Warsaw, Poland – On 30 August, the Russian government extended a ban on the export of diesel fuel oil, marine fuel, and gas oil by producers. This will keep these bans in place past the originally planned end point at the end of August until 30 September. According to reports by Germany’s Deutsche Welle, this extension is designed to stabilize the Russian domestic petrol and other fuels market.
While this extension will add a month to the previous 31 August expiration date for fuel producers, a broader ban on several types of fuel exports will remain in effect until 31 January 2027. Having been through one round of fuel shortages, with motorists queueing for miles to fill their tanks, Russia is now facing a second wave of shortfalls that have even reached major cities like Moscow.
Russian officialdom has explained that the cause of this latest crisis in fuel supplies is due to “unscheduled repairs at oil refineries.”
But it is clear to all of those who have been following the situation that the decline in the availability of fuel is due to a continuing campaign of Ukrainian drone strikes on Russian oil facilities.
The original shortages that were seen earlier in the summer were caused by Kyiv’s long-range drone attacks as well. But there has been no let-up since, with attacks on Russia’s domestic fuel production, the terminals and oil ports used for the export of unrefined oil, and petrol products as a whole.
This targeting of oil refineries has now resulted in what is now a record level of 21 Ukrainian attacks on oil refineries that took place throughout the entire month of August. The targets hit included four facilities that are ranked among Russia’s ten largest refineries.
These particular sites supply fuel to the country’s major industrial regions and some of its most densely populated areas.
20 Hours to Fill Up in Crimea
Russia’s petroleum industry has been so damaged — and at many facilities shut down altogether — that the data from EA Analytics indicate that Russian oil refining volume has plummeted to its lowest level in over two decades.
In August, the average output level was just 3.8 million barrels per day.
This is well below the traditional summertime output, which typically ranges from 5.3 to 5.5 million barrels per day. This is the production tempo required to meet the combined effects of increased seasonal use by motorists going on holiday and demand for agricultural production.
This drastic decline in refining levels has had a predictable impact on all domestic supplies. During the first three weeks of August, petrol production and domestic deliveries fell by nearly 20 percent year-on-year.
At the same time, diesel production declined by more than 23 percent.
As one would expect, this has produced retail shortages in many of Russia’s regions.
As was the case with fuel shortfalls and the first major output reductions at the beginning of the summer, restrictions are again being imposed at the pump, limiting the number of liters each motorist can purchase.
In June, this saw motorists in Crimea limited to purchasing as little as 20 liters, slightly more than five gallons, at a time.
In many of these instances, waiting in a queue for up to 20 hours in order to fill up with even this small amount was not uncommon.
No Relief in Site
The Kremlin had previously attempted to insulate Moscow’s population from the worst of the crisis by increasing shipments to the capital. This was facilitated by sending in shipments that had originally been planned for delivery to eastern Russia.
This then caused an already inadequate fuel supply in at least 10 other regions – including Krasnodar, Primorsky, and Krasnoyarsk – to reach near-collapse proportions.
By mid-August, several major petrol station chains in Moscow, including Gazprom Neft and Tatneft, introduced less restrictive limits ranging from 40 to 60 liters per vehicle for both gasoline and diesel. But AI-95 petrol, the second-highest octane normally available, has been the most difficult to find.
This grade has been disappearing from numerous stations operated by Rosneft, NefteMagistral, and Teboil, with prices soaring to 120 rubles ($1.50) per liter.
There also appears to be little chance that the supply crisis will improve anytime soon. Forecasts from IA Analytics are that Russian companies could increase oil refining throughput to approximately 4.2 million barrels per day by September. But the upward trend is not considered likely to continue.
Any further recovery in production will depend on the condition of the damaged refineries and how soon they could be brought back up to normal capacity. Any new Ukrainian strikes on oil-refining infrastructure could also prevent Russia’s oil sector from recovering to its previous oil-processing and fuel-production volumes.
S&P Global now reports at least 26 Russian refineries are facing shutdowns, and many other production facilities have remained offline throughout the summer. Other energy analysts warn the fuel crisis could worsen in early September as several major Russian plants and the Belarusian Novopolotsk refinery will close for scheduled seasonal maintenance.
The situation takes its toll in numerous ways, including an increase in reports of social fragmentation.
People are “withdrawing into narrower circles and avoiding broader discussion,” according to another report from Deutsche Welle.
“People are mad…and blame the West for all their troubles. Life has become far poorer, duller and more dangerous than before the war,” noted one subscriber to the German news service. “People either shut down or cut off any conversation about life and the war immediately. Almost no one is left putting on a brave face or posturing.”
About the Author: Reuben F. Johnson
Reuben F. Johnson has thirty-six years of experience analyzing and reporting on foreign weapons systems, defense technologies, and international arms export policy. Johnson is the Director of Research at the Casimir Pulaski Foundation. He is also a survivor of the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. He worked for years in the American defense industry as a foreign technology analyst and later as a consultant for the U.S. Department of Defense, the Departments of the Navy and Air Force, and the governments of the United Kingdom and Australia. In 2022-2023, he won two awards in a row for his defense reporting. He holds a bachelor’s degree from DePauw University and a master’s degree from Miami University in Ohio, specializing in Soviet and Russian studies. He lives in Warsaw.
