For years, Iran relied on a network of proxy militias in an attempt to assert control across the Middle East.
That all changed in 2023. Following the 7th October attacks on Israel by Hamas, the former obliterated the latter’s presence in Gaza, severely weakening Iranian influence in the region.
Iran’s Drones That Russia Is Using. Image Credit: Creative Commons.
Iran F-14 Tomcat Fighter. Image Credit: Creative Commons.
Soon after, the Lebanon-based Hezbollah suffered a similar fate, with conflict resuming shortly after the beginning of the Iran war earlier this year.
Iran’s proxy militias have been severely damaged, but now Tehran is looking to rebuild this network through renewed coordination elsewhere in the Middle East.
Down, But Not Out
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu set out to destroy Hamas immediately after the Palestinian militant group attacked Israel in October 2023, killing almost 1,200 and kidnapping a further 251.
After two years of conflict, which largely saw the Gaza Strip reduced to rubble, Hamas was all but defeated, and the threat it once posed is now no longer present, even if the group is still technically active.
The same could be said for Hezbollah, another Iranian-backed militia north of the Israeli border.
After a year of fighting in which Israel wiped out much of Hezbollah’s senior leadership, a ceasefire was agreed before hostilities resumed in February 2026.
Since then, Israel has occupied parts of southern Lebanon, while sporadic strikes against the remaining Hezbollah targets continued.
Increasing Cooperation
Alas, Iran has sought to rebuild its proxy network through existing allies in the Middle East.
For years, Tehran has backed the Houthis in Yemen, where an ongoing civil war has been raging for more than a decade.
In Iraq, militia groups tied to Iran have been present since 2014, during a time when ISIS held control over significant portions of the country.
With its strongest allies severely weakened, Tehran has used its proxies in Iraq and Yemen to threaten the United States, Saudi Arabia, and other U.S. allies during the Iran war.
This coordinated coalition saw the U.S and Saudi Arabia bomb Iran-backed militias in Iraq after a Houthi-claimed drone attack on Saudi oil facilities in July.
Regional officials told The Associated Press that the two-day attack had involved Houthi support in coordinating the drone assault from Iraq.
Houthis have reportedly been killed in Iraq, while sources told the AP that Houthi emissaries have worked in operations rooms run by Iraqi militias.
All of this suggests a new level of cooperation between the different groups in different states.
Opening New Fronts
This new level of cooperation has been growing since the Gaza War, soon after it became clear that Hamas and Hezbollah would be reduced to a shadow of their former strength.
In the context of the Iran war, it allows Tehran to effectively open another front, as the U.S. and its allies must target threats beyond the confines of Iran’s geographical boundaries.
“Iran has a hybrid strategy in the current war,” wrote Mahdi Mohammadi, an adviser to the speaker of Iran’s parliament, on social media in July. “We are not fighting on one front, and we are not using one tool.”
This is particularly troublesome for Saudi Arabia.
Iraq borders the kingdom to the north, and Yemen to the south. As a result, the Saudis are surrounded by militant groups, and it’s already having an effect.
Economic Conflict
The Saudi-Houthi conflict is nothing new, even if a ceasefire has been in place since 2022.
However, the wider impacts of the Iran war, specifically Tehran’s closure of the Strait of Hormuz, mean that Saudi Arabia has increased its reliance eightfold on the Bab al-Mandeb Strait in the Red Sea.
In July, the Houthis declared a blockade against Saudi shipping, while also launching offensives towards government-held areas near al-Makha and the strait, threatening even further disruption to Saudi exports.
Tensions have risen between the Saudis and the Houthis in recent days, with attacks confirmed in the kingdom and Houthi-held areas of Yemen.
Iran’s main leverage in the conflict has been its ability to inflict economic disruption on U.S. allies in the Middle East. While the Strait of Hormuz remains closed, exporters that rely heavily on its opening struggle to find alternatives.
The added complexity of a cooperative network of Iranian proxies, now piling additional economic disruption in the Middle East, leaves the U.S., Saudi Arabia and its neighbors with yet another headache in a conflict which has dragged on for over six months.
About the Author: Shay Bottomley
Shay Bottomley is a British journalist. He has written for the Western Standard, Business Insider, Maidenhead Advertiser, Slough Express, Windsor Express, Berkshire Live and Southend Echo.
