Key Points and Summary: The main battle tank is not obsolete; its relevance is determined by battlefield context, not by the advent of new technologies like drones.
-Historically, predictions of the tank’s demise, such as after the 1973 Yom Kippur War, have proven false.
-While drones pose a new threat, they also enhance armor’s survivability by providing better reconnaissance. As long as ground forces need to take and hold territory, armored platforms will be essential.
-The future, exemplified by concepts like the AbramsX, lies in integrating tanks into a multi-domain network with AI, robotics, and advanced active protection, ensuring their continued dominance in land combat.
From WWI to AbramsX: The Enduring Power of the Main Battle Tank
Innovation in the consumer space is as much a matter of choice, taste, and government and corporate influence as it is a byproduct of technological change. When new products and standards are widely adopted, the market shifts to producing what people want—out goes VHS, in comes DVDs, out goes CDs, in comes streaming, and so it goes. Weapons development does not follow the same pattern.
Weapons systems are about lethality—as long as they are useful and effective at killing enemies, they never truly become obsolete. The US Army, for instance, disbanded horseback cavalry in the 1940s, only to deploy special forces on horseback to fight in Afghanistan. From mines to bayonets and artillery, weapons borne by doughboys in the trenches in World War I are carried and employed by Ukrainian soldiers today defending their country—from trenches. Weapons, unlike fashion, don’t go out of style on a whim.
The continued utility of killing systems is determined more by context than consumer choice. Remember the battleship supposedly made obsolete by aircraft carriers in World War II? The US did not decommission its last battleship, the USS Missouri (BB-63), until 1992. The ship was taken out of service not because it was no longer a combat-effective weapons system but primarily because the Navy determined the cost and manpower required to run the ship were prohibitive.
All About Armor
When Israel’s enemies widely deployed cheap and effective anti-armor systems in the 1973 Yom Kippur War, many predicted the end of the age of armor (ignoring that armor units undertook some of the strategically decisive operations in the conflict). Yet, almost thirty years later, during Operation Desert Storm, the American Abrams tank led the way in a lightning campaign that swept through the Iraqi armed forces. Even today, tanks are widely deployed in the Russia-Ukraine war.
Historically, why armor has succeeded or failed in combat today appears little different from when it was first introduced on the battlefield during World War I. Success or failure is more a matter of tactics than mechanics. When tanks are poorly employed, they perform poorly. When tank crews are not well trained, well supplied, and well supported, tanks become metal coffins, not combat systems.
On the battlefield, rather than technology driving weapons systems into obsolescence, often the opposite happens. Technological advances make weapons more effective. Cost-effective suicide drones, for example, have proven competent tank killers. Drones can also act as scouts, helping identify threats that make tanks more survivable. Indeed, armor is one of the greatest beneficiaries of multidimensional warfare, which brings capabilities from the air, space, cyberspace, and the electromagnetic spectrum to the warfighter on the ground.
As long as weapons systems with armored protection are needed to go into harm’s way, tanks have a role in battle. Indeed, with the increasing capacity to deliver battlefield enablers into the combat space, armor will likely have a more significant role in land combat.
Armor Future and AbramsX
How do we know if AbramsX is the right system for the future?
The Army has said that the prototype demonstrator must deliver, drawing specifically from the lessons of the fighting in Ukraine and Russia, a better “active protection system, lighter weight, more survivability, and of course reduced logistical burdens as well for the Army.” Capabilities, however, is not the only determinant over whether fielding a new tank is suitable, feasible, and acceptable.
First, and most importantly, the Army only needs a tank if America plans to deter and, if necessary, fight land combat in the future—and where it might do that. A realistic assessment suggests that the US military will be in the conventional deterrence business for the foreseeable future in diverse theaters where the Americans might have to plan for land combat.
Second, friends and allies will need armor as well. The US can ill-afford to lose a defense industrial base capable of designing and manufacturing land combat vehicles.
Third, the multidimensional capabilities the US armed forces will field in the future will likely allow the Americans to deploy an extremely capable and effective armor force.
Capabilities
What is most important for a new generation of tanks to deliver?
Power is everything. The energy demands on future armor are likely to grow dramatically as tanks add AI processing, robotics, tethered drones, on-board protective measures, and other plug-ins that suck power like soda through a straw.
Stealth is cool. Tanks are useless if they are survivable. As self-defense measures proliferate, among the most desirable will be stealth capabilities that prevent armored vehicles from being targeted in the first place. Stealth technology for ground vehicles is crossing the gap to fieldable, capable systems.
Logistics are the lifeblood of war. Who wouldn’t want a tank that weighs nothing and runs on air? There, however, have to be trade-offs. While dropping a few pounds and simplifying maintenance and support is always appreciated, the US Army is always going to deploy with a big logistical tail. Further, the greatest virtue of America’s heavy forces is not getting there fast—but delivering sustainable, robust combat power once they get in theater. So, if trade-offs have to be made, weight and logistics are less of a strategic priority.
Cost counts. With all the advances in advanced manufacturing and modeling, it’s time to start being intolerant of programs that run wildly over budget and bust the timelines for manufacturing and deployment like an overripe melon. US defense spending doesn’t have big margins for waste. For programs to survive, they must deliver on time, cost, and performance.
An Age of Armor and AbramsX
As with most emerging combat systems on land, sea, air, and space, expect a mix of manned and unmanned platforms working together, linked in a network of capabilities, and AI-enabled. That is the way of the future advanced conventional combat power. Armor will likely be part of the mix. Done, right, AbramsX could lead the way.
About the Author: Dr. James Jay Carafano
Dr. James Jay Carafano is a leading expert in national security and foreign policy affairs. Carafano previously served as the Vice President of Heritage Foundation’s Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy and served in the US Army for 25 years. He is an accomplished historian and teacher as well as a prolific writer and researcher. Follow him on X: @JJCarafano.
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