North Korea: A ‘Game Changer’ in Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine?

Will an infusion of fresh troops from North Korea significantly impact the war in Ukraine? Not a lot. However, the deployment of more North Korean soldiers to Russia in support of the war with Ukraine is important if it is simply a very small part of a much larger picture. It has now been confirmed by a plethora of sources that more North Korean combat troops are going to be fighting in the war Russia is waging against Ukraine.

North Korea Enters the Ukraine War: A Game Changer?

The questions that arise from this are why now, what personnel are being deployed, what is the bigger picture of North Korean proliferation to Russia in support of the war in Ukraine, is the proliferation North Korea is providing to Russia a “game changer” in the conflict with Ukraine, and of course, what is this likely to mean in the long term?

North Korea Soldiers. Image Credit: KCNA/North Korean State Media.

North Korea is reportedly in the process—if it is not already complete—of deploying an additional 1,000-3,000 troops to the Ukraine conflict in support of Russian forces. These numbers range suspiciously close to the number of reported casualties that the 12,000 North Korean Special Operations Forces (SOF) troops already deployed have suffered thus far in the conflict.

According to sources in the press quoting South Korea’s National Intelligence Service, the North Koreans had approximately 300 dead and 2,700 wounded as of January. These figures seem small compared to the 2,000 dead a week that the Russians are reportedly suffering. Of course, the North Koreans have far fewer troops in the conflict. Thus, the new troops sent to Russia may simply be replacement troops for the casualties the North Koreans have taken thus far.

Reportedly, in 2022, North Korea offered up 100,000 troops to support the fight. That appears unlikely to happen now, but the North Koreans have contributed to the Russian war machine in much more significant ways in terms of both largesse and lethality.

North Korea in Ukraine: By the Numbers

The amount of troops North Korea has sent to Russia for combat is not nothing. In fact, when compared to other troop deployments such as North Korean SOF (and sometimes other units) sent to places such as Angola, Mozambique, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, and most recently, Syria (during the Syrian Civil War), this deployment has been considerably more significant in numbers—though it may end up being shorter in time duration.

The North Korean troops sent to Russia are reportedly the best trained, best fed, and best equipped that Pyongyang has to send. Yet, because of the relatively small personnel numbers (roughly 12,000 men), they are a small and minor (if symbolic) contribution to the overall and significant part of the war effort that North Korea is contributing to.

HWASONG-18 ICBM North Korea. Image Credit: North Korean state media.

Another important element to consider is the cry from many pundits that the North Koreans are simply being used as “cannon fodder.” While the North Korean SOF have taken heavy casualties, it is certainly not more or at a higher rate than their counterparts in the Russian army, and Ukrainian forces have reportedly been impressed with their bravery and discipline.

Arms Proliferation

What are the other contributions North Korea is making to Russia’s war against Ukraine? The numbers are actually quite staggering. By January 2024, the list of arms North Korea had transferred to Russia included short-range ballistic missiles (SRBM), anti-air missiles, and anti-tank missiles, as well as several types of artillery. In addition, North Korea had, by this time, transferred rifles, rocket launchers, rockets, mortars, and shells along with a great deal of ammunition.

In fact, by February of 2024, the US State Department reported that North Korea had exported more than 10,000 containers of munitions or munitions-related materials to Russia—roughly all in the first year of Pyongyang’s proliferation to Moscow’s effort against Ukraine. This contribution was a vast and unprecedented number. Military weapons analyst Joost Oliemans stated at the time that these deliveries reportedly primarily consisted of “120-millimeter mortars, 122mm and 152 mm artillery shells and 122 mm rockets.”

The shipments continued in 2024, and the volume of weapons did not slow down.  In fact, in 2024, the North Koreans added long-range 170MM self-propelled artillery to the mix, 240MM multiple rocket launchers, and “Bul-sae” anti-tank guided missile systems to the mix (among other systems) while continuing to supply SRBM and heavy artillery at a high and steady rate—along with many other types of conventional weapons systems and ammunition. By early 2025, it was widely assessed that North Korea had shipped around 20,000 containers to Russia containing military systems and ammunition.

And of note, North Korea has reportedly been responsible for more than 50% of the ammunition used by the Russians in this war and about a third of the ballistic missiles used. In early 2025, according to press reports, North Korea had made more than $6 billion in profits from military proliferation to Russia. The proliferation includes many conventional weapons systems and hundreds of ballistic missiles.

Russian President Vladimir Putin (R) meets with North Korea’s leader Kim Jong Un in Vladivostok, Russia April 25, 2019.

This activity and proliferation of systems from North Korea that are essentially copies of systems Pyongyang originally got from Russia can be head-scratching. One is tempted to ask why. The answer lies in the way the Russian army operates. The Russian military is a blunt instrument, unlike American or NATO forces, which strive to use precision targeting. Thus, this campaign consisted of Russia firing millions of artillery rounds, thousands of missiles, and many other conventional systems at its disposal. Moscow simply does not have the resources to pump munitions at the present rate into Ukrainian military units, cities, and towns without also being supplied by outside entities.

Enter North Korea. Since North Korea’s systems are essentially copies of old Soviet or Russian systems, their compatibility and inclusion fairly quickly into combat is a relatively easy task for the Russian army.

Thus, if one is to ask, as I did at the beginning of this essay, are the 12,000 troops the North Koreans have interjected into combat at Russia’s request a game changer? The answer would be no, not if one considers them alone. But the overall North Korean contribution to the war in Ukraine can be called nothing but a game changer. Anyone following this war would have to be blind not to assess just that.

When one state is supplying more than half of the ammunition for another state in a war dominated by artillery and rockets, of course the inclusion of that state into the military supply system is a game changer. North Korea is precisely that—at least as long as the war continues. It is also important to realize that to the North Korean government, SOF troops are simply a weapons system to be proliferated, like Koksan 170MM artillery or Bul-sae ATGM’s. The big picture is the money generated by the proliferation and the ability it gives the Kim regime to continue and maintain its key objectives.North Korea Will Be Part of the Ukraine War for the Long Haul

North Korean ICBM. Image Credit: KCNA/North Korean State Media.

What will this mean in the long term? North Korea is currently receiving Russian assistance with several of its military programs. Pyongyang also receives foodstuffs, money and fuel from Russia like never before since the end of the Cold War. So now the question arises: how will all of that go when the war with Ukraine is over, and Russia no longer needs North Korea’s weapons?

Only time will tell. Thus, it is in North Korea’s interest for this war to go on as long as possible. Let us hope that does not happen.

About the Author: Dr. Bruce E. Bechtol Jr.

Dr. Bruce E. Bechtol Jr. is a professor of Political Science at Angelo State University. He is also the president of the International Council on Korean Studies and a fellow at the Institute for Corean American Studies. The author of five books dealing with North Korea, his latest work is entitled North Korean Military Proliferation in the Middle East and Africa.