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Ukraine War

North Korea Sending to Troops to Fight in Ukraine: It Looks Like a Mess

M2020 Tank from North Korea.
M2020 Tank from North Korea. Image Credit: KCNA/North Korea State Media.

North Korea will apparently send soldiers to Ukraine’s Russian-occupied territories as part of the mutual defense pact signed recently by Kim Jung Un and Vladimir Putin.

It’s not clear whether the North Koreans will be front-line soldiers or members of a construction and engineering corps. Nor are the numbers involved known, though Russian commentators have spoken of several thousand.

Whatever the exact details, which aren’t clear at the moment, the North Korean presence will be at best a mixed blessing for both Russia and North Korea.

For starters, there’s the language barrier. That may matter less if the North Koreans are handed shovels and told to dig, but it’s hard to imagine just how soldiers with no knowledge of Russian could be integrated into a Russian-speaking army. How will rank-and-file Russians communicate with the North Koreans? How will their officers give them orders?

Modern militaries are complex sets of individuals, equipment, hierarchies, and plans. One can’t just take a bunch of trigger-happy North Koreans and tell them to shoot—unless, of course, the idea is to use the North Koreans as cannon fodder in suicidal frontal attacks.

That may suit the Russians, but it’s hard to see how Kim and his comrades will be thrilled to see their soldiers blown to bits.

North Korea: How Much Can It Really Help Russia?

Communication isn’t just about language. Every army, like all institutions, has specific ways of getting things done. It may take weeks, if not months, before the North Koreans figure out just what their roles are in the system.

Meanwhile, a bloody war is taking place; soldiers are dying, North Korean missiles aren’t working properly, and the Russians have their hands full trying to survive. The North Korean contingent could prove to be not an asset but an obstacle. And the last thing the hard-pressed Russian army needs is another obstacle.

Finally, there’s the question of experience. The Russians may not be the best soldiers, but many of them have served on the front for one to two years. In contrast, the North Koreans have had no combat experience. Marching in parades, saluting the great leader, and snarling at the South Koreans don’t count.

Burdened with the unhelpful North Koreans, the Russians will find it hard to ask Pyongyang to take what’s left of them back without hurting Kim’s feelings. Kim, meanwhile, will have to wonder whether his returning soldiers are as resolutely loyal as they were when they went to war. Having witnessed Russia’s humiliating stalemate (and, quite possibly, defeat) firsthand, they may decide that their own leadership is—heaven forbid!—ill-informed and less than fully infallible.

Ultimately, Russia’s willingness for and need of North Korean assistance, in whatever form, reflects its sad state. Genuine great powers don’t go begging, hand outstretched, to small rogue states. In doing just that, Putin has demonstrated yet again that Russia is the “sick man” of Eurasia.

About the Author: Dr. Alexander Motyl

Dr. Alexander Motyl is a professor of political science at Rutgers-Newark. A specialist on Ukraine, Russia, and the USSR, and on nationalism, revolutions, empires, and theory, he is the author of 10 books of nonfiction, including Pidsumky imperii (2009); Puti imperii (2004); Imperial Ends: The Decay, Collapse, and Revival of Empires (2001); Revolutions, Nations, Empires: Conceptual Limits and Theoretical Possibilities (1999); Dilemmas of Independence: Ukraine after Totalitarianism (1993); and The Turn to the Right: The Ideological Origins and Development of Ukrainian Nationalism, 1919–1929 (1980); the editor of 15 volumes, including The Encyclopedia of Nationalism (2000) and The Holodomor Reader (2012); and a contributor of dozens of articles to academic and policy journals, newspaper op-ed pages, and magazines. He also has a weekly blog, “Ukraine’s Orange Blues.”

Alexander Motyl
Written By

Dr. Alexander Motyl is a professor of political science at Rutgers-Newark. A specialist on Ukraine, Russia, and the USSR, and on nationalism, revolutions, empires, and theory, he is the author of 10 books of nonfiction, including Pidsumky imperii (2009); Puti imperii (2004); Imperial Ends: The Decay, Collapse, and Revival of Empires (2001); Revolutions, Nations, Empires: Conceptual Limits and Theoretical Possibilities (1999); Dilemmas of Independence: Ukraine after Totalitarianism (1993); and The Turn to the Right: The Ideological Origins and Development of Ukrainian Nationalism, 1919–1929 (1980); the editor of 15 volumes, including The Encyclopedia of Nationalism (2000) and The Holodomor Reader (2012); and a contributor of dozens of articles to academic and policy journals, newspaper op-ed pages, and magazines. He also has a weekly blog, “Ukraine’s Orange Blues.”

5 Comments

5 Comments

  1. James Saldana

    June 27, 2024 at 7:27 pm

    I’m not sure any of the things you mentioned matter. If the North Koreans can fulfill roles behind the lines that free up Russian troops for the frontlines (building fortifications, repairing infrastructure and patrolling border areas with advisors/translators), while supplying them with equipment and ammunition, it’s a force multiplier. While China is not willing to directly contribute to Russia’s war in the open, they could do that through North Korea, by supplying the North Koreans who then in turn supply Russia.

  2. Mc

    June 28, 2024 at 6:47 am

    An opportunity for these North Koreans to defect…

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