Key Points and Summary – DDG(X) is the U.S. Navy’s bid to move beyond Arleigh Burke destroyers that have hit their limits on space, power, and cooling.
-Designed at roughly 14,000–15,000 tons with an integrated power system, larger radar arrays, and room for lasers and hypersonic missiles, DDG(X) is meant to answer China’s heavy Type 055 cruisers and carry the fleet’s next-generation sensors for decades.
(Oct. 16, 2025) The Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Paul Ignatius (DDG 117) renders honors to the USS Roosevelt (DDG 80), Oct. 16, 2025. Paul Ignatius is on a scheduled deployment in the U.S. 6th Fleet area of operations to support the warfighting effectiveness, lethality and readiness of U.S. Naval Forces Europe-Africa, and defend U.S., Allied and partner interests in the region. (U.S. Navy photo by Seaman Bradley Wolff)
ATLANTIC OCEAN (Sept. 06, 2008) – The guided-missile destroyer USS Roosevelt (DDG 80) steams through the Atlantic Ocean. Roosevelt is deployed as part of the Iwo Jima Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG) in support of maritime security operations in the Navy’s 5th and 6th fleet areas of responsibility. The Iwo Jima ESG is made up of Roosevelt, homeported at Mayport, Fla.; the amphibious assault ship USS Iwo Jima (LHD 7); the amphibious dock landing ship USS San Antonio (LPD 17); the amphibious transport dock ship USS Carter Hall (LSD 50); the guided-missile cruiser USS Vella Gulf (CG 72); the guided-missile destroyer USS Ramage (DDG 61); all homeported at Norfolk, Va.; and the fast attack submarine USS Hartford (SSN 768), homeported at Groton, Conn. U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Jason R. Zalasky (Released)
-But the program faces serious headwinds: high projected costs, overstretched shipyards, immature technologies, and a Navy record scarred by Zumwalt, LCS, and Ford-class troubles.
-The core question is whether the Navy can deliver this needed ship without repeating past acquisition failures.
DDG(X): Can the Navy Build the Warship It Needs?
The U.S. Navy’s next major surface combatant, DDG(X), is being designed to replace the Arleigh Burke-class destroyers for a simple and important reason: the Burke hull is simply out of room for growth.
The latest Flight II ships are already operating at their limit, right on the edge of their power, cooling, and weight margins. The implication is this: the class cannot support the next generation of radars, sensors, and directed-energy weapons that the U.S. Navy will ultimately need to employ.
Meanwhile, China is now fielding larger surface combatants like the Type 055 – ships that are equipped with more missile cells, more power, and larger radar arrays.
The only way for the U.S. Navy to keep pace is to field its own larger ships that provide the electrical power and physical margins needed to accommodate current, emerging, and future combat systems.
(Aug. 22, 2023) Gunner’s Mate 2nd Class Chase Allen maintains the barrel of a Mark 45 5-inch light-weight gun on the fo’c’sle of the Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Paul Hamilton (DDG 60) in the Pacific Ocean, Aug. 22, 2023. Paul Hamilton is deployed to the U.S. 3rd Fleet area of operations. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Elliot Schaudt)
The challenge, however, is that a larger and more capable ship usually means a more expensive and slower one at sea. After the cost overruns and reliability problems of the Zumwalt-class and the early retirements of the Littoral Combat Ship, DDG(X) now faces severe pressure to avoid becoming another troubled next-generation program.
So, can the DDG(X) deliver the capability the Navy needs without repeating the cost overruns and delays of the Zumwalt, LCS, and other next-generation programs?
What the DDG(X) Is Supposed to Be – and Why the Navy Needs It
DDG(X) is expected to be significantly larger and more capable than today’s destroyers. The ship is expected to displace roughly 14,000-15,000 tons – about 50% more than a Flight III Burke
A larger hull gives the Navy one thing that the Burke can no longer provide: more space and power to host future systems. The DDG(X) is therefore being designed around this, offering more space now and providing larger growth margins. That means the upcoming platform will provide additional room for weight growth, and physical space for electrical power systems that could be added over the next several decades, it remains in service.
In fact, electrical systems are a crucial and significant part of this new system. DDG(X) is planned to use an updated version of the integrated power system seen on Zumwalt-class destroyers. Instead of mechanical drive shafts, it will generate a large pool of electrical power and then direct that power to where it is needed – whether that’s to propulsion, sensors, or weapons. That’s important because future radars, electronic-warfare suites, and potential shipboard lasers could draw hundreds of kilowatts of power or more. The Burke cannot generate that.
Then there’s the missile battery. The Navy is said to be evaluating a baseline load of 96 standard VLS cells with options to include larger launchers for hypersonic weapons.
And, of course, range and endurance are crucial areas where improvement is always welcome – and necessary.
The bottom line is this: the Burke hull can’t support the Navy’s next set of sensors and weapons, and the DDG(X) is intended to be the platform that carries those new systems for the next several decades.
Costs, Shipyard Capacity, and the Navy’s Track Record
While DDG(X) is meant to solve a series of significant problems, it also carries major risks. Cost is at the top of that list. A Congressional Budget Office estimate puts the likely price per ship at around $4.4 billion, roughly one-third higher than early Navy estimates.
The use of new technology also adds more uncertainty. An integrated power system and other major components may not reach full maturity before detailed design work has begun, which increases the chance of redesigns or delays.
And then there’s the industrial base issue, which persists across multiple programs. Both major U.S. destroy shipyards – Bath Iron Works and Huntington Ingalls – are already tasked with Arleigh Burke production, Coast Guard cutters, and work on the Columbia-class ballistic-missile submarine. Workforce shortages and limited capacity are already slowing these programs down, and will undoubtedly impact DDG(X) as a result.
Adding a much larger and more complex ship is necessary in today’s landscape, but doing so on top of this heavy workload will likely stretch the shipyards even further. If that happens, the Navy risks slower production, higher costs, and a reduced overall fleet size.
There’s also the Navy’s recent history with next-generation ships to consider. The Zumwalt-class, for example, was cut from 32 ships to just three after major cost increases and technical problems. The Littoral Combat ship also suffered mechanical issues and mission-module failures, leading the Navy to retire several ships early. And, the Ford-class carrier faced years of delays and high-profile reliability problems with new systems like its advanced weapons elevators.
For the DDG(X) to succeed, therefore, the Navy must prove that it can control cost, manage shipyard capacity, and avoid the pitfalls of past next-generation programs. But how much of this is truly within the Navy’s control?
About the Author:
Jack Buckby is a British author, counter-extremism researcher, and journalist based in New York. Reporting on the U.K., Europe, and the U.S., he works to analyze and understand left-wing and right-wing radicalization, and reports on Western governments’ approaches to the pressing issues of today. His books and research papers explore these themes and propose pragmatic solutions to our increasingly polarized society. His latest book is The Truth Teller: RFK Jr. and the Case for a Post-Partisan Presidency.
More Military
Could America Have Lost the Revolutionary War?
The Marines Don’t Have Tanks Anymore
The Essex-Class Aircraft Carriers Have An Embarrassing Message for the U.S. Navy
‘New’ Mach 4 MiG-41 6th Generation Stealth Fighter Has Warning for U.S. Air Force
Boeing’s F-47 NGAD 6th Generation Stealth Fighter Is No ‘Mission Impossible’
