Iran’s strangulation of the Strait of Hormuz, one of the world’s vital maritime chokepoints, has added new impetus to its neighbors’ plans to find alternative overland routes to transport their oil to ports around the world. For the Gulf countries, pipelines that can bypass the Strait are a worthwhile insurance policy — not as a completely viable alternative to the Strait.
Nearly one-fifth of the world’s oil moves through that bottleneck every day, underscoring the volume of oil that transits that waterway. As the ongoing war with Iran has shown, even short disruptions can cause chaos. Exporting Gulf oil overland won’t completely eliminate the risks, but it will provide a valuable partial alternative to the Strait of Hormuz.
Tomahawk Block IV Missile. Image Credit: Creative Commons.
Several projects are already either under construction or in various stages of planning and development.
Pipeline Projects
The United Arab Emirates Abu Dhabi Crude Oil Pipeline, or ADCOP, often called the Habshan-Fujairah pipeline, already allows much of the country’s crude to reach the Gulf of Oman without transiting the Strait. Its capacity is around 1.5 million barrels per day. The UAE is now pursuing a second pipeline to Fujairah that would roughly double the country’s Hormuz-bypassing export capacity. And once finished, a substantial amount of Emirati crude could be loaded directly onto tankers outside the Gulf, reducing exposure to disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz.
Iraq is also reviving the Basra-Haditha pipeline and plans to connect southern oil fields to the country’s broader network in the west. The project could eventually provide access to export routes that avoid the Persian Gulf entirely, including links to Jordan’s Red Sea port of Aqaba or other Mediterranean nodes if regional infrastructure there expands. As Baghdad seeks greater export flexibility, construction has gained new momentum.
In the meantime, Saudi Arabia can already leverage the region’s biggest Strait of Hormuz bypass pipeline: the East-West pipeline, which carries Saudi crude from the Eastern Province to the Red Sea port of Yanbu. Riyadh is planning to increase the capacity of that pipeline by another 2 million barrels per day (bpd), which would allow more crude to reach global markets without transiting the Strait. Combined with existing capacity, the expansion would further strengthen Saudi Arabia’s ability to restrict exports during wars or other crises.
USS Iowa Tomahawk Box. National Security Journal Photo.
But despite the advantages that these pipeline projects offer, they are not without their own security challenges and, crucially, do not eliminate risk entirely.
The Risks
Pipelines are fixed, unlike tankers, which move through international waters. They are, consequently, vulnerable to missile strikes, drone attacks, sabotage, and potentially cyberattacks against pumping stations and control systems. Saudi Arabia’s East-West pipeline has already demonstrated this vulnerability. In 2019, drones struck pumping stations along the pipeline route, causing a temporary disruption to operations. Long pipelines that cross sparsely populated deserts are difficult to monitor continuously, making them juicy targets of opportunity during periods of regional tension.
Export terminals and the ends of oil pipelines are other vulnerabilities. Fujairah, Yanbu, and future Red Sea or Mediterranean outlets could very well become targets during a broader regional war. Moving these exports away from Hormuz shifts the location of risks and disruptions but does not eliminate them altogether.
The Limits
While potentially attractive in terms of risk and economics, pipeline capacity is well below the total volume of crude normally shipped through the Strait of Hormuz during more peaceful times, with around 20 million bpd of oil and petroleum products passing through. Even if the combined capacity of existing and proposed pipelines were realized, a substantial share of Gulf exports would depend on maritime shipment through Hormuz, and some producers — particularly Qatar and Kuwait — have very few practical alternatives to utilizing the Strait for their exports.
These projects are, in essence, a geopolitical hedge against future disruption, not a complete replacement for the Strait of Hormuz. They do have the potential to improve regional — and, as a consequence, global — resilience by allowing producers to maintain part of their exports if shipping via Hormuz becomes untenable. These projects also undercut Iran’s leverage over the Gulf countries, thanks to the Strait.
But even an extensive regional pipeline network cannot fully replicate the capacity and efficiency of a maritime route. Even if the previously mentioned pipeline networks are completed, Hormuz will remain an important avenue for Gulf exports. Pipelines reduce exposure to disruption, but don’t make the Strait a completely redundant route for the region.
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About the Author: Caleb Larson
Caleb Larson is an American multiformat journalist based in Berlin, Germany. His work covers the intersection of conflict and society, focusing on American foreign policy and European security. He has reported from Germany, Russia, and the United States. Most recently, he covered the war in Ukraine, reporting extensively on the war’s shifting battle lines from Donbas and writing on the war’s civilian and humanitarian toll. Previously, he worked as a Defense Reporter for POLITICO Europe. You can follow his latest work on X.
