter. Soldiers also called it the “hootch popper.”
The problem was that it was rarely used. It was the wrong weapon to turn to when personnel needed to make a big blast. It didn’t do much damage, and the V40 often stayed on soldiers’ belts, forgotten during battle. Even when used, it had little ability to cut through the dense foliage of Vietnam and find the enemy. Special ops personnel just had no use for the golf ball grenade.
About the Author: Dr. Brent M. Eastwood
Brent M. Eastwood, PhD is the author of Don’t Turn Your Back On the World: a Conservative Foreign Policy and Humans, Machines, and Data: Future Trends in Warfare plus two other books. Brent was the founder and CEO of a tech firm that predicted world events using artificial intelligence. He served as a legislative fellow for U.S. Senator Tim Scott and advised the senator on defense and foreign policy issues. He has taught at American University, George Washington University, and George Mason University. Brent is a former U.S. Army Infantry officer. He can be followed on X @BMEastwood.
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