Key Points and Summary – RUSI’s new study argues Russia’s Sukhoi fighter lines—Su-30/Su-34/Su-35 and Su-57—remain vulnerable despite wartime output.
-Second- and third-tier suppliers still depend on foreign machine tools and electronics; RFE/RL tallied 2,000+ Western parts flowing via third countries.
Russian Su-34 fighter-bomber. Image Credit: Creative Commons.
Su-34 Fullback. Creator: Vitaly V. Kuzmin. Credit: Vitaly V. Kuzmin
-The report urges widening sanctions to those lower-tier nodes, far stricter enforcement (a chronic weak spot), and syncing Ukraine’s long-range strikes with economic measures.
-It also recommends accelerating skilled-engineer “brain drain” and outcompeting Moscow in export markets with affordable, maintainable alternatives.
-Bottom line: Russia can sustain low-intensity production, but targeted pressure on chokepoints could slow Sukhoi deliveries and raise costs.
Russia’s Best Fighters and Bombers Like Su-34 and Su-57 Felon Share A Common Flaw
WARSAW, POLAND – One of the constantly-repeated phrases about the current war in Ukraine is that “Russia has the means to keep making weapons for as long as it wants.”
Another frequently uttered prediction is that Russia could be re-armed and its military re-constituted in as little as two years, and then be ready to take on all of NATO.
For someone who has been watching the developments of this war since the beginning, these assertions are debatable for several reasons.
But assuming, for the moment, that they are essentially factually correct, they think that Russia’s defense production lines can continue to function without disruption.
It is also true that Russian supply chains cannot be degraded in any meaningful measure.
Su-34 Fullback from Russia. Image Credit: Creative Commons.
Sukhoi Su-34 Heading Into the Sky. Image Credit: Creative Commons.
A new report from the Royal United Service Institute (RUSI) in London calls these and other assumptions into question.
It points out that Russia’s production of Sukhoi fighter aircraft can and should be disrupted.
By taking specific measures, the manufacture of Sukhoi platforms, this most critical series of combat aircraft designs—Su-30SM, Su-34, Su-35, and Su-57—could suffer significant crippling effects.
These actions need to be given more attention, as, instead of being reduced, Russia’s production of combat aircraft has actually risen slightly during the course of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
But some disruptions have been caused by delays in the delivery of subsystems from these aircraft’s complex, far-flung supply chains.
Persistent Foreign Dependencies
Despite years of sanctions and other embargoes, Russia still relies heavily on foreign imports of materials, machine tooling, and specialized equipment, the authors of the report have found.
These dependencies are within the second and third-tier supply chains of the Sukhoi production centers.
The Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty investigation project called “Schemes” found in April 2024 that over 2,000 foreign-made electronic components were still being used in the production of Russian Sukhoi fighter aircraft.
Su-35. Image Credit: Creative Commons.
Su-35. Image Credit: Creative Commons.
Moreover, the majority of these foreign-made components originate from Japan and the United States.
According to RFE/RL researchers who have collaborated with the Independent Commission Against Corruption, Ukrainian intelligence sources have compiled a list of foreign-made components still used in the production of the Russian Su-27SM3, Su-30SM, Su-34, Su-35S, and Su-57 fighter jets.
There is now an extensive list of Western sanctions regimes designed to sever these foreign supply lines.
But Russia continues to receive shipments of these sanctioned items, such as microchips, via third countries.
It is the primary mechanism by which Moscow sustains its war production.
Russia has had limited success with a mechanism for import substitution in its aviation sector.
But this has not had a comprehensive adverse effect, as Moscow has enjoyed increasing success in purchasing these foreign-sourced machine tools and other materials through time-honored subterfuges, such as front companies and third-nation pass-throughs.
Recommended Actions
The report’s authors have several recommendations they believe could choke off the supply of production inputs Russia is still receiving and using to maintain the production tempo of Sukhoi aircraft.
One of those recommended actions calls for expanding sanctions on Russian industry to now include second- and third-tier suppliers in Russia’s aerospace supply chain.
This would have a significant effect in slowing production that has thus far not been experienced by the Russian industry.
A second activity would be to be more diligent about enforcing sanctions to prevent Russia from acquiring critical equipment and materials from Europe and other regions of the world.
Some persons in government entities responsible for sanctions enforcement believe that these restrictions are immediately put into effect and then automatically begin to take effect, as if there were some autopilot mechanism to prevent items from being shipped illegally to Russia.
Su-57 Felon Screengrab from Russia. Image Credit: X Screengrab.
Su-57 Felon Stealth Fighter Taking Off. Image Credit: Creative Commons.
In practice, however, sanctions enforcement requires constant attention to how the sanctioned party may be circumventing the restrictions. This then requires adapting to how the sanctions are being enforced. This is frequently a task that does not receive adequate effort and attention.
It is the principal reason that the US Special Envoy for Ukraine, Lt. Gen. Keith Kellogg, has said more than once that the sanctions imposed on Russia are about a “6” on a scale of one to ten, but that enforcement “is only about a 3.”
Three other activities that would also make a difference, says the RUSI report, are to:
“Coordinate military and economic strategies by aligning long-range strike campaigns with economic measures to maximise disruption of Russian production facilities.”
“Encourage brain drain through developing pathways for skilled Russian engineers to emigrate, reducing Russia’s long-term aerospace capabilities.”
“Compete in global markets to create competitive offers from NATO to displace Russia and China in combat aircraft exports, focusing on affordability and ease of maintenance.”
The message is that there is still plenty of room for improvement.
Last year, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said that an estimated total of 1,500 foreign-made components were used in Russian missile attacks on Kyiv.
The number is most likely unchanged a year later.
About the Author: Reuben F. Johnson
Reuben F. Johnson has thirty-six years of experience analyzing and reporting on foreign weapons systems, defense technologies, and international arms export policy. Johnson is the Director of the Asia Research Centre at the Casimir Pulaski Foundation. He is also a survivor of the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. He worked for years in the American defense industry as a foreign technology analyst and later as a consultant for the U.S. Department of Defense, the Departments of the Navy and Air Force, and the governments of the United Kingdom and Australia. In 2022-2023, he won two awards in a row for his defense reporting. He holds a bachelor’s degree from DePauw University and a master’s degree from Miami University in Ohio, specializing in Soviet and Russian studies. He lives in Warsaw.
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