Key Point and Summary – On November 25, 2025, the U.S. Navy killed the Constellation-class frigate after delays, redesigns, and soaring costs turned a “low-risk” FREMM derivative into yet another broken promise.
-What began as a $940 million, 20-ship answer to the small surface combatant gap drifted toward $1.4 billion a hull and slipped years to the right. Design creep, integration headaches, and an underperforming industrial base all played a role. Two ships will limp to completion; four others are gone.
An artist rendering of the U.S. Navy guided-missile frigate FFG(X). The new small surface combatant will have multi-mission capability to conduct air warfare, anti-submarine warfare, surface warfare, electronic warfare, and information operations. The design is based on the FREMM multipurpose frigate. A contract for ten ships was awarded to Marinette Marine Corporation, Wisconsin (USA), on 30 April 2020.
-The article argues that canceling may be the least-bad option—and a brutal indictment of how America now builds warships.
-It also warns that future “low-risk” imports could repeat the fiasco.
Broken U.S. Navy? What the Death of the Constellation-Class Says About U.S. Shipbuilding
On November 25, 2025, the U.S. Navy announced that it would be canceling the Constellation-class frigate project. Yes, another U.S. Navy class of warships has a crisis that ended it, or scaled it back majorly. Yeah, we have a trend here.
The decision was announced by Secretary of the Navy John Phelan announced Tuesday over social media.
The decision to cancel the project was driven by numerous factors, including redesign issues, delays, cost overruns, and the U.S. Navy’s inability to procure anything other than submarines and aircraft carriers. Two vessels of the class- the USS Constellation and the USS Congress will be completed, but the other four ships under construction will be cancelled.
Background: What is the Constellation-class?
Originally conceived as a solution to bridge the gap between smaller Littoral Combat Ships and larger Arleigh Burke-class destroyers, the Constellation-class was intended to provide a versatile, multi-mission platform capable of anti-submarine warfare, surface warfare, and air defense.
Based on the Italian FREMM design, the program was touted as a low-risk, cost-effective approach to modernizing the fleet. The Navy planned to acquire twenty ships, with the lead vessel, USS Constellation (FFG-62), scheduled for delivery in 2026 at an estimated cost of $940 million per hull.
However, the program quickly encountered challenges that undermined its original promise. One of the most pressing issues was severe schedule delays.
The lead ship, initially expected in 2026, is now projected to arrive no earlier than 2029, with subsequent hulls facing similar setbacks. A Government Accountability Office report found that the design was only about 70% complete after 5 years, despite earlier claims of near-complete maturity.
Escalating costs compounded these delays. What began as a $940 million per ship estimate ballooned to approximately $1.4 billion per hull, threatening to siphon resources from other critical naval priorities.
Why the Program is Being Terminated
Technical complications further exacerbated the situation. Although the program was intended to leverage a proven European design to minimize risk, numerous design changes were introduced after the contract award.
These modifications led to weight growth beyond acceptable tolerances, forcing consideration of reducing speed requirements to compensate. Integration challenges with U.S. combat systems and sensors added layers of complexity, eroding confidence in the program’s ability to deliver on time and within budget.
Navy leadership has increasingly emphasized speed to delivery as a guiding principle, driven by the urgency of countering near-peer threats, particularly in the Indo-Pacific. “We are reshaping how the Navy builds its fleet. Today, I can announce the first public action is a strategic shift away from the Constellation-class frigate program,” Secretary Phelan writes.
The Navy is pivoting toward distributed maritime operations, favoring smaller, more numerous platforms, including unmanned surface vessels, over traditional mid-sized combatants. This approach aims to create a more agile and resilient force structure capable of operating effectively in contested environments.
The Constellation-class’ downfall was also driven by economic needs.
“A key factor in this decision is the need to grow the fleet faster to meet tomorrow’s threats. This framework seeks to put the Navy on a path to more rapidly construct new classes of ships and deliver capabilities our war fighters need in greater numbers and faster,” a Navy official said.
Fincantieri Marinette Marine, the primary contractor, invested heavily in U.S. shipyards and employs thousands of workers. To mitigate the impact of the cancellation, the Navy will complete the first two ships, FFG-62 and FFG-63, to sustain the workforce and preserve the yard’s viability for future programs.
While losing four hulls is a setback for the company, compensation measures and new orders for other ship types are expected to soften the blow.
What the Loss of the Constellation-class Means for the U.S. Navy
The implications of this decision are far-reaching. For the Navy, it means rethinking fleet composition and acquisition strategies.
The requirement for 73 small surface combatants will now have to be met by entirely new designs or unmanned hulls, as many advocate.
(February 10, 2024) — The Zumwalt Class Guided Missile Destroyer USS Michael Monsoor (DDG 1001) breaks away from the Henry J. Kaiser-class fleet replenishment oiler USNS Pecos (T-AO 197) shortly before sunset after taking on fuel. (U.S. Navy photo by Chief Mass Communication Specialist Mark D. Faram)
Operational doctrine will continue to evolve toward dispersed, networked forces, aligning with broader efforts to counter China’s growing naval capabilities through flexibility and scalability rather than reliance on fewer, high-value assets.
The Constellation-class is one more in a long line of programs that have been killed by the U.S.’ broken acquisitions requirements and acquisitions process.
It also serves as a cautionary tale for future programs: design stability must be achieved before production begins, and procurement strategies must balance the pursuit of advanced capabilities with the imperative of timely delivery.
Congress, meanwhile, is likely to scrutinize the Navy’s acquisition practices, given that the program was marketed as low-risk but ultimately succumbed to redesigns and overruns.
Debates will center on whether the Navy’s shift away from traditional frigates is a prudent adaptation or a reactionary move that could leave capability gaps.
(Dec. 10, 2010) The Los Angeles-class attack submarine USS Houston (SSN 713) takes part in a photo exercise as part of Keen Sword 2011. Keen Sword is a joint, bilateral exercise designed to strengthen Japan-U.S. military operations. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Casey H. Kyhl)
Ultimately, the Constellation-class frigate program failed to deliver on its core promise of providing an affordable, timely, and low-risk solution to the Navy’s small surface combatant needs. Instead, it became yet another example of design creep, schedule slippage, and strategic misalignment.
The Navy’s decision to pull the plug on the program is probably for the best in the long run.
As the Navy’s former top acquisition executive Nickolas Guertin put it, “turns out modifying someone else’s design is a lot harder than it seems.”
About the Author: Isaac Seitz
Isaac Seitz, a Defense Columnist, graduated from Patrick Henry College’s Strategic Intelligence and National Security program. He has also studied Russian at Middlebury Language Schools and has worked as an intelligence Analyst in the private sector.
