Key Points and Summary – The F-22 Raptor, though technologically dominant, suffers from a “fatal flaw”: its tiny fleet size.
-The U.S. Air Force’s original plan for 750 jets was slashed to just 186 by 2009, driven by the end of the Cold War and staggering program costs ($67 billion).
U.S. Air Force maintainers assigned to the 3rd Air Expeditionary Wing prepare F-22 Raptors for take-off on the flightline during exercise Resolute Force Pacific 2025 in Tinian, Northern Mariana Islands, July 19, 2025. The REFORPAC exercise is part of a first-in-a-generation Department-Level Exercise series, employing more than 400 Joint and coalition aircraft and more than 12,000 members at more than 50 locations across 3,000 miles. (U.S. Air Force photo by Airman 1st Class Tala Hunt)
This “hollow” force now lacks the redundancy and mass to counter the growing number of Chinese J-20s in a major conflict.
-This history serves as a critical lesson for the upcoming, $300M-per-jet F-47 NGAD program: if the U.S. can’t afford to build its next-generation fighter in sufficient numbers, it risks repeating the same strategic mistake.
The F-22 Raptor Math Problem
When the U.S. Air Force introduced the F-22 Raptor in December 2005, it promised to usher in a new era of air-superiority warfare.
The platform was designed to replace the F-15 and dominate any adversary fighter jet in contested skies, combining stealth, super-cruise (sustained supersonic flight without afterburner), advanced sensors, and improved maneuverability.
And today, the Raptor does have a fatal flaw – but it’s not its engineering. Its main problem is simply numbers. Although early planning called for around 750 aircraft (and some internal U.S. Air Force documents recommended even higher), production stopped at just 186 operational jets.
Origins and Ambitions
In the 1980s, amid the Cold War, U.S. planners launched the Advanced Tactical Fighter (ATF) program to develop a next-generation air-superiority fighter that could replace the F-15 across multiple theaters.
The F-22 was the winning design, and the Air Force originally envisaged hundreds of units joining the U.S. Air Force fleet.
U.S. Air Force Capt. Nick “Laz” Le Tourneau, F-22 Raptor Aerial Demonstration Team commander, performs an aerial maneuver during the Cocoa Beach air show in Florida, July 12, 2025. The F-22 Aerial Demonstration Team highlights cutting-edge airpower, precision, skill, all while reinforcing public confidence in the Air Force’s ability to protect and defend. (U.S. Air Force photo by Staff Sgt. Lauren Cobin)
The logic was thus: to face peer adversaries with large numbers of modern fighters and sophisticated air defenses in a potential high-end war scenario, requiring both quality and quantity.
But as conditions changed, so too did the plans.
The ambitious production targets started to unravel in the 1990s and 2000s. With the Cold War over, U.S. defense strategy began to shift toward expeditionary operations, counterinsurgency, and asymmetric warfare rather than large-scale air wars.
At the same time, the unit cost of the F-22 began to increase. The total program cost, by some accounts, exceeded $67 billion, making unit costs extremely high once spread across a smaller number of aircraft.
The combination of problems prompted Congress and the Department of Defense to eventually decide that the value of adding additional Raptors simply didn’t justify the cost. In 2009, the program was capped and ultimately cut off.
The manufacturing lines then closed, tooling was retired, and restart costs were so high that further production became completely infeasible.
In short, the Raptor wasn’t a failure in terms of its performance, because it succeeded technically.
The world simply changed around the program, so it was never fielded in the numbers initially intended.
In short, the F-22 was a great plane, but it lost the math war, so to speak.
What Use Is A Small Fleet?
While the F-22 didn’t technically fail as a platform, a small fleet poses challenges. With only 186 in service, the U.S. Air Force simply never had enough to cover every mission or replace losses in the event of a major war.
In military planning, that’s called a lack of redundancy – meaning there aren’t enough aircraft to rotate through combat, maintenance, and training without significant gaps.
If a significant conflict were to break out with China or Russia, that shortfall would be felt. China’s air force, for example, is now believed to operate several hundred fifth-generation J-20 fighters and many more advanced fourth-generation jets.
U.S. AIR FORCE ACADEMY, Colo. – Two F-22 Raptors perform a flyover and air demonstration during noon meal formation at the U.S. Air Force Academy in Colorado Springs, Colo., April 12, 2023. Events such as these aim to cultivate warrior ethos, a future-focused mindset, and supplement existing character, leadership, and officer development efforts with the cadets. (U.S Air Force Photo by Trevor Cokley)
Meanwhile, Russia continued to produce the Su-57, though in markedly smaller numbers.
Because the F-22 fleet is small, the Air Force can only send limited numbers to forward bases and must be cautious about overusing them.
It also can’t easily afford combat losses. And unlike the F-35, the Raptor was never exported. Congress banned sales to allies, meaning that the U.S. alone bears the cost of operating and maintaining the platform.
Even today, the Raptor is still widely regarded as the best air-superiority fighter ever built, but it will never be able to dominate every front in a high-intensity air war without support.
Lessons for the Future
As the U.S. Air Force now turns toward its next-generation fighter program, Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD), the F-22’s story offers some important lessons.
Most important for today is that investing in the latest high-end capability is good, but without sufficient numbers, the strategic utility may be somewhat hollow.
Buying small numbers of elite jets can be great in short-lived conflicts, but if a real war were to break out, it’s now possible that the United States could be outnumbered.
Quality matters, of course, but so too does quantity. Deterrence and war-fighting ability depends on having good scale.
The Air Force’s next fighter, NGAD, is expected to cost around $300 million per aircraft. If the U.S. can only afford to produce the plane in the dozens, rather than the hundreds, it could repeat the same mistake made with the F-22 – having the best technology in the world, but not enough aircraft to make a real difference in a real war.
As the U.S. Air Force warns that it needs “hundreds” more fighters to meet rising threats, it’s essential that the Department of Defense responds to those calls and does so appropriately.
With China and Russia expanding production, too, delays or underinvestment in NGAD risk leaving the U.S. short again—this time, when competitors are finally beginning to catch up to the United States’ once-unchallenged technological lead.
About the Author:
Jack Buckby is a British author, counter-extremism researcher, and journalist based in New York. Reporting on the U.K., Europe, and the U.S., he works to analyze and understand left-wing and right-wing radicalization, and reports on Western governments’ approaches to the pressing issues of today. His books and research papers explore these themes and propose pragmatic solutions to our increasingly polarized society. His latest book is The Truth Teller: RFK Jr. and the Case for a Post-Partisan Presidency.
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