Key Points – The October 2, 2021, collision of the USS Connecticut submarine (SSN-22) with a dangerous undersea seamount in the South China Sea was significantly influenced by a poor command climate and pre-existing leadership failures under Commander Cameron Aljilani.
-Investigations revealed a “tense relationship” between crew and staff, and Aljilani had a record of poor command performance, including a prior pier allision that did not result in his relief.
-The seamount crash, which caused heavy bow damage and 11 injuries, was ultimately attributed to failures in communication and adherence to safety protocols by the command team, leading to Aljilani’s relief and disciplinary actions for other officers.
Command Climate on USS Connecticut Submarine Resulted in Seamount Crash
Few sailors serving in the U.S. Navy’s Silent Service have to face a disaster. They are well-trained to deal with tragic contingencies, and if these protocols are followed effectively, they can help avoid the worst circumstances. Sometimes, accidents do happen, and submarines can go off the rails. This is the true story of the USS Connecticut’s flirtation with disaster.
The Connecticut, a Seawolf-class fast attack boat, was patrolling in the South China Sea on October 2, 2021. It hit a sea mount that the navigation system did not catch. The Connecticut was having trouble with its sonar at the time, and this may have contributed to the accident. There was heavy damage after the wreck, and it initially looked like the sub was not going to survive.
At the time of the crash, the Connecticut was performing a humanitarian evacuation (HUMEVAC) transit. Sometimes, a sub’s crew will have a family or medical situation that necessitates a return to shore, allowing a sailor to leave the boat. Also, the sub could have been picking up a VIP from land.
Background of Extensive Problems
The problems for the Connecticut started before the deployment. The sub was based out of Naval Base Kitsap-Bremerton in Washington State. Sailors admitted to the investigatory body that there were some negative command climate situations on the vessel. The enlisted personnel may not have had faith in the command team. The final report determined that there was a “tense relationship between the crew and the staff.”
The Sub’s Commander Had a Lackluster Record
For these problems, the sub’s captain, Commander Cameron Aljilani, was counseled by his superior officer and notified that the situation on the Connecticut needed to be improved. Aljilani’s fitness report stated that he needed to fix his “command’s overall performance, lack of improvement, and reluctance to accept feedback.”
The situation on the sub was further undermined because there were bedbugs on board – a problem that sapped morale.
There Was Another Incident That Presaged the Later Crash
It got worse. In 2021, the Connecticut hit a pier in what could have been a grave situation but was later only considered a less serious “allision” instead of a collision. It was at this time that Aljilani should have been relieved, but he remained in command.
The crew was retrained on basic safety duties following that incident to improve readiness and rehearse tasks that would prevent the boat from experiencing a similar problem again.
A report from the allision recommended that Aljilani receive disciplinary action – perhaps a letter in his personnel file that would have hurt his chances to be promoted in the future.
Leadership Team’s Dereliction of Duty
The command team in charge of the boat during the allision was also scathingly indicted for dereliction of duty. These were the same people who were in charge during the later collision with the Sea Mount. It appears that the Connecticut should have never left the shore with that particular command team.
Aljilani was finally relieved after the Sea Mount crash. The group of enlisted personnel and officers were also formally admonished for their leadership failures. The Executive Officer also received punishment.
“There were also recommendations for nonjudicial punishments for the submarine’s navigator (NAV) and assistant navigator (ANAV) at the time of the accident, along with the officer of the deck (OOD) and quartermaster of the watch (QMOW) who were on duty when the ground occurred. Chief of the Boat Cory Rodgers was recommended for formal counseling ‘regarding his duties and responsibilities to uphold standards,’” according to the War Zone.
The final investigation revealed that these individuals did not communicate with each other, and that led to the crash. Orders were not heard and were not followed.
It Could Have Been Worse for Submarine and Crew
The crash into the sea mount created significant damage to the bow and the spherical sonar array. The sub started sinking back down in what could have been the undoing of it. The commander ordered an “emergency, low-pressure blow of the main ballast tanks.”
This allowed the sub to survive, and the nuclear power plant was not damaged. The bow dome was barely attached after the wreck. Then, it was lost during the voyage back to Guam.
Eleven sailors were hurt during the crash. The report mentioned two injuries. One suffered a cut to the head and a concussion. Another had a wound to his clavicle.
This may have been avoided with a different commander of the sub. Curiously, Aljilani was not relieved sooner. The Navy has fired officers for much less transgressions before. This will be remembered as an accident that resulted from a complex chain of factors. Sailors and officers had low morale, failed to fulfill their duties in dangerous situations, and did not adhere to safety protocols. All of this led up to the wreck.
The Navy was forced to replace the Connecticut’s bow and sonar dome. After a painstakingly long and slow voyage from Guam to San Diego, it was finally at dry dock in July 2023 at Puget Sound Naval Shipyard in Bremerton, Washington, for the work. The Navy determined that the sub would eventually be restored to full-time duty since the propulsion plant was not damaged.
The saga of the Connecticut showed that even the most elite officers and sailors of the U.S. submarine service can be afflicted with poor performance and unsatisfactory teamwork. The Navy should be credited for conducting an extensive investigation that assigned blame fairly evenly. Hopefully, this case will be studied by sailors and officers in various training schools for the Silent Service. The stakes are too high for preventable accidents to happen that could have resulted in the complete loss of the sub and its crew.
About the Author: Dr. Brent M. Eastwood
Brent M. Eastwood, PhD is the author of Don’t Turn Your Back On the World: a Conservative Foreign Policy and Humans, Machines, and Data: Future Trends in Warfare plus two other books. Brent was the founder and CEO of a tech firm that predicted world events using artificial intelligence. He served as a legislative fellow for U.S. Senator Tim Scott and advised the senator on defense and foreign policy issues. He has taught at American University, George Washington University, and George Mason University. Brent is a former U.S. Army Infantry officer. He can be followed on X @BMEastwood.
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