The Alaska Whiplash: Trump, Putin, Zelensky—and a Peace Trap for Russia

Key Takeaways

• Trump’s tone veered wildly: warm welcome for Putin, then a push for land “swap,” then cordial talks with Zelensky and EU leaders. 
• Security guarantees for Ukraine are back on the table; details TBD, but EU/NATO-style assurances were discussed. 
• Trump’s tripartite idea effectively boxes in Putin, who claims Zelensky is “illegitimate.” Meet him—or snub Trump. 
• Putin’s push for a comprehensive accord (not a ceasefire) signals a stall tactic: negotiate endlessly, strike continuously. 
• Net result: less breakthrough than brinkmanship—but Kyiv avoided the worst-case outcome (for now).

The Ukraine Peace Talks in DC: What Do We Know?

The rollercoaster ride continues.

Before the August 15th Alaska summit, Donald Trump seemed like he would finally get tough with Russia’s illegitimate president, Vladimir Putin. Then came the actual summit, which began with Trump’s shockingly obscene red-carpet welcome of a war criminal, warmonger, and genocidaire.

But then, once the summit ended, it looked like nothing of substance had been achieved.

Ukrainians in particular breathed a sigh of relief. Until the next day came around and Trump appeared to side with Putin, arguing for a land “swap” and for a peace agreement instead of a ceasefire.

And then came Monday, the eighteenth, and Trump’s cordial meeting with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and several top European leaders. They appear to have had a fruitful discussion regarding security guarantees for Ukraine as well as the mechanics of a possible peace.

This is either a very clever negotiating strategy or incoherence. Who can tell anymore?

More important are these takeaways.

First, the mere fact that Trump met with Zelensky and the Europeans without berating or insulting them is essential, testifying (perhaps!) to Trump’s finally understanding that Putin isn’t the only interlocutor that matters. Alternatively, it may just be Trump being Trump, and he may decide to treat them with disdain next week.

Second, Trump didn’t just refrain from berating his guests. He went out of his way to be courteous and appears to have treated his parlay seriously. What this portends is impossible to say, but one thing is clear: the triumphalist outbursts of Russian propagandists who crowed about Putin’s victory at the summit may now need to be tempered.

Third, willfully or not, Trump set a trap for Putin by insisting that he meet Zelensky and, possibly, himself. Engaging in a breathtaking display of chutzpah, Putin has explicitly and repeatedly stated that he considers Zelensky to be illegitimate (!) and that he could not sign any documents with him.

Since a tripartite meeting is central to Trump’s plans, Putin’s likely ‘nyet’—and Zelensky’s having already expressed a ‘yes’—puts the Russian dictator in a pickle. If he agrees to meet Zelensky, he will effectively be dissing himself. If he refuses, he will dis Trump. Either way, Zelensky comes out the winner.

Finally, the summit and subsequent meeting revealed once again that Trump genuinely suffers from the delusion that Putin wants peace.

Yes, Putin wants the peace of the graveyard, which he happily pursues by bombing Ukrainian cities and killing Ukrainian civilians (14 were killed by Russia on August 18, just before the meeting with Zelensky and the Europeans).

Ironically, the most persuasive evidence of Putin’s unwillingness to pursue peace is his insistence on a comprehensive peace agreement.

He knows that his unconditional demands are unacceptable to Ukraine, Europe, and any person with a brain and a heart. Putin thereby hopes to negotiate endlessly and thereby continue to kill endlessly.

In contrast, a ceasefire would stop the killing immediately—something Putin can’t abide.

All in all, the Friday-Monday rollercoaster ride proved far less scary then it could have been. Of course, it’s sure to continue. Dramamine is recommended.

About the Author: Dr. Alexander Motyl, Rutgers University

Dr. Alexander Motyl is a professor of political science at Rutgers-Newark. A specialist on Ukraine, Russia, and the USSR, and on nationalism, revolutions, empires, and theory, he is the author of 10 books of nonfiction, including Pidsumky imperii (2009); Puti imperii (2004); Imperial Ends: The Decay, Collapse, and Revival of Empires (2001); Revolutions, Nations, Empires: Conceptual Limits and Theoretical Possibilities (1999); Dilemmas of Independence: Ukraine after Totalitarianism (1993); and The Turn to the Right: The Ideological Origins and Development of Ukrainian Nationalism, 1919–1929 (1980); the editor of 15 volumes, including The Encyclopedia of Nationalism (2000) and The Holodomor Reader (2012); and a contributor of dozens of articles to academic and policy journals, newspaper op-ed pages, and magazines. He also has a weekly blog, “Ukraine’s Orange Blues.”

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