Key Points and Summary – The Air Force once eyed 700+ F-22 Raptors to dominate Cold War skies, but production ended at 186 operational jets. Costs ballooned—about $67B total—with per-jet program averages estimated near $350M and steep sustainment bills.
-After 9/11, strategy shifted from peer-air-superiority to expeditionary ops, weakening the case for a huge Raptor fleet as the multirole, export-friendly F-35 gained priority.
U.S. Air Force maintainers assigned to the 3rd Air Expeditionary Wing prepare F-22 Raptors for take-off on the flightline during exercise Resolute Force Pacific 2025 in Tinian, Northern Mariana Islands, July 19, 2025. The REFORPAC exercise is part of a first-in-a-generation Department-Level Exercise series, employing more than 400 Joint and coalition aircraft and more than 12,000 members at more than 50 locations across 3,000 miles. (U.S. Air Force photo by Airman 1st Class Tala Hunt)
-Congress capped funding, killed additional buys in 2009–10, and imposed a cost ceiling.
-A statutory export ban prevented economies of scale, while low-observable maintenance on a small fleet stayed pricey.
-The Raptor didn’t fail—its world changed before mass fielding could.
Why Did the Air Force Stop At 186 F-22 Raptors?
The F-22 Raptor is a fifth-generation stealth air superiority fighter that remains one of the crown jewels of American air combat capability; however, it was never fielded in the numbers initially expected.
Designed from the start to dominate contested skies, the Raptor combines stealth, supercruise, advanced sensors, and maneuverability to perform suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD), oversee fleet air defense, and even provide escort duties in heavily defended airspace.
And because few aircraft can match the Raptor’s ability to identify and strike adversary fighters without being detected, it serves as a critical asset for U.S. forces, enabling other assets to operate with less risk.
Initially, U.S. Air Force planners envisioned a much larger force of these jets.
On many occasions, officials stated their original intentions to field as many as 700 Raptors. Some sources suggest that planners even considered plans to procure 750 during the later years of the Advanced Tactical Fighter (ATF) program—the U.S. Air Force’s competition in the 1980s to design a next-generation air superiority fighter, which ultimately resulted in the production of the F-22 Raptor.
U.S. Air Force Capt. Nick “Laz” Le Tourneau, F-22 Raptor Aerial Demonstration Team commander, performs an aerial maneuver during the Hyundai Air and Sea show at Miami, Florida, May 25, 2025. The F-22 Aerial Demonstration Team highlights cutting-edge airpower, precision, skill, all while reinforcing public confidence in the Air Force’s ability to protect and defend. (U.S. Air Force photo by Staff Sgt. Lauren Cobin)
Over time, however, program documents and public statements often described the 700 figure as the yardstick of an ideal inventory – and not necessarily a realistic number.
And while the figure was certainly ambitious, it was for a reason: the Cold War. Planners assumed at the time that they would need sufficient aircraft to handle contested airspace over Europe or Asia, as well as two large regional wars.
Planners also expected to need sufficient aircraft to achieve high sortie rates in dense threat environments. The idea? To combine sheer numbers with the Raptor’s technological edge to create a deadly, formidable air force that also served as a deterrent.
But the U.S. Air Force not only abandoned those numbers – it never even came close to them. In fact, only 186 operational Raptors were ever built before production was halted. Instead of the planned fleet, a combination of funding constraints, changing strategic priorities, and the rise of the multi-role F-35 fighter jet, along with congressional pushback and maintenance burdens, ultimately led to the end of the Raptor program.
F-22 Raptor Cost
Among the most decisive factors behind the end of the F-22 program was cost. By the time production wound down, the Raptor had accrued approximately $67.2 billion in program costs, encompassing both research and development, as well as procurement expenses. That pushed the average unit cost higher, with later analyses estimating a figure of around $350 million per jet once the total program expenditure was distributed across the limited fleet.
U.S. Air Force Maj. Josh Gunderson, F-22 Demo Team commander, enters into the Raptor Slide during the Millville Airshow, Sept. 3, 2021, at Millville Army Airfield, Millville, New Jersey. During the Raptor Slide the aircraft actually slides down and backwards under control before Gunderson adjusts the aircrafts position and powers out of the maneuver. (U.S. Air Force photo by Staff Sgt. Don Hudson)
The expenses, however, did not end there. A 2017 Air Force study concluded that restarting production would cost $50 billion for 194 more Raptors, including at least $10 billion in restart costs alone.
With such small production numbers, the Air Force never achieved the economies of scale needed to reduce costs sufficiently, leaving each jet not only expensive to build but costly to sustain.
Ultimately, both Congress and the Department of Defense decided that the marginal cost of additional F-22s could not be justified against the backdrop of competing priorities such as the F-35 – an aircraft that promised a larger, more versatile fleet at a lower cost.
Strategy
While cost was a decisive factor, it may have ultimately mattered less had the strategic rationale underpinning the F-22’s development not changed as well. The aircraft was initially conceived in the late Cold War environment to establish uncontested air superiority inside heavily defended adversary airspace. But with the Soviet threat gone and U.S. forces redirected elsewhere, the original argument for fielding such a large fleet of F-22s no longer applied.
In the post-Cold War era, defense strategy shifted toward power projection and expeditionary operations—military actions in a foreign territory that involve rapid deployment. The massive fighter fleets once deemed necessary to contest European or Asian airspace became less compelling once mission demands shifted to Iraq and Afghanistan.
Congress
Congress also played a decisive role in curtailing the F-22 program, and it did so based on the above reasoning. In 2009, the Senate voted 58-40 to strike $1.75 billion in additional funding for new Raptors, effectively eliminating any expansion beyond the number already funded.
The House then followed by approving an amendment to strip out a down payment for twelve more jets in its 2010 defense bill. Then, Congress imposed a $40.9 billion cost cap on the program – meaning that if the project exceeded that limit, the Air Force would have to absorb overruns from other accounts.
…And More
Among the plethora of reasons the F-22 program was finally wound down was an export ban. Since FY 1998, U.S. appropriations law has explicitly barred the sale or licensing of the F-22 to foreign governments. It was a measure taken at the time to guard America’s advanced stealth and sensor technologies from being exploited by adversaries. That prohibition meant the Raptor never benefited from export economies of scale, resulting in higher costs.
At the same time, maintenance and sustainment costs put a heavy strain on the program. In fiscal year 2020 alone, upkeep exceeded $1.6 billion, with challenges stemming from the complex low-observable coatings and the small fleet size, which limited vendor support.
A U.S. Air Force F-22 Raptor performs an aerial demonstration during Aviation Nation 2025 at Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada, April 5, 2025. Aviation Nation is an airshow held at Nellis Air Force Base, showcasing the pride, precision and capabilities of the U.S. Air Force through aerial demonstrations and static displays. The F-22 Raptor performed there to highlight its unmatched agility and air dominance as part of the Air Force’s efforts to inspire, recruit and connect with the public. (U.S. Air Force photo by Staff Sgt. Lauren Cobin)
All of these constraints help explain why the F-22 program ended—not because the aircraft failed, but because it succeeded in a world that was changing rapidly.
Its stealth, performance, and dominance were all very real. Still, the missions, strategic environments, and threat environments all shifted before it could ever be fielded in the numbers planners once anticipated.
One thing is clear: in a world where the Air Force can only now dream of having more F-22 Raptors, this is one call I am sure the Air Force would love to have a do-over on.
About the Author:
Jack Buckby is a British author, counter-extremism researcher, and journalist based in New York who writes frequently for National Security Journal. Reporting on the U.K., Europe, and the U.S., he works to analyze and understand left-wing and right-wing radicalization, and reports on Western governments’ approaches to the pressing issues of today. His books and research papers explore these themes and propose pragmatic solutions to our increasingly polarized society. His latest book is The Truth Teller: RFK Jr. and the Case for a Post-Partisan Presidency.
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