Key Points and Summary – As European diplomats hold last-minute talks to prevent the reimposition of sanctions on Iran, a critical issue threatens to derail any potential deal: Iran’s existing stockpile of highly enriched uranium (HEU).
-Before the recent war with Israel, Iran possessed a significant quantity of near-weapons-grade uranium.
-The exact location and status of this material are now unknown.
-Any new agreement that focuses only on future enrichment while ignoring this existing, recoverable stockpile will fail to prevent Tehran from developing nuclear weapons, as it could provide the fastest pathway to a bomb.
Iran Negotiations Must Focus On Existing Enriched Uranium
European and Iranian diplomats are reportedly set to hold last-minute talks over the future of the Iranian nuclear program.
In a matter of days, Iran faces the prospect of Britain, France, Germany, and the United States triggering a “snapback” mechanism that will reimpose pre-2015 sanctions that were lifted as part of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, better known as the Iran Nuclear Deal.
Representatives from Germany, France, and the United Kingdom – known as the E3 – are expected to meet with their Iranian counterparts today, August 26, according to a spokesperson of the Iranian Foreign Ministry.
The meeting, which was confirmed on Monday, August 25, is expected to focus on what can be done to prevent the reimposition of sanctions that would further isolate Iran, cripple its economy, and hurt its burgeoning missile manufacturing operations. In principle, the Europeans are looking to see how receptive the Iranian regime might be to making concessions over the future of its nuclear program – but if those discussions don’t cover the whereabouts of Iran’s highly enriched uranium (HEU) stockpiles, negotiators will not succeed in preventing the Islamic Republic from building nuclear weapons.
What is HEU, and Where Is It?
Before the 12-Day War, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) verified that Iran had a stockpile of 408.6 kg of uranium enriched up to 60%. According to the IAEA’s quarterly report, published 31 May 2025, Iran’s total enriched-uranium stock, of all levels, was 9,247.6 kg.
Iran’s highest declared level before the strikes was 60%, which is also known as “near-weapons-grade” – short of the 90% required to build a bomb.
Not only does it remain unclear exactly where those stockpiles now are, with most analysts agreeing that they are likely buried beneath the rubble at its Fordow and Natanz sites, but there’s also no telling whether the IAEA’s assessments are accurate. Iran has been accused on multiple occasions of obscuring facts and hiding nuclear assets, in violation of international agreements. Iran may possess uranium enriched to higher levels than those it has declared, and some of its enriched materials may have been stored elsewhere.
In July, a senior Israeli official expressed concern that Iran could recover some of its enriched uranium following U.S. and Israeli strikes. While recovering the uranium would be difficult, the official said, it wouldn’t be impossible – and any attempt to do so would be met with further Israeli strikes. Speaking under the condition of anonymity, the same official, however, said that any attempt to recover the uranium would likely be detected by Israeli intelligence officials.
But what if it isn’t?
Well, if Iran were capable of recovering the uranium – whether it’s buried beneath the rubble of one of its facilities, or if it’s somewhere else entirely – then it could, in theory, allow for the development of nuclear weapons to go ahead.
Writing for Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Edwin Lyman explained in July that Iran “can still build nuclear weapons without further enrichment,” noting that recovering the uranium would solve one of the biggest challenges the country faces in building a nuclear weapon.
“If Iran still has access to some of its HEU stockpile, then direct use of that material may suddenly appear to its leaders as the most attractive and fastest pathway to a bomb, especially if its ability to enrich uranium has indeed been significantly degraded. There may be other chokepoints along the road to weaponization, but access to bomb material would not be one of them,” Lyman notes.
The fact that the West cannot say with certainty how much of Iran’s HEU still exists, how much of it is recoverable, and whether there are undeclared assets hidden elsewhere, underscores the necessity for negotiations to focus on existing assets as well as future plans.
Unless negotiators address the location of that stockpile now, any deal on enrichment alone will leave room for Iran to continue its nuclear program in violation of whatever agreement might be made.
About the Author:
Jack Buckby is a British author, counter-extremism researcher, and journalist based in New York who writes frequently for National Security Journal. Reporting on the U.K., Europe, and the U.S., he works to analyze and understand left-wing and right-wing radicalization, and reports on Western governments’ approaches to the pressing issues of today. His books and research papers explore these themes and propose pragmatic solutions to our increasingly polarized society. His latest book is The Truth Teller: RFK Jr. and the Case for a Post-Partisan Presidency.
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