The U.S. Navy’s Underfunded Mine Warfare Arsenal Is a Problem

The U.S. military’s preeminence in naval warfare has historically relied on staying one step ahead of its adversaries, a strategy that proved successful in the 1990s and early 2000s. However, as adversaries rapidly expand their portfolio of munitions—including mine arsenals—the Navy’s stockpile has dwindled, with procurement lagging and capabilities aging. Despite their proven effectiveness in modern conflicts, maritime mines are only now seeing a slight renewal of attention and funding. If the Navy is to stay current, it should double down and work to expand advanced mine purchases.

The crew of the Virginia-class fast-attack submarine USS Missouri (SSN 780) render honors to the Battleship Missouri Memorial following a homeport change from Groton, Connecticut. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Michael H. Lee/ Released)

While innovation has been clear in the Navy’s latest and most technologically advanced aircraft, ships, and missiles, a chronically overlooked aspect of sea-based mine warfare has been neglected until just now. Mine warfare has been a low priority in Navy’s budgets, as following the collapse of the Soviet Union the weapons were put in “a strategic, operational, and budgetary backwater,” by naval planners. 

In fact, no major mine laying operation has been conducted by the U.S. Navy since the end of the Cold War. 

Despite the Navy’s reluctance to embrace mine warfare, recent successes show it is not obsolete. Maritime mines can be used against surface ships and submarines to deny access to bodies of water and keep enemies in or out of certain areas. Evidenced by Ukrainian successes against the Russian navy, mines remain a useful and capable tool for these purposes. 

Indeed if anyone should know this, it’s U.S. Navy leaders. Out of the 19 American ships that have been severely damaged or destroyed since the end of the Second World War, 15 are owed to enemy maritime mines.

However, decades of inaction have let the Navy’s mine arsenal quietly deteriorate and current estimates put the arsenal around just 10,000 mines. While 10,000 may seem like a large number, especially compared to small stockpiles of modern exquisite anti-ship munitions, mass is increasingly the name of the game when it comes to mines to effectively deploy over large areas and deny enemy movement. 

By contrast, great power competitors clearly understand the effectiveness of these weapons, as evidenced by their large and growing stockpiles. The combined arsenals of China, Russia, Iran and North Korea, is 26 times larger than the United States at an estimated 261,000 maritime mines. 

China fields more than 30 different variants of maritime mines, and Chinese naval doctrine places heavy emphasis on minelaying in wartime use to block ports and key shipping lanes. Since invading Ukraine in 2022, Russia embarked on an extensive mining campaign in the Black Sea to block Ukrainian shipping. Iran has a history of mining the Strait of Hormuz, and threatens to retread often.  

Meanwhile the U.S. Navy’s mine inventory is not keeping pace. The future of our mine warfare strategy relies on innovating on preexisting systems and concepts. 

The Navy’s mine programs are focused broadly in two categories. The first is that of Quickstrike series mines created from modified general purpose bombs, which are cheaper and more plentiful. The second is that is of exquisite submarine delivered clandestine mines, which are more specialized, stealthy, and capable, such as the Hammerhead mine that waits in the depths and fires a torpedo at detected enemy ships. However, this increased capability comes with a higher price tag and has led to small procurement quantities.  

Advanced mines like the Hammerhead provide the Navy with a timeless capability, and production of these critical assets needs to ramp up fast. Even with our modest mine stockpile, it’s uncertain whether these older platforms will be deployable in a contested environment against a peer. Quickstrike mines, which make up the majority of the stockpile, are often air deployed and experts have shed doubt on whether these weapons could be employed in war.  

Increased investment in a newer, clandestinely-deployed maritime mine stockpile is overdue. These mines would be able to be used deep behind enemy lines by stealthy submarines and wreak havoc on enemy naval forces and seaborne supply lines. 

However, procurement and production of new mines is not enough to meet modern threats. According to the Navy’s budget, only 100 Quickstrike tail kits and 27 Hammerhead mines were requested in fiscal year (FY) 2025, a modest increase. Maritime mines in general would receive $100 million in FY 2025. While up from a decade ago, this funding stagnates in mid-range plans and is expected to rise by just $8 million by 2029. Additionally, plans project very low production rates for these systems—likely not enough to keep the line viable—with only three Hammerhead mines being delivered per month. 

The French Marine Nationale aircraft carrier FS Charles De Gaulle (R91), and the aircraft carrier USS John C. Stennis (CVN 74) are underway in formation in the Red Sea, April 15, 2019. The John C. Stennis Carrier Strike Group is deployed to the U.S. 5th Fleet area of operations in support of naval operations to ensure maritime stability and security in the Central Region, connecting the Mediterranean and the Pacific through the western Indian Ocean and three strategic choke points. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist Seaman Joshua L. Leonard)

Yet combatant commanders have made clear their desire for more mining capability, with the FY 2025 Indo-Pacific Command Unfunded Priorities Lists calling for $482 million in maritime mine procurement funding—nearly a 5X increase over the Navy’s request. 

Mine investment has outsized impact as they are a relatively cheap and low-cost way of raising the costs of naval warfare. A single Hammerhead mine, for example, is estimated to cost $1.1 million, less than one-third of the cost of a Long Range Anti-Ship Missile, which has a unit cost of $3.3 million.

Three Hammerheads a month is not sufficient to deter a Chinese invasion of Taiwan, especially when they require a production lead time of 12 months. The industrial base needs to be primed now to be able to deliver necessary capability when needed. The shock on industry throughout the war in Ukraine exemplifies this, underlining that to deter, our Navy must be able to produce and arm itself before war breaks out to prevent one in the first place. 

About the Author: Mackenzie Eaglen

Mackenzie Eaglen, now a National Security Journal Contributing Editor,  is a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), where she works on defense strategy, defense budgets, and military readiness. She is also a regular guest lecturer at universities, a member of the board of advisers of the Alexander Hamilton Society, and a member of the steering committee of the Leadership Council for Women in National Security.

Ms. Eaglen is also one of the 12-member US Army War College Board of Visitors, which offers advice about academic program objectives and effectiveness, and serves on the US Army Science Board, an advisory body that provides guidance on scientific and other matters to the Army’s senior leadership. In 2023, she became a member of the Commission on the Future of the Navy, established by Congress to study the strategy, budget, and policy concerning the future strength of the US Navy fleet.

Image Credit: U.S. Government.