The Constellation-class frigate seemed like a safe bet for a service desperate for a procurement win. Wanting a frigate after the failure of the Littoral Combat Ship and the retirement of the last ships of the Oliver Hazard Perry (OHP) class, the U.S. Navy decided to hedge its bets by going with a proven design, the European Multipurpose Frigate (FREMM) proposed by Fincantieri Marine Group and operated by both France and Italy. The ‘Connies’ were supposed to be an easy win, but unfortunately, the program has strayed into the kind of trouble that seems to follow the U.S. Navy wherever it goes.
Constellation-Class: Twilight of the Frigates
The term “frigate” has a very long history in naval circles. During World War II, the modern frigate emerged as a vessel smaller and slower than a destroyer that could specialize in escort work, especially in an anti-submarine role.
In the Royal Navy, these ships were called “sloops” or “corvettes;” in the USN, they were designated “destroyer escorts.” Over the course of the Cold War this type evolved into ships that could perform multiple missions, including anti-submarine and anti-aircraft defense.
Over a hundred Knox and Oliver Hazard Perry (OHP) class frigates provided the backbone of the US Navy, supporting carrier battle groups and also operating independently under dangerous conditions. For example, USS Stark, an OHP class frigate, was struck by an Iraqi Exocet missile in 1987 while conducting escort duties in the Persian Gulf.
Relatively inexpensive and unsophisticated, the last of the OHP frigates left American service in the 2010s. Since that time the roles performed by frigates have been taken on by the DDG-51, an upgrown destroyer that is closer to a cruiser in size and capability. The Arleigh Burkes can do frigate missions, but fleet is already stretched beyond the breaking point and consequently the Navy’s interest in a smaller ship is unsurprising.
Failure of Littoral Combat Ship (LCS)
In the 2000s, it was hoped that the Littoral Combat Ship could fill the gap left by the classic frigates. Unfortunately, the failure of the Littoral Combat Ship program paved the way for the Connies. Both Austal and Lockheed Martin submitted their respective versions of the LCS for consideration as the basis for the new frigate, and both were rejected (Lockheed Martin withdrew its proposal during the process). Instead, the FREMM was selected because of the maturity of the design, relatively low cost, and success in international service.
Of course, the US Navy made some adjustments to the original project. The Constellations will displace some 7200 tons, bigger than most foreign destroyers (and bigger than the FREMM) but considerably smaller than the Arleigh Burkes. They are designed to reach about 26 knots with a crew of less than 200 officers and men, offering the economy that larger ships lack.
As with previous frigates, the Connies will include multirole capabilities but concentrate on anti-submarine support of task forces. 32 VLS cells will offer the essential offensive and defensive firepower.
Additional weapons include 16 canister-launched Naval Strike Missiles and a 21-cell RIM-116 Rolling Airframe SAM missile system. Modern sensor suites will provide air, surface, and underwater visibility.
Construction of the Constellation began in Marinette, Wisconsin in 2022, with the keel laying taking place in April 2024. The first ships of the new class were expected to start entering service in 2026, although that has already been pushed back to 2029. Several early ships take the names of the “six frigates” built by the US Navy in the late eighteenth century. Twenty boats are currently planned, but if the class is successful in both shipbuilding and operations, it is not difficult to imagine the Navy ordering more.
Troubles for the Constellation-Class
But now problems are emerging. Concurrent construction means that the Constellation herself is being built even as she is being designed, a process that invariably produces problems and delays. Adaptation of the FREMM design for US service increased size and weight. Weight growth that the design has already sustained may reduce the speed of the vessels to below 25 knots (making it difficult for the ships to keep up with carriers and DDG-51s) and may make it more difficult to modify the ships with advanced technology in the future. Perhaps most importantly, the Marinette shipyard has run into severe problems maintaining its workforce, a situation undoubtedly exacerbated by the Covid-19 pandemic.
These problems have already pushed up the price of the ship (from $800 million to $1.3 billion) and pushed back its projected completion date by about 36 months, creating a gap in capabilities exacerbated by the retirement of the Ticonderoga class cruisers.
What is the U.S. Navy Doing?
Selecting an already mature design should have made it easy to avoid catastrophes like the LCS and the Zumwalt class destroyer. Unfortunately, there seems to be something fundamentally broken about how the USN acquires new ships. There is still time to make this project a success, but the stakeholders within the Navy will need to come to an agreement about what they need to give up in order to build a functional, affordable ship.
With thirty-two VLS cells and a suite of capabilities that can help in a wide variety of situations, the Connies still have plenty of upside. If their careers resemble those of the Cold War frigates, they should be able to take some of the burden off the Arleigh Burkes.
However, the USN needs to work hard to turn this program around.
About the Author: Dr. Robert Farley
Dr. Robert Farley has taught security and diplomacy courses at the Patterson School since 2005. He received his BS from the University of Oregon in 1997, and his Ph. D. from the University of Washington in 2004. Dr. Farley is the author of Grounded: The Case for Abolishing the United States Air Force (University Press of Kentucky, 2014), the Battleship Book (Wildside, 2016), Patents for Power: Intellectual Property Law and the Diffusion of Military Technology (University of Chicago, 2020), and most recently Waging War with Gold: National Security and the Finance Domain Across the Ages (Lynne Rienner, 2023). He has contributed extensively to a number of journals and magazines, including the National Interest, the Diplomat: APAC, World Politics Review, and the American Prospect. Dr. Farley is also a founder and senior editor of Lawyers, Guns and Money.
Eric Jewett
July 27, 2024 at 9:03 am
What is the problem in the Navy today that they can’t take good enough as an answer? Everything needs to be perfect and that means they can never put down the pen (literally and figuratively) and start implementing. My personal preference for the SSC post-LCS was to build a stripped-down version of the DDG-51 similar to what the tried with the ‘phibs. You’d still get economy of scale in the shipyards with so much commonality remaining and that would carry on to training and maintenance in the fleet. Plus, that hull form would give you tons of space to grow capabilities later.
Andy
July 27, 2024 at 12:35 pm
I was and continue to hope similarly for a Flt IV Burke. We have enough flt III under contract.
3-4 face EASR
Remove the bow sonar and add Captas-4
Strip 2 LM2500 and add in 2 gensets, possibly remove the aft genset
Add in the hybrid plant developed for Flt IIA
Possible swap mk 45 for Mk 110 to reduce some headcount.
Dan Farrand
July 27, 2024 at 2:47 pm
The problems can be solved by having the ships built in Japan or S. Korea. De industrialization of the US is complete and will take generations to fix. In the meantime our vassal states can still be compelled to accept USD in payment for hardware and we can produce unlimited USD out of thin air.
James Drouin
July 27, 2024 at 10:11 am
With respect to the author, anyone who has been keeping tabs on the Constellation Class Frigate program knows that it is ALREADY “The U.S. Navy’s Next Self-Created Disaster”.
The program is the boulder at the top of the hill that is ALREADY rolling and has all the momentum it needs to roll straight into disasterville.
And there is only one solution:
Shut the program down IN ITS ENTIRITY on January 20, not another weld laid, not another hatch installed, not another coat of paint applied, nothing. Then, fire a whole lot of Admirals and Captains at the Pentagon (a few summary executions for treason might be in order), and tell everyone else (if they haven’t gotten the message by that point) “NO MORE BOONDOGGLES”.
cbvand
July 27, 2024 at 10:21 am
The Navy selected a proven design, already in service and then every swinging Richard with at least one star began to make changes. Idiocracy thy name is synonymous with Navy leadership.
Andy
July 27, 2024 at 12:32 pm
The idea the design would ever share much commonality was an impossibility and a lie to get it funded.
RTClorado
July 27, 2024 at 1:37 pm
There are many “angles” in what is wrong with the Navy’s acquisition process. There are “too many cooks” as the old proverb goes. There are no consequences for “bad” or negligent behavior, not all mistakes are malicious. The process for actually building ships is a disaster with little if any competition, it’s competition that drives quality. The design processes have completely abandoned the principle “If it ain’t broke, don’t fix it”, but understanding that technologies have to “mature” through use and evaluation prior to being incorporated. But, what do I know?
Curtis Conway
July 28, 2024 at 7:19 pm
FREMM Parent design ? . . truth is the U.S. Navy have abandon almost any semblance of a FREMM Frigate. As for its mission being designated as leaning to Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) . . . it is hard to prosecute submarines without ASW weapons. No torpedo tubes, and Vertical Launch Antisubmarine Rockets (VL-ASROC) has not been listed as coming out of the Mk41 VLS system. The ASW Helo cannot do it all. It can be broke, on other missions, or simply not present.
As for systems on board . . . the FREMM is designed as a Condition Based Maintenance (CBM) vessel. This requires maintenance only when needed . . . not on a predetermined and periodic schedule for the majority of the mechanical equipment. This limits/reduces man-hours required for underway periods thus reducing manning, and the Navy like all the other services are having huge manning problems at present.
The ships length, beam, and draft growth was made to INCREASE space for future systems and growth. Some of that space is already being planned to upgrade electrical power generation capacity. Size of the electrical drive motors can change to meet the need. No one will make the decision and move out. Lack of Leadership is the problem.
The statement that the design “may make it more difficult to modify the ships with advanced technology in the future…” is propaganda. The U.S. Navy has standard systems and equipment on destroyer, cruisers, and other vessels that can be used and the CBM systems can be developed by the Navy for use on all Surface Combatants saving time, maintenance dollars, and reducing manning. No one in the U.S. Navy has the vision or gumption to do what is required to build the Land Based Test Engineering Site (as ORDERED by Congress) to pursue this very development.
Leadership is the primary problem here AGAIN! Scaling design and substituting systems should not be that hard and the trougher nuts to crack are done over time at the LBTES as systems are developed for the ENTIRE U.S. Navy Fleet. No One In The U.S. Navy thinks like this! They are hamstrung by their own paradigm and competence…or lack thereof.
No Program Manager with the POWER to make decisions and move the program forward exist. Only bureaucrats. That is a huge problem. No Plan of Action & Milestones has been developed either. THAT is the primary tool for keeping things on track, and preparing for what is to come. There is not plan for the Combat Systems Ship’s Qualification Trials (CSSQT) and the first one will most likely be at Wallops Island, but the program will go broke trying to do all CSSQTs there. A new missile range needs to be developed in Lake Superior.
Roger Maris
July 27, 2024 at 1:44 pm
Read The Oregon Files Books
by Clive Cussler
That is a ship.
Jacksonian Libertarian
July 27, 2024 at 10:10 pm
Industrial Age dumb weapons (armored vehicles, cannons, manned aircraft, warships, etc.) are obsolete.
Information Age Remotely controlled drones can do all those weapons tasks at greater speed, less cost, and less risk.
The DOD is trapped in the “Sunk Costs Fallacy” spending 90% of its resources trying to defend obsolete weapon systems whose combat power is in the toilet.
Where are America’s overwhelming drone swarms?
Geoff
July 27, 2024 at 10:38 pm
“Industrial Age dumb weapons (armored vehicles, cannons, manned aircraft, warships, etc.) are obsolete.”
War in Ukraine is largely being fought with trenches and dumb cannon artillery barrages. Precision weapons too small to use inertial nav systems are fairly useless due to widespread GPS jamming.
Next up, we’re now fielding satcom jammers…soon everyone will. That’s going to have a dramatic impact on all of Information Age systems. Precision weapons, communications, all of the information systems and hardware dependent upon them. And that’s not even considering the impacts when both sides of a peer-near peer war get serious and start popping satellites.
All the war porn videos are from a “drones eye view”, which dramatically overstates their utility. Useful, but not as overwhelming as most think.
For every new measure, there’s a counter-measure. For every counter-measure, a counter-counter-measure.
While “dumb weapons” never go out of style.
mark richards
July 28, 2024 at 12:01 am
The so-called Industial Age “dumb weapons” the Jacksonian Libertarian spoke of will be around for quite some time. That individual is entitled to his opinion, but to state that drones will replace manned aircraft, warships, armored vehicles and even Artillery is absurd. I doubt if the Jacksonian libertarian ever served in any branch of the U.S. Armed Forces. I served in the U.S. Army from 83 to 85 and from 87 to 89 in the Field Artillery. Drones are useful for reconnaissance, but drones are not going to replace any of the weapons comprising the combat arms of the Army, for instance any time soon. Nor will drones replace Infantry, Special Forces, Rangers Jet and Bomber pilots and so on. And it’s extremely unlikely that the navy will scrap its warships and use drones.
Earl
July 28, 2024 at 10:02 am
The only solution is to take naval ship procurement away from the Navy. Flat out have an independent Bureau or Commission at in the DoD that is not allowed to talk to ANY naval officer. Don’t give the US Navy officials or officers any say in the ships. Let the independent agency decide what the Navy will own and use, issue the ship to them, and order them to make do with the tools given. It is drastic and not the most efficient, but the Navy seems to have bred a culture of incompetency, arrogance, and treasonous level stupidity in its upper officer culture.
Doc Holliday
July 28, 2024 at 12:50 pm
We have entirely too many Admirals and Generals in the US Military. There are way too many chiefs and not enough Indians to effectively get this done. It makes no sense to say you are using a proven design and then literally change everything about the existing design to jam tonnage of weapons and systems on board that it was never designed for. I agree. Go back to DDG51 until someone with long term thinking has a better more cost effective solution.
Nunya Bizness
July 28, 2024 at 2:53 pm
Thank you to the author. When the GAO came out with its report, there was a sputter of storm and fury but nothing after a few days.
The program needs to be “re-scoped”. We’ve read this story before, so just trash it now.
There should be a complete top-down review of the Navy. Not just procurement but everything. Are they set to accomplish their mission.
Curtis Conway
July 28, 2024 at 7:04 pm
FREMM Parent design ? . . truth is the U.S. Navy have abandon almost any semblance of a FREMM Frigate. As for its mission being designated as leaning to Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) . . . it is hard to prosecute submarines without ASW weapons. No torpedo tubes, and Vertical Launch Antisubmarine Rockets (VL-ASROC) has not been listed as coming out of the Mk41 VLS system. The ASW Helo cannot do it all. It can be broke, on other missions, or simply not present.
As for systems on board . . . the FREMM is designed as a Condition Based Maintenance (CBM) vessel. This requires maintenance only when needed . . . not on a predetermined and periodic schedule for the majority of the mechanical equipment. This limits/reduces man-hours required for underway periods thus reducing manning, and the Navy like all the other services are having huge manning problems at present.
The ships length, beam, and draft growth was made to INCREASE space for future systems and growth. Some of that space is already being planned to upgrade electrical power generation capacity. Size of the electrical drive motors can change to meet the need. No one will make the decision and move out. Lack of Leadership is the problem.
The statement that the design “may make it more difficult to modify the ships with advanced technology in the future…” is propaganda. The U.S. Navy has standard systems and equipment on destroyer, cruisers, and other vessels that can be used and the CBM systems can be developed by the Navy for use on all Surface Combatants saving time, maintenance dollars, and reducing manning. No one in the U.S. Navy has the vision or gumption to do what is required to build the Land Based Test Engineering Site (as ORDERED by Congress) to pursue this very development.
Leadership is the primary problem here AGAIN! Scaling design and substituting systems should not be that hard and the trougher nuts to crack are done over time at the LBTES as systems are developed for the ENTIRE U.S. Navy Fleet. No One In The U.S. Navy thinks like this! They are hamstrung by their own paradigm and competence…or lack therof.
Francis Maikisch
July 29, 2024 at 6:23 am
Why do we keep shoveling taxpayers money to such a dysfunctional entity? Unaccounted for trillions since the 90’s, multiple weapons programs are failures and substantially over budget. Zero accountability anywhere to be found. On the contrary, like the rest of the federal govt, failure gets you promoted. Deep reforms are needed at DOD, just like the rest of the federal govt. Nothing works anymore. Or as intended.
RYANKC
August 7, 2024 at 9:36 am
Aye.
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RYANKC
August 7, 2024 at 9:34 am
It’s obvious the senior officer corps in all branches have been retained and advanced for reasons not conducive to efficient and effective warfighting. Rather, they excel at adapting to certain political ideologies and practices.
Tim
August 13, 2024 at 9:58 am
“..Constellation herself is being built even as she is being designed,..” Unbelievable, simply unbelievable.
I’m no expert, but wasn’t this the root of the myriad problems with the Ford? Jesus, whatever happened to “lessons learned”?
Quartermaster
September 8, 2024 at 12:17 pm
A 7200 ton frigate? That’s insane!
Tim
September 9, 2024 at 12:19 pm
Can ANYTHING go right in the Navy these days? Maybe it’s easier if we just throw our hands up and tell the Chinese “ok, you can have the western Pacific, we’ll stay over here”.
James T Matters
September 10, 2024 at 12:10 pm
Build a hull from the 40’s like Salem. Ease up on the armor. Drop the 8″ guns from 9 to 2. Add missiles. Lots of them. Update electronics and propulsion with PROVEN designs.
Repeat.
1KoolKat
September 15, 2024 at 6:56 am
The Constellation project says it all the MIC is gone and will take decades to rebuild. If they are struggling to build a small project frigate. What about the gigantic, huge, enormous nuclear deterrent modernization project underway which is over-budget and behind schedule? We are in deep trouble
Marco Polo
September 22, 2024 at 9:35 am
Only a matter of time before the Marinette shipyard is bankrupt or sold off by the Italians.
Cannot build 6 Frigates for the Dollars to complete 2.5.
Now they are bidding all kinds of other projects looking for work-of which they are staffed or resourced to do, either. Sound familiar?
Navy won’t see a frigate out of the seaway until 2032, or later. So much for useless deterrence in South China Sea.