With the arrival of the USS Theodore Roosevelt, the United States now has a third aircraft carrier operating in the Middle East.
That’s an extraordinary amount of airpower, and it suggests to many that the Americans are preparing to escalate. It indicates that US President Donald J. Trump has optionality.

USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN 78) conducts high-speed turns in the Atlantic Ocean. Ford is at sea conducting sea trials following the in port portion of its 15 month post-shakedown availability. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Connor Loessin).

ATLANTIC OCEAN (June 14, 2011) The Nimitz-class aircraft carrier. Creative Commons photo.
He could theoretically escalate.
Then again, he could use this incredible amount of military force available to him as a means to pressure the Islamic Republic of Iran to either negotiate or to deter Tehran from unilaterally escalating.
Will the War Restart
Multiple sources have insisted to me on background that the Americans were prepared to initiate a sweeping air campaign potentially the day after the Midterm Elections. That air campaign would have included the use of at least two Massive Ordnance Air Burst (a.k.a. “The Mother of All Bombs,” or simply the MOAB) bombs on Iran’s newest suspected nuclear weapons development facility underneath Pickaxe Mountain.
Trump ultimately called off those attacks. Although there are now far more forces in the region than at the start of the war, the forty-seventh president seems less interested in escalating.
That doesn’t mean that Trump won’t attack if the Iranians escalate on their own (or if an increasingly desperate Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu lashes out and forces the Americans to come to his rescue).
Right now, though, the US side appears to be posturing. Before the carrier arrived, there was talk that Vice President JD Vance, with assistance from Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner, had initiated informal talks with Iran via intermediaries, like Qatar and Iraq.
One report said the Americans had agreed to four of Iran’s seven demands to end the conflict (with the final three still up for negotiation). As of press time, we cannot confirm that reporting.
Of course, shortly after that potential development, Trump reversed course and removed Vance from the negotiations, tasking him with domestic policy concerns.
We can only speculate as to what that means.
But the military campaign (such as it is) will be dictated not by the president’s mercurial whims or Netanyahu’s vituperations. The facts on the ground will govern it.
Those facts have remained mostly unchanged throughout this entire war.
The Iranian regime has de facto control over the Strait of Hormuz (SoH), Iran’s military capabilities have been degraded but not destroyed, and Iran has reconstituted much of that degraded capability.
That’s to say nothing of the drastic depletion of America’s critical munitions arsenal. Specifically, few THAAD and Patriot missile defense munitions remain.
Once they are depleted, the remaining American bases and forces throughout the Middle East, which are all in range of Iranian drone swarms and missile barrages, are essentially left undefended (along with the infrastructure of the Gulf Arab states).
So, if Trump did restart the conflict fully, then the Americans and their Arab partners would potentailly be obliterated by the massive Iranian retaliation.
What’s more, key standoff precision-guided munitions are dangerously low, meaning that any sustained resumption of large-scale warfare with Iran would require American warplanes and warships to move closer to Iran.
Given Iran’s defensive capabilities, and the fact that American forces could not guarantee total suppression of enemy air and anti-ship defenses, American warplanes and warships would be at high risk of severe Iranian counterattack.
And what of the strategic implications?
What Is Going to Happen Next?
We are told repeatedly by the president’s supporters that he does not favor regime change (presumably because it would force him to deploy US ground troops into the cauldron of Iran).
We’ve spent the last year proving that an air war alone cannot overthrow the Islamic Republic.
Perversely, an air war has only strengthened the resolve and militarism of Tehran.
The US president has subjected his administration and the country to a race against the clock that the US is not destined to win.
The longer the pressure campaign lasts, the less likely the US military will be able to conduct sustained warfare because the president is going to have an intransigent Democratic Congress to contend with soon.
Plus, the US Navy cannot maintain its porous blockade indefinitely.
The Secretary of the Treasury, Scott Bessent, and Secretary of State Marco Rubio believe that an economic war coupled with the blockade could collapse the Islamic Republic economically over the next year.
That seems unlikely.
Iranian Unpredictability
But the Iranians hear this, and that is the concern. Not that Trump will escalate, because not only will escalation by Trump do more long-term damage to the US military, but it will also be strategically inconclusive.
The concern is that Iran will become fed up with the tit-for-tat, frozen nature of the conflict and instead decide that it needed to escalate unilaterally now to try to break the American blockade and push the US military back.
If, however, the US can avoid direct military escalation in the next several weeks, and if the Iranians can keep their powder dry until the new Democratic Party majorities are sworn into office in the United States House of Representatives and United States Senate, then the chances of avoiding a direct US-Iran war reduce significantly.
It looks as though Trump prefers the Bessent-Rubio approach to the war, and that introducing the USS Theodore Roosevelt was merely part of an ongoing pressure campaign.
If that is accurate, then one can expect tensions to remain very high over the next several weeks before things finally settle into a pace that is neither full-blown war nor actual peace.
That doesn’t mean miscalculations and misunderstandings won’t risk pushing us to war.
Or that even the timeline is amenable to de-escalation. It means the president isn’t necessarily looking to escalate, despite deploying forces to the region.
About the Author: Brandon J. Weichert
Brandon J. Weichert is the Senior National Security Editor. He also manages The Weichert Brief on Substack. Weichert is the co-host of The Mario Nawfal Show on Twitter/X. He is the author of four bestselling national security books, most recently A Disaster of Our Own Making: How the West Lost Ukraine (Encounter Books). His next book, Fortress Americas: A New Monroe Doctrine (Tucker Carlson Books), is due out December 8. Follow him via Twitter/X @WeTheBrandon.
