Key Points and Summary – The Constellation-class frigate, intended as a low-risk, FREMM-based escort to replace LCS gaps and relieve destroyers, is now 36 months late and 13% heavier.
-U.S. system insertions, added survivability features, and building before design maturity drove cascading changes, stalled production, and rising costs.
An artist rendering of the U.S. Navy guided-missile frigate FFG(X). The new small surface combatant will have multi-mission capability to conduct air warfare, anti-submarine warfare, surface warfare, electronic warfare, and information operations. The design is based on the FREMM multipurpose frigate. A contract for ten ships was awarded to Marinette Marine Corporation, Wisconsin (USA), on 30 April 2020.
-GAO says the Navy prioritized drawing volume over design quality, compromising schedules.
-First delivery slipped from 2026 to 2029; only ~10% of the lead ship is complete.
-Even if problems are addressed, critics warn the ship may be underarmed for Pacific missile saturation.
-With budgets tight and unmanned options improving, Congress could curb buys unless the program stabilizes quickly.
Is the Constellation-class Frigate Doomed to Fail?
The Constellation-class frigate, sold as a mid-tier escort to bridge the gap between Littoral Combat Ships and destroyers, is now falling behind by 36 months, and the ship’s weight has increased by 13 percent before it has even entered service.
What was intended to be an efficient and low-risk way to field 20 modern frigates is now another delayed project that the U.S. Armed Forces must grapple with – and the implications span fleet readiness, naval strategy, and industrial risks.
Why the Constellation-Class Exists
The U.S. Navy established the Constellation (FFG-62) program to revive a credible, survivable frigate capability that was lost in 2015 with the retirement of the Oliver Hazard Perry class, and to replace the underperforming Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) model.
LCS variants have repeatedly underdelivered in terms of reliability, survivability, and utility in contested environments—a problem that has prompted the Navy to seek a more robust and flexible escort platform.
However, to minimize risks and keep development time to a minimum, the Navy opted to base the Constellation hull on the European FREMM design, adapting an established platform to U.S. standards and systems.
In 2020, the Navy awarded the design and construction contract to Fincantieri Marinette Marine (F/MM) and floated the possibility of constructing additional hulls in the future.
Initially, the Navy expected to field at least 20 Constellation-class frigates. The ships were planned to assume duties that included convoy escort, forward presence, and anti-submarine warfare, freeing up the Arleigh Burke-class destroyers for more pressing missions.
But the Navy’s decision to begin construction before the design has proven controversial.
Design, Capabilities, and Trade-offs
The Constellation-class is designed with a full-load displacement of roughly 7,500 tonnes.
The vessel, measuring 151.8 meters in length, is designed to accommodate approximately 200 personnel and operate two crews in alternating operational cycles. As one crew retires, the other crew takes over.
Propulsion is based on a combined diesel-electric and gas (CODLAG) system, which features electric motors and a gas turbine to provide both efficiency and good sprint speed. Its combat systems include variant radar, a Mk 41 vertical launch system (VLS) for air and strike missiles, and the ability to accommodate an MH-60R Seahawk helicopter and other unmanned systems. The Constellation-class can also host anti-ship, surveillance, and electronic warfare suites.
And because the Navy insisted on inserting U.S. systems, a series of structural changes, additional armor, and damage-control features were made. It means that the Constellation is far from the plug-and-play system it was initially intended to be. These design changes are the primary reason for the project’s heavy-weight growth.
Because the design continues to evolve even during construction, the projected delivery date for the first ship has also slipped.
The contract initially set delivery for April 2026, but the program now forecasts that the first ship will actually be delivered in 2029. Recent reports even suggest that the first hull is only roughly 10 percent complete, despite years of construction work.
In 4 Words: Challenges Ahead Look Difficult
The program still faces many challenges ahead, but many of the problems have so far been caused by the decision to begin construction before finalizing a stable design.
That decision has triggered a cascade of structural adjustments and unpredictable cost increases. A report from the Government Accountability Office (GAO) harshly criticized the Navy’s decision, noting that decision-makers prioritized the volume of completed drawings over the quality or maturity of the designs, creating a misleading illusion of progress being made on the ships.
In the report, titled “Unstable Design Has Stalled Construction and Compromised Delivery Schedules,” the GAO argues that the decision to begin construction without first completing the design was “inconsistent with leading ship design practices.” The report argued that the decision “jeopardized” the program.
“Further, design instability has caused weight growth,” the report adds.
Beyond design, the project is threatened by cost escalation. The Navy’s FY2025 budget request already includes procurement funding for the 7th ship, and six more between FY 2026-2029. Yet Congressional patience may be thin: some lawmakers have already warned that the program is at a “tipping point,” arguing that the Navy should get back on track or change direction entirely.
And then there’s the matter of capability. Even if Constellation ultimately delivers, albeit years later than planned, it may be under-armed by design. Critics have argued that the ships could struggle in high-end conflicts, particularly in the Pacific, where missile saturation attacks should be expected. And because it’s not a destroyer-class ship, survivability trade-offs must be managed very carefully indeed. Any compromise here could render the platform vulnerable.
Unmanned alternatives are more cost-effective, easier to deploy, and less risky. If the project faces further delays, Congress may argue that pursuing unmanned solutions could be worthwhile before the Constellation-class project is complete.
About the Author:
Jack Buckby is a British author, counter-extremism researcher, and journalist based in New York who writes frequently for National Security Journal. Reporting on the U.K., Europe, and the U.S., he works to analyze and understand left-wing and right-wing radicalization, and reports on Western governments’ approaches to the pressing issues of today. His books and research papers explore these themes and propose pragmatic solutions to our increasingly polarized society. His latest book is The Truth Teller: RFK Jr. and the Case for a Post-Partisan Presidency.
More Military
Russia’s Big Sierra-Class ‘Titanium’ Submarine Mistake Still Stings
USS United States: The Aircraft Carrier Custom Designed To Launch Bombers
Why the Navy Never Built Deep-Diving Titanium Nuclear Submarines Like Russia
USS Illinois: The Forgotten Iowa-Class Battleship the U.S. Navy Never Finished
Vought Model 1600: The Navy’s Big F-16 Fighter ‘Flying on Aircraft Carrier’ Mistake Still Stings
