Donald Trump’s Reckless War at Sea

The Trump Administration’s ongoing military strikes against alleged “narco-terrorists”, on the high seas, has resulted in the deaths of at least 37 foreign nationals. These reckless, unnecessary, pointless and provocative actions are justified by threadbare legal principles and are unbefitting a global superpower.

I began my 40+ year legal career as a Coast Guard JAG officer. During this period, I was also appointed as a Special Assistant United States Attorney and found myself, on numerous occasions, seated at the prosecution table in Federal Court a few feet across the aisle from soon-to-be-convicted seaborne drug smugglers.

The defendants were typically foreign nationals who, in those days, were transporting large quantities of marijuana from South America to the U.S. and whose vessels had been intercepted and seized by U.S. Coast Guard assets.

Several years later, after a three-year stint on the White House staff, I was appointed by President George H. W. Bush as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Drug Enforcement) and helped lead the Pentagon’s global counterdrug program from its infancy. I traveled extensively to Central and South America; particularly the (then) cocaine source countries of the “Andean Ridge” (Bolivia, Colombia and Peru).

Countering drug trafficking and other components of trans-national crime has been an important part of my long career as has been addressing the many complex issues surrounding the use of America’s military in the counterdrug fight.

Until the Trump Administration, our nation has steadfastly resisted the urge to abandon our centuries-long principle that the roles of the military and of law enforcement are fundamentally incompatible. Our warriors are not cops. Nor are our cops warriors. Military force is a blunt instrument, as has been proven in these recent incidents.

There are some fundamental truths that need to be recognized. First, most illegal drugs (and other contraband) entering our nation do so at air, land, and seaports of entry, hidden within the legitimate stream of commerce. We lack the technical and human resources to do a meaningful job of detecting this cargo, so much of it enters unimpeded. In 2024, a truly bipartisan border bill was on the verge of passing when then Candidate Trump ordered his GOP allies to oppose it for purely campaign-related reasons. The bill contained significant funding to help bring new detection technology to aid in screening.

Seaborne drug smugglers use a variety of platforms, from converted fishing trawlers, small freighters, pleasure craft to rudimentary submarines to the ubiquitous “Panga” or “go-fast” boat. I have seen them all.  Drug traffickers are innovative, determined, clever and resilient. They use every resource at their disposal.

For decades, one of our most successful resources has been, and continues to be, the U.S. Coast Guard “HITRON” sea-based, armed helicopters. Typically deployed from cutters patrolling known trafficking routes, the helos pursue the prolific Pangas and use a variety of tactics to stop them including the use of large caliber weapons to fire into boat engines resulting in engine failure. The cutter will then deploy one of its over-the-horizon fast boats whose crews board, search and seize the contraband and arrest the vessel operators.

Unlike the recent military operations that essentially vaporized the suspected drug boats (almost all were Pangas) their crews and cargo, yielding zero forensic value, Coast Guard interdictions typically provide a wealth of intelligence concerning trafficking organizations and the contraband itself. Aside from the sheer brutality of annihilating nearly 40 people who may or may not have posed a legitimate national security threat to the United States, we gained nothing in terms of further understanding the operational intricacies of our alleged adversaries.

There are other troubling aspects to these recent military strikes. Very little information has been released about the locations of these various strikes other than “in international waters of the Caribbean Sea north of Venezuela” or even more vaguely “in the Eastern Pacific Ocean.” It appears that a number of the Caribbean strikes were against vessels operating in known trafficking routes to Trinidad and Tobago where drugs are normally trafficked to Europe and Africa — not to the United States.

President Trump, on several occasions following these strikes has suggested that the vessels were carrying Fentanyl and that each strike could be translated into the saving of 25,000 lives. This is simply untrue. Virtually no Fentanyl is transshipped from South America. Fentanyl precursor chemicals originate almost exclusively from China and recently, to a lesser extent, India. They are shipped to Mexico where clandestine labs produce finished Fentanyl and from where it is shipped, in bulk, and often hidden within the legitimate stream of commerce, through ports of entry.

Since coca cultivation occurs almost entirely within the nations of South America’s Andean Ridge, and its manufacture as a ‘street drug” occurs primarily in Colombia, the suspect vessels were most likely carrying cocaine. Not to diminish the danger posed by cocaine abuse in the United States, but cocaine plays no significant role in the nearly worldwide opioid epidemic fueled by the ready availability of cheap and deadly Fentanyl.  The trafficking in both cocaine and Fentanyl is controlled by powerful cartels, primarily in Mexico.

Questions abound. The Administration has asserted (without proof) that most of the vessels destroyed in the Caribbean were operated by members of the Venezuelan terrorist organization Tren de Aragua.

Granted, the line between narcotics and terrorism can often be quite blurry; however, the Administration has an obligation to its citizens to provide greater detail regarding these heretofore unprecedented actions without disclosing sensitive intelligence such as sources and methods. We need to know how something that, on its face, appears to be nothing more than a law enforcement threat somehow morphed into a national security threat demanding an act of warfare.

Perhaps even more troubling than the use of our military might against vessels that do not present a clear national security threat to the United States, is President Trump’s recent suggestion that he may deploy CIA assets and U.S. military forces to attack land-based targets in Venezuela.

This seems to answer the often-pondered question as to whether we learned anything from our involvement in Vietnam.

About the Author: Robert Kelly

Robert Kelly is a former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense and served in the White House in the Reagan and George H.W. Bush Administrations. He also served as a United States Coast Guard JAG Officer.