From TikTok to ‘Police Stations’: Why CCP Ops Thrive on What Feels Harmless

Key Points and Summary – Chinese espionage on U.S. soil is expanding—from MSS/MPS recruitment and cyber theft to covert “police stations” and data-harvesting apps.

-Because of salience bias, visible threats (the 2023 spy balloon) alarm Americans, while diffuse ones (TikTok, backdoored devices) are ignored.

-Chinese-made screens, cameras and even hospital monitors can hide access paths; PRC security laws compel firms to assist intelligence.

-These risks touch schools, highways and clinics, not just D.C. Michael Lucci argues undisclosed backdoors are consumer fraud that erode rule of law.

-With IP theft costing hundreds of billions, federal, state and local action—and public vigilance—are urgently required.

The China Threat and the Problem of Salience: Why the Biggest Risks are Those We Cannot See

Chinese espionage and transnational repression on U.S. soil are expanding rapidly in both scale and sophistication. The Ministry of State Security (MSS), by some estimations the largest spy agency in the world, and the Ministry of Public Security (MPS), China’s national police force, aggressively target the U.S. homeland in pursuit of the Chinese Communist Party’s broader strategic ambitions of weakening U.S. power while aggrandizing Beijing’s regional and global influence.

In just the past year, Chinese operatives and proxies have been caught executing a stunning range of malign activities. At the University of Michigan, a Chinese scientist was arrested for smuggling a potential agroterrorism agent into the U.S. In San Diego, two Chinese nationals were charged with acting as agents of the MSS and attempting to recruit U.S. Navy personnel. The Department of Justice indicted a Chinese hacking group for conducting a years-long cyber espionage campaign targeting defense contractors, technology firms, and federal agencies. A Chinese national allegedly stole more than 1,000 confidential AI-related files from Google. Two active-duty U.S. soldiers were arrested for transmitting classified information—including material marked Top Secret—to Chinese intelligence in exchange for cash. And in New York City, a resident pled guilty to operating an illegal Chinese “police station” used to surveil and intimidate dissidents. These cases are undoubtedly the tip of the proverbial iceberg.

Countering this kind of pervasive espionage requires whole-of-society awareness and concerted efforts—backed by resources and timely legislation—at the federal, state, and local level. For many Americans, however, the aforementioned examples engender a sense of complacent helplessness or lethargic indifference. After all, if you’re not in the military, you’re not affiliated with the government, you’re not an anti-CCP protestor with family in mainland China, and you’re not concerned that your profession warrants attention from the MSS or MPS, you might view Chinese malfeasance as simply “not my problem.”  In other words, if you can’t see it and you can’t feel it, why should you care?

To get the American people involved in fortifying our nation against the predations of Chinese espionage, prudent policymakers should recognize the power of the salience bias, the human tendency to respond more strongly to threats that are visible, vivid, and immediate. Recall the uproar over the Chinese spy balloon that crossed over the U.S. in 2023. Many Americans correctly surmised that what the Chinese Embassy in Washington called a weather balloon was more likely packed with sensitive technology designed for intelligence collection, and called for the government to respond. The risk to the average American was infinitesimal, but Americans nonetheless wanted their government to take immediate action. Why? The balloon was a time-sensitive, tangible representation of a foreign power’s invasion of America’s privacy and sovereignty.

Now take TikTok. Like the spy balloon, it represents an invasion of privacy and an attack on U.S. sovereignty—but this time, the threat is hidden in plain sight. The app harvests massive amounts of data on American users, including facial recognition, location tracking, and behavioral data, and shapes narratives to drive polarization and anti-American views. Yet despite widespread awareness of these risks, TikTok is used by more than a third of U.S. adults and remains wildly popular. Why? Because the threat it poses is abstract, diffuse, and lacks the visual or emotional immediacy of a spy balloon floating overhead. In short, it’s less salient and therefore easier to ignore.

This same dynamic applies, alarmingly, to smart devices such as LED screens, surveillance cameras, and other connected infrastructure manufactured by Chinese companies. These systems are increasingly embedded in schools, airports, transit systems, government buildings, and hospitals across the country. Such devices may appear innocuous, but they can be—and have been—engineered with software or hardware backdoors that allow for covert surveillance, data exfiltration, and even remote manipulation. In a recent example, Chinese-made Contec CMS8000 patient monitors—used in clinics and hospitals across America— were found to contain hidden backdoors enabling remote access and potential data theft. Florida Attorney General James Uthmeier has subpoenaed Contec and their American affiliate, Epsimed, in what looks like an initial investigation of obvious consumer fraud. This could be a sign that state and federal law enforcement officers will expand inquiries into Chinese consumer fraud and deceptive trade practices.

Because China’s National Security Laws require all Chinese companies to cooperate with state security agencies upon request, any device owned by a Chinese company, whether a hospital monitor or a public-facing LED screen, may serve as a tool of the Chinese government. Why might this matter to the average American? Imagine a Chinese-manufactured digital sign outside your child’s school being used not just to display information, but to gather it: capturing Bluetooth signals, tracking movements, or even switching content in the event of a geopolitical crisis. Or consider LED message boards on highway overpasses, devices trusted to relay emergency information, being compromised to spread disinformation or disrupt evacuations during a natural disaster or conflict.

Michael Lucci, founder of State Armor, believes such Chinese devices present systemic espionage risks and furthermore undermine American rule of law. “Any Chinese manufacturer that makes a device that surreptitiously collects data and sends it to Beijing is committing consumer fraud. So are the American companies that ‘white label’ such Chinese products. Every time we hear a story about an undisclosed backdoor or other material non-disclosure, that is a Chinese company violating our laws to comply with CCP’s espionage requirements. The CCP’s approach is incompatible with American rule-of-law, and we need rapid action to unwind their ill-gotten economic gains.”

That rapid action is needed now, because Chinese espionage is not a future threat—it is a daily assault on American privacy, innovation, and sovereignty. And it’s costing us. By some estimates, the theft of U.S. intellectual property by China costs the American economy hundreds of billions annually—amounting to roughly $6,000 per household for a family of four. The federal government must confront the macro-level threats, and state and local governments must tighten procurement processes and secure critical infrastructure. And we must, of course, build and manufacture critical technology such as LED screens here in America.

But the most important shift must happen at the individual level. The American public must shed the illusion of safety and the false sense of distance from the CCP threat. Chinese espionage is not just happening in D.C. or Silicon Valley. It is happening in classrooms, medical clinics, transit hubs, and on the screens and sensors that surround us. The CCP is preparing for conflict, and they are playing the long game. Until these threats become visibly real in the public imagination, they will remain dangerously underestimated. That’s the challenge of salience. The key to solving it is not to wait for the next balloon, but to help Americans see what’s already here.

About the Author: 

Rob Pierce served as a Naval Intelligence Officer and has worked on Capitol Hill and at the State Department.

The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Department of Defense. The appearance of external hyperlinks does not constitute endorsement by the Department of Defense of the information contained therein.