Russia Has Lost over 3,000 Tanks in Ukraine War and Can’t Replace Them

Key Points – Russia’s tank production and refurbishment efforts, centered at the UralVagonZavod (UVZ) plant, are reportedly insufficient to replace the over 3,700 tanks lost in Ukraine.

-Much of the proclaimed output consists of refurbished, previously mothballed T-72s from depleting storage depots, rather than entirely new vehicles.

-Significant challenges plague this process, including actual repair capabilities being far below official claims, a critical lack of parts interchangeability between different tank models (even pre-dating the 2022 invasion), and many stored vehicles being found stripped of essential components.

-These deep-seated industrial and logistical issues hinder Russia’s ability to sustain its armored losses.

Russian Tank Production Cannot Meet Demands of the War

A 2024 production report on the Russian UralVagonZavod (UVZ) armored vehicle plant reveals that the Nizhni-Tagil, Russia-based facility could have potentially turned out 200 T-72B and T-72B1 Main Battle Tanks (MBT). They would all have been modernized to the T-72B3 configuration.

These units would then have been delivered to the Russian army in addition to 60 to 80 new-build T-90M Proryv tanks. In addition to these MBTs, the delivery package would have included a small number of BMPT Terminator tank support fighting vehicles.

These statistics were compiled by the Polish military website Defence24, with some information on UVZ production sourced from armor industry researcher Andrii Tarasenko.

However impressive these numbers may seem, the 200 modernized T-72 models and the approximately 60–80 new main battle tanks (MBTs) are not nearly enough to replace the losses sustained by the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

After almost three years of intense wartime operations, Russian units have lost over 3,700 tanks (of course, this being wartime, numbers and sources do vary). Production rates at UVZ and other facilities are insufficient to produce enough replacements.

Artificial Production and Extended Repairs

Reports coming from experts analyzing the UVZ production line state that Russian manufacturing facilities are running out of resources and production inputs. Without these raw materials and supplier deliveries, they cannot build enough vehicles to keep up with the Russian army’s losses in the field.

However, the deep, dark secret is that one of the mechanisms used to maintain an artificially high production tempo at UVZ is that many of the “new” tanks being rolled out of the plant are not new at all. They were actually formerly mothballed T-72s stored in conservation. They are then “brought back to life” with a refurbishment program and presented as new productions.

However, those tanks that can be withdrawn from storage bases to be overhauled and then recorded as “newly manufactured” vehicles are becoming fewer in number as those storage depots are emptied.

Even when there are still tanks that can be repaired and then issued as new-build units, there are also other complications.

According to data released in a Russian military journal Military and Technical Support of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, the actual capability to repair Russian tanks is 3-5 times less than what is claimed in official manuals.

The consequence is that the repair timelines for equipment then increase by 15-20%. However, there is another chapter to the story.

Not Interchangeable

The same publication details that the Russian facility has discovered a critical lack of interchangeability between the weapons and equipment installed in different tank models across the entire armored vehicle fleet. Moreover, this is not a new development but a complication that had already reached what the publication called a “critical limit” even before the February 2022 invasion began.

Specific examples include the fact that the fire control systems in T-72 and T-80 tanks have non-interchangeable components. Additionally, there are as many as seven different engine models used in Russian armored vehicles, which is a nightmare for the logistics and repair system.

The publication also reveals that many of the vehicles brought to the UVZ factory from storage depots are found to be missing critical parts, and other significant components are discovered to be defective. Many of these vehicles end up requiring engine replacements and battery charges, and some or all of their spare parts or “ZIP” packages and tool kits are also incomplete—or missing altogether.

At the same time, the ability of Russian industry to resume serial production of T-80 tanks also remains a big question. Those plans were announced back in the Autumn of 2023 but with no follow-on reports on the progress of this effort.

There is additional reporting that the Russian military-industrial complex plans to restart production of the gas turbine engines used in some T-80 models despite the problems the Russian military has encountered with this version of the tank.

As Tarasenko points out in a Ukrainian publication, the UVZ plant is a shadow of its Soviet-era self.  UVZ, as he writes, did “not even cope with the Т-90М contracts received in peacetime. All interviews about the increase in production by 300 percent are nothing more than juggling numbers. Now UVZ no longer resembles a tank factory, but a repair enterprise of the level of the mid-level Soviet-era plant.”

Russian officials “try to disguise all this shame with all sorts of [camera] shots from different angles, reports from the Zvezda [military TV] propaganda channel and other information garbage that the Russian citizens so like to consume.”

Old habits die hard. The Russian practice of hiding accurate production numbers and covering up shortfalls in the defense sector appears to persist.

About the Author

Reuben F. Johnson is a survivor of the February 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine and is an Expert on Foreign Military Affairs with the Fundacja im. Kazimierza Pułaskiego in Warsaw.  He has been a consultant to the Pentagon, several NATO governments and the Australian government in the fields of defense technology and weapon systems design.  Over the past 30 years he has resided in and reported from Russia, Ukraine, Poland, Brazil, the People’s Republic of China and Australia.

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