PUBLISHED on August 14, 2025, 7:04 PM EDT – Key Points and Summary: The U.S. Navy’s Constellation-class frigate program, intended to replace the troubled Littoral Combat Ships, is already facing a “nightmare” of its own.
-The lead ship is now 759 metric tons overweight and its delivery has been delayed by three years, to 2029.
-A scathing GAO report criticizes the Navy for starting construction before finalizing the design, a practice that led to the failures of previous shipbuilding programs.
-With a massive 33% cost discrepancy between the Navy’s estimate and the CBO’s projection, the future backbone of the fleet is in serious trouble before the first ship is even 10% complete.
The Constellation-Class Frigate Is In Trouble
The Constellation-class frigate is the newest class of missile frigate being developed and constructed for the U.S. Navy.
Based on the Italian FREMM frigate, the Constellation-class is intended to replace the troubled littoral combat ships. However, the frigate has come under fire for mismanagement and the program’s ballooning costs. The ship’s weight has also failed to stay within the required constraints, which has drawn considerable scrutiny from oversight bodies.
When Expectations Meet Reality
The Constellation-class frigates are based on the Italian FREMM design, which has been adapted to meet U.S. Navy requirements. This adaptation incorporates the integration of advanced sensors and weapons systems, including the AN/SPY-6(V)3 Enterprise Air Surveillance Radar, the AN/SQQ-89(V)16 undersea warfare suite, and a 32-cell Mk 41 Vertical Launch System, capable of firing Standard Missiles and other munitions. The ships will also carry Naval Strike Missiles for surface warfare, a 57 mm Mk 110 gun with advanced munitions, and a RIM-116 Rolling Airframe Missile launcher for close-in defense. Aviation capabilities include support for an MH-60R Seahawk helicopter and an MQ-8C Fire Scout unmanned aerial vehicle, enhancing the ship’s reach and versatility.
Despite an abundance of high hopes, the program has encountered significant challenges. As of mid-2025, the lead ship, USS Constellation (FFG-62), is only about 10 percent complete. The final design has not yet been fully approved, and the boat is currently 759 metric tons overweight, which raises concerns about its performance and cost.
Initially scheduled for delivery in April 2026, the lead ship’s completion has been delayed by 36 months, pushing the expected delivery date to April 2029.
Program Mismanagement
One of the major criticisms of the program is that the Navy began construction before finalizing the design. This approach has been flagged by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) as inconsistent with best practices in shipbuilding, which typically recommend completing the design before starting construction to avoid costly rework and delays. The Navy’s design stability metric has also been criticized for focusing on the quantity of design documents rather than their quality, making it difficult to assess the true readiness of the design.
To date, the Navy has procured six ships through fiscal year 2024 and has requested funding for a seventh ship in fiscal year 2025.
However, the fiscal year 2026 budget does not include funding for any new ships, although construction of the first six continues under previously awarded contracts. The Navy’s long-term shipbuilding plan envisions a fleet of at least 20 Constellation-class frigates, with the possibility of expanding to 58 ships, including a future “Flight II” variant that may incorporate additional capabilities.
The first ten ships are being built by Fincantieri Marinette Marine in Wisconsin under a fixed-price incentive contract. This arrangement is intended to control costs and limit financial risk to the government. However, there are concerns about the shipyard’s ability to meet production goals, especially given its involvement in other shipbuilding programs and ongoing workforce challenges. Congress is currently considering introducing a second shipyard to help mitigate production risks and accelerate delivery timelines.
Cost Overruns
Cost estimates for the program vary significantly depending on the source. The Navy estimates the average cost of the first ten ships at approximately $870 million per ship, resulting in a total procurement cost of $8.7 billion. In contrast, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) projects a higher average cost of $1.2 billion per ship, totaling $12.3 billion for the first ten ships. The discrepancy stems from historical trends in underestimating lead ship costs, the complexity of adapting a foreign design, and the potential for contract modifications. The CBO estimates that the lead ship alone could cost up to $1.6 billion.
Beyond procurement, operating and support costs are also substantial. The CBO estimates that each ship will incur approximately $63 million in annual direct operating expenses and $130 million in total annual expenses, including indirect and overhead costs.
Over a projected 25-year service life from 2026 to 2060, the total cost to operate a fleet of 20 ships is estimated at $40 billion in direct costs and $90 billion when indirect costs are factored in. These figures highlight the long-term financial commitment required for the program, extending well beyond initial construction.
The Troubled Status of the Constellation-Class
Several oversight bodies have raised concerns about the program’s trajectory. The GAO has emphasized the risks associated with design instability and premature construction. The Department of Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E) has flagged gaps in testing and evaluation, particularly for the ship’s anti-air warfare systems.
There is also concern about the Navy’s reliance on data from other platforms to validate performance, which may not accurately reflect the capabilities of the Constellation-class.
The Constellation-class frigates are intended to support the Navy’s concept of distributed maritime operations. This approach emphasizes the use of smaller, more numerous, and more survivable platforms to complicate adversary targeting and enhance operational flexibility.
The frigates are expected to complement larger surface combatants, such as the Arleigh Burke-class destroyers, and provide a more cost-effective solution for missions that do not require the full capabilities of a destroyer.
About the Author: Isaac Seitz
Isaac Seitz, a Defense Columnist, graduated from Patrick Henry College’s Strategic Intelligence and National Security program. He has also studied Russian at Middlebury Language Schools and has worked as an intelligence Analyst in the private sector.
Military Matters
The F-22 Raptor Just Keeps Getting Better
Curtis Conway
August 14, 2025 at 10:58 pm
Aegis Light-Off is easy enough to test because it happens at the pier. However, Combat Systems Ship Qualification Trials (CSSQT) is a wholly different equation. All combat systems must be demonstrated right up to the AAW missile system against a live target in a missile range. EVERY SHIP must qualify by passing their CSSQT before they can report for duty. The initial ship may do that at Wallops Island in the missile range, but if more are built they will need to do this near the construction site so problems can be addressed rapidly and efficiently. A missile test range should be established in Lake Superior for this purpose. The trip there and back requires testing all other systems. This should be planned, invested, and developed between now and the first required CSSQT.
Gregg Pennington
August 15, 2025 at 9:11 pm
Why is there a problem with this prototype ?