The DMZ, Again? Why a Trump–Kim Meeting Is Back on the Table
North Korea has said it’s ready to talk with Washington if denuclearization isn’t on the table anymore. Seoul’s new line now treats a nuclear weapons production freeze as a realistic interim step. And Donald Trump is set to visit South Korea next month for the APEC summit.
Those three signals, taken together, recreate the narrow diplomatic geometry we last saw in 2019—when Trump invited Kim Jong Un to the Demilitarized Zone and diplomacy briefly rebooted.
The setting, the incentives, and the politics are aligning for an encore.
Kim’s Message—and What It Really Means
Kim’s latest speech made two points that matter. First, Pyongyang will not give up its nuclear arsenal. Second, the door to dialogue opens if Washington shelves disarmament demands and negotiates around peaceful coexistence.
Critics will call this a stall. It is also the only lane that has produced even temporary restraint: freezes on missile and nuclear testing, fewer surprises, and lower odds of a crisis spiraling out of control.
If your objective is risk reduction in the near term, you meet North Korea where the leverage is—on caps, pauses, and verification, not utopian disarmament.
Seoul’s Pivot Changes the Math
Seoul’s new posture—publicly blessing a freeze-first bargain as an “interim emergency measure”—is the underappreciated breakthrough.
The South Korean president is telling Washington and Pyongyang that a pause in production is not capitulation but triage while the long-term goal of denuclearization remains alive.
That matters for two reasons. It removes a perennial wedge that Pyongyang exploits to divide allies. And it gives Trump cover to pursue a transaction that can be defended as practical, measurable, and immediately stabilizing.
Summitry That Fits the Moment
The DMZ is more than a backdrop. In 2019, it enabled leader-level improvisation—exactly the channel that matters in a system where only Kim can trade on nuclear issues.
The lesson from that episode is not to chase TV theatrics; it’s to use leader-level optics after the staff have quietly boxed in a deal’s contours. If Trump wants a win that sticks, he can reprise the formula but with more polish: appear at the DMZ once a technical freeze and verification annex are essentially locked, using the moment for last-inch trade-offs and to announce a tightly defined first phase.
The timing will be tight, but if anything is possible when it comes to Trump and North Korea, as history has shown us.
But even if an interm deal isn’t possible right off the bat, there are clearly reasons for both leaders to meet at the DMZ and at least hammer out what is possible, and see if Kim is truly serious after all.
What a Realistic First Phase Looks Like
No op-ed should pretend there’s an instant fix. But there is a defensible opening trade: Freeze fissile-material production and long-range flight tests.
Stand up continuous monitoring at declared sites with fast-reaction dispute resolution. Offer narrow, reversible relief—humanitarian channels insulated from regime skimming; limited non-dual-use economic lanes that shut off automatically if inspectors are blocked or missiles fly. Pair the give with a published “penalty ladder” so the cost of non-compliance is known in advance.
The point isn’t trust; it’s predictability and leverage.
Why Trump, Why Now
Trump still carries unique leader-to-leader equity with Kim; even Pyongyang’s latest messaging nods to “good memories” of prior summitry. Combine that with Seoul’s explicit openness to a freeze and a crowded regional calendar that already has Trump landing in South Korea, and the logic of a DMZ encounter writes itself.
The White House can frame it as disciplined realism: reduce risk today, preserve options tomorrow, and keep allies glued to the process rather than watching from the sidelines.
The North Korea Alliance Test
None of this works if Seoul or Tokyo feel blindsided. The surest way to kill a DMZ gambit is to treat it as a U.S.–DPRK two-hander.
The opposite is required: fold allies into verification, sanctions sequencing, and the penalty architecture; expand real-time warning links; and pre-commit that any liaison “goodies” turn off the moment compliance falters. If Kim tries to bypass Seoul, the response should be to tighten trilateral coordination, not freelance for headlines.
The Payoff—and the Risk
A production freeze won’t end the North Korean nuclear problem. It will, however, slow the worst-case arithmetic—especially if South Korea’s estimate of 15–20 additional warheads a year is in the ballpark.
Slowing that curve, and stopping long-range test theatrics while improving allied readiness, is not a small thing. The risk is obvious: Kim pockets optics and cheats. That’s why every incentive must be modular, time-boxed, and instantly reversible—and why the “penalty box” has to be public before a single handshake.
Conclusion: History Doesn’t Repeat, but It Rhymes
We’ve seen this movie before. In 2019, the DMZ meeting created political space for technical talks, even if the follow-through faltered. In 2025, the conditions are arguably better: Kim is advertising the lane he’ll accept; Seoul is validating a freeze-first step; and Trump will already be on the peninsula. If the goal is fewer tests, tighter caps, and a sturdier deterrent while keeping the long game alive, then a DMZ reboot is not a stunt.
It’s the one move that matches the moment—and it could happen again. I hope it does. And knowing Trump, even if it’s just to test Kim’s intentions on a deal, I think it happens.
About the Author: Harry J. Kazianis
Harry J. Kazianis (@Grecianformula) is Editor-In-Chief and President of National Security Journal. He was the former Senior Director of National Security Affairs at the Center for the National Interest (CFTNI), a foreign policy think tank founded by Richard Nixon based in Washington, DC. Harry has over a decade of experience in think tanks and national security publishing. His ideas have been published in the NY Times, The Washington Post, The Wall Street Journal, CNN, and many other outlets worldwide. He has held positions at CSIS, the Heritage Foundation, the University of Nottingham, and several other institutions related to national security research and studies. He is the former Executive Editor of the National Interest and the Diplomat. He holds a Master’s degree focusing on international affairs from Harvard University.
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Jim
September 23, 2025 at 1:03 pm
North Korea is a big headache that won’t go away.
We’ve been dealing with the nuclear issue for decades now, starting back under Bill Clinton’s administration in the 1990’s.
Efforts were made but failed to steer North Korea away from going nuclear and then to give up their nukes.
Trump tried, in his own inimitable style, the Big Sell… selling it like a giant real estate development project with great potential and up-side for North Korea.
And, that didn’t work either (at least he tried).
My suspicion is North Korea is sincere in stating they will never give up their nuclear weapons program.
So what now? First things first, lower the tension on the Korean Peninsula and hopefully increase the ability for each side to be able to engage with each other reasonably (increasing trust is also important, but the “trust factor” is very low between the two sides).
Talking and communicating with respect and civility might lead to increased levels of trust if those talks lead to actions which both sides follow through on and both sides see it as a positive outcome.
Trust-building steps in diplomatic parlance.
As tough as it is to accept a nuclear North Korea, it isn’t going away anytime soon. Lowering the temperature on the Korean Peninsula is far better than some kind of stratagem to denuclearize North Korea… that could easily end in disaster.
Jaw, Jaw is better than War, War.
Maybe, Trump can achieve more than a mere photo-op and actually lower tensions on the Korean Peninsula, that would be a good place to start.
Then we can go from there.