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Military Hardware: Tanks, Bombers, Submarines and More

The Navy’s New SSN(X) Submarine Has China and Russia Smiling

Los Angeles-Class Submarine
101210-N-5538K-056 PHILIPPINE SEA (Dec. 10, 2010) The Los Angeles-class attack submarine USS Houston (SSN 713) takes part in a photo exercise as part of Keen Sword 2011. Keen Sword is a joint, bilateral exercise designed to strengthen Japan-U.S. military operations. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Casey H. Kyhl)

Key Points and Summary on SSN(X) Submarine Program – The U.S. Navy’s next-generation SSN(X) attack submarine, designed to be a revolutionary blend of stealth, firepower, and endurance, is already a “nightmare” of delays and soaring costs.

-The program is not expected to deliver an operational boat until the 2040s, a dangerous gap as older Los Angeles-class subs retire and China’s naval power grows.

-This crisis is compounded by a struggling U.S. shipbuilding industrial base that is being dramatically outpaced by Beijing, raising serious questions about the future of American undersea dominance and the viability of the SSN(X) itself.

SSN(X) Premise and Promise

The SSN(X) certainly sounds like a great concept.

This next-generation attack submarine will feature a fancy electric drive propulsion, enhanced sensors, and the ability to counter enemy unmanned underwater vehicles, systems that are surely needed.

NOTE: “SSN” stands for “Submersible Ship Nuclear,” i.e. a nuclear-powered general purpose attack submarine aka “fast-attack” boat.

Though nuclear-powered, SSNs don’t carry actual nuclear weapons, i.e. submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs); that doomsday duty is instead tasked to SSBNs (“Ship Submersible Ballistic Nuclear”) aka “boomers” such as the Ohio-class and Columbia-class boats.

Meanwhile, as the Congressional Research Service (CRS) explains, the “X” designation indicates that the exact design of the boat is still to be determined.

As far as augmenting—and presumably eventually replacing—the Seawolf-class SSNs, it’s worth remembering that only three Seawolves in service (USS Seawolf [SSN-21], USS Connecticut [SSN-22], and USS Jimmy Carter [SSN-23]), commissioned between 1997 and 2005. The program was cancelled in 1995.

Meanwhile, the first of the Virginia-class SSNs, USS Virginia (SSN-774), was commissioned in October 2004—whilst the newest, USS Iowa (SSN-797; obviously not to be confused with the legendary USN battleship [BB-61]) was commissioned this past April (coincidentally the same month as the aforementioned SECDEF announcement and POTUS executive order on military acquisitions).

Last but not least, the venerable time-honored Los Angeles-class (SSN 668) fast-attack subs were commissioned between 1976 and 1996.

Hence, the extra sense of urgency for getting the SSN(X) up and running sooner rather than later.

So far so good, right? Sounds ideal, right?

SSN(X) Problems

The SSN(X) program, which sounds great in theory, is floundering in practice due to massive expenses and production delays.

Just how bad are these delays and expenses?

The U.S. Navy is requesting $586.9 million for SSN(X) design workups in FY25. That is up from the $544.7 million asked for FY24.

So, we are talking over half a billion dollars to get this project off the ground and into something that sees tangible results.

Mind you, those figures are just for research & development (R&D).

In other words, not even factoring in the cost of the actual hands-on, nitty-gritty, physical labor that would go into building the boats at the shipyard, from the keel-laying to the launching, not to mention post-assembly growing pains such as commissioning, sea trials, and so forth.

To make matters worse, the SSN(X) has not yet received clear and unequivocal Congressional backing.

Regarding the production delays, hands-on shipyard labor is unlikely to begin until 2031, and the boats may not be operational until the 2040s.

In other words, a lag time of at least 15 years, with the current USN SSN fleet continues to not get any younger and China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) continues to expand and modernize its own submarine fleet.

What’s the Solution? More Virginia-Class Submarines?

So then, can the U.S. Navy simply build more Virginia-class boats instead (at least in the interim)?

That sounds great in theory, since the Virginia-class is already well established, with 23 of these boats having already been commissioned.

However, this potential solution would in turn be beset by a problem of its own: shipbuilding capacity in the United States is a shell of its former self, and this is especially true of the submarine program.

Back on May 2, 2025, Indo-Pacific (INDOPACOM) Commander Admiral Samuel Paparo told the McCain Institute’s annual Sedona Forum that the PLAN churns out six combat naval ships annually, compared with the 1.8 manufactured in the US; diving deeper into those sobering stats, the Admiral noted that Beijing produces two submarines a year for every 1.4 made in America.

The Navy brass is hoping to rectify these lagging numbers. Back in November 2024, they announced a goal to boost submarine production to three per year—one Columbia and two Virginias—by 2028, via the so-called  “1+2+Sustainment by 2028” plan.

A key component of this plan is the ongoing BuildSubmarines employment recruiting push. However, whether this laudable and ambitious goal of more than doubling American submarine production can be achieved in three years remains to be seen. Time will tell.

About the Author: Christian D. Orr, Defense Expert

Christian D. Orr is a Senior Defense Editor. He is a former Air Force Security Forces officer, Federal law enforcement officer, and private military contractor (with assignments worked in Iraq, the United Arab Emirates, Kosovo, Japan, Germany, and the Pentagon). Chris holds a B.A. in International Relations from the University of Southern California (USC) and an M.A. in Intelligence Studies (concentration in Terrorism Studies) from American Military University (AMU).

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Christian Orr
Written By

Christian D. Orr is a former Air Force officer, Federal law enforcement officer, and private military contractor (with assignments worked in Iraq, the United Arab Emirates, Kosovo, Japan, Germany, and the Pentagon). Chris holds a B.A. in International Relations from the University of Southern California (USC) and an M.A. in Intelligence Studies (concentration in Terrorism Studies) from American Military University (AMU). He has also been published in The Daily Torch and The Journal of Intelligence and Cyber Security. Last but not least, he is a Companion of the Order of the Naval Order of the United States (NOUS).

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