Published on August 18, 2025, 12:12 PM EDT – Key Points and Summary – Today’s Russian Navy is a smaller, “green water” version of its Soviet predecessor, focused primarily on coastal defense rather than global power projection.
-Hobbled by the collapse of its shipbuilding industry, the fleet’s surface capabilities are limited, and its sole aircraft carrier, the Admiral Kuznetsov, is likely to be scrapped.
-The Russian Navy’s primary strength lies in its modern submarine fleet and its emphasis on long-range hypersonic missiles like the Kalibr and Tsirkon.
-While these weapons provide a potent offensive punch, the navy as a whole lacks the strategic reach and carrier-based airpower to rival the U.S. or other blue-water navies.
The Russian Navy On the Comeback Trail or Sinking?
The Soviet Navy of the 1960s–1980s operated large surface ships, nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines, and several aircraft carriers complete with naval aviation wings. Its role was never to retain control of sea lanes across the globe. Although it possessed a power-projection capability, thanks especially to its ballistic missile submarine force, the Soviet Navy’s primary objective was littoral defense and coastal patrol. Its goal was to deny those spaces to NATO naval vessels.
It is true that some of the Soviet Navy’s largest warships, such as Kirov-class battlecruisers or Slava-class cruisers, did have the capabilities needed to push NATO carrier strike groups back to sea and away from important Soviet naval nodes in Okhotsk, the Barents Sea, or other areas.
However, they were not designed to support amphibious operations or respond to crises around the globe. And while the Soviet Navy did have overseas bases, those postings often were used to support regimes friendly to the Soviet Union.
Today’s Russian Navy is tasked with a very similar mission and has a similar set of tools with which to accomplish the littoral defense mission, though at a smaller scale than the Soviet Navy. The 1990s collapse of Russia’s shipbuilding industry – much of which occurred, ironically, in Ukraine – has hampered the Russian Navy’s ability to build warships.
A period of modest modernization in the 2000s and 2010s helped boost capabilities and hull numbers, although this initiative did not aim to drastically expand the Russian Navy’s blue-water capabilities, but rather to revive a gutted industry.
Consequently, the Russian Navy today could be better described as a green water navy, regionally dominant in Russia’s coastal areas and its near-abroad, but lacking the rapid-response, global deployment capabilities of the U.S. Navy.
In practical terms, the Russian Navy’s submarine fleet is perhaps its strongest component. Many of the Russian submarines are nuclear-powered, giving them a range constrained only by crew sustainment and periodic maintenance requirements. And like the U.S. Navy, some Russian Navy nuclear submarines are also nuclear-armed, making them the silent, underwater component of Russia’s nuclear triad.
A recent and very detailed breakdown of the Russian Navy’s submarine capabilities is available from H I Sutton, a British defense analyst. It is well worth the watch.
Operational Nodes and Focus
The majority of Russia’s naval operations originate from the Northern and Baltic Seas, and the Pacific Ocean – strategic locations from which the Russian Navy can operate in or near Russian waters and enjoy some protection from Russia’s defensive umbrella.
One exception to this is Russia’s Black Sea Fleet, which has been battered into retreat by Ukraine – a country with virtually no navy to speak of. Using homegrown Neptune missiles and extremely innovative unmanned naval drones, Ukraine has notched several major successes against that fleet, including the high-profile sinking of the Moskva, the Black Sea Fleet’s flagship.
One of the major differences between the Russian and U.S. navies is their employment of naval aviation.
Given the whopping 11 nuclear-powered aircraft carriers currently in the U.S. Navy, as well as the diverse and mature naval aviation assets – including not just fighter jets, but reconnaissance and transport aircraft, anti-submarine platforms, and other assets – the Russian Navy’s paltry single aircraft carrier means little. If reports hold true, that carrier, the problem-ridden Admiral Kuznetsov, will most likely soon be scrapped and sold, reducing the Russian aircraft carrier fleet to zero.
Strategic Reach and Balancing for the Russian Navy
The Russian Navy’s emphasis on long-range, high-speed weaponry (including hypersonic weapons) boosts capabilities without necessarily boosting warship numbers, and theoretically allows the Kremlin to hold even distant targets at risk.
Weapons such as Kalibr and Tsirkon missiles could allow even a relatively small grouping of Russian warships to hold at risk targets on land and at sea hundreds or even thousands of miles away, especially if those targets lack robust air defenses with deep magazines necessary to reliably shoot down adversaries’ weaponry.
Even if the Russian Navy is unable to match the U.S. Navy on a ship-for-ship basis, the hope appears to be that hypersonic weapons will breathe new life into a moribund Russian Navy.
What Happens Now?
In narrowly specific areas, the Russian Navy could become more lethal, though that lethality would be tempered by the service’s relatively narrow focus on coastal defense. Its missile-centric doctrine, even when mated to comparatively old ships, does boost the individual platforms’ offensive potential.
Submarine modernization is one area where the Russian Navy excels, and while considered less capable than U.S. Navy submarines, Russia’s newest submarines are still world-class.
Long-range strike, even at hypersonic missile speeds, is not necessarily a substitute for the capabilities of the blue-water navies of the United States, France, or the United Kingdom. Especially when operating together, the combined tonnage of NATO’s navies tips the balance distinctly away from today’s Russian Navy.
About the Author: Caleb Larson
Caleb Larson is an American multiformat journalist based in Berlin, Germany. His work covers the intersection of conflict and society, focusing on American foreign policy and European security. He has reported from Germany, Russia, and the United States. Most recently, he covered the war in Ukraine, reporting extensively on the war’s shifting battle lines from Donbas and writing on the war’s civilian and humanitarian toll. Previously, he worked as a Defense Reporter for POLITICO Europe. You can follow his latest work on X.
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