China’s Military Is Getting Close to Superpower Levels Status Thanks to Russia

Synopsis: Russia’s arms sales to China in the 1990s and 2000s helped accelerate Beijing’s modernization—fighter jets, air defenses, engines, submarines, and destroyers that seeded China’s rapid learning curve.

-Flanker sales and licensed production fed the J-11 family, while Russian engines and S-300/S-400 systems bolstered China’s airpower and area-denial confidence.

Su-27 Flanker Up Close. Image Credit: National Security Journal Taken on July 19, 2025.

-Naval buys like Kilo-class submarines and Sovremenny destroyers jump-started key operational concepts.

-In hindsight, the relationship looks uncomfortable as China competes with Russia in export markets, but Moscow’s choices were shaped by post-Soviet cash needs and limited buyers.

China Copied Russia’s Best Military Gear: Why Moscow Sold It Anyway

Russia helped arm China’s military forces for decades. Even today, many Chinese designs show their Russian lineage.

Now, as China’s power rises, Russia’s recedes, and great power competition renews, Moscow is revisiting the wisdom of arming China. Did Russia help create a future peer competitor?

Probably not—the transaction made sense in a constrained market, even if it has become strategically awkward since.

History of the Deal

In the 1990s and early 2000s, Russia needed hard currency and stable buyers. Moscow needed to ensure its post-Soviet defense industry survived.

China, meanwhile, needed rapid modernization to close capability gaps with the United States, Japan, and Taiwan. Russia and China shared a mutual interest in counterbalancing against the United States.

Cooperation made sense at the time.

Russian Su-27 Flanker from USAF Museum. Image Credit: National Security Journal.

What Was Sold

Russia sold China a variety of fighter aircraft. The baseline Su-27 was sold to China with licensure and assembly rights. This led to China’s indigenous derivative, the J-11 family. Russia also sold Su-30 variants, thus helping introduce the Chinese aerospace industry to the multirole concept, avionics integration, and weapons employment.

Later came the Su-35. That sale was smaller and more symbolic—regardless, by that point, China already had advanced domestic projects in place.

Arguably the most important technology transfer was Russian turbofan/turboshaft engines; China had struggled to produce a passable turbofan engine. The AL-31 engine included with the Flanker line was Russia’s primary source of leverage over China for years.

The development of China’s early air-defense systems depended on Russia; sales of the S-300 surface-to-air missile system were crucial.

Later sales of the S-400 were politically significant and tactically meaningful, even if they were not a great step forward in Chinese capabilities.

But the transfer did allow China to improve their area-denial confidence and doctrine.

Kilo-Class Submarine Fleet. Image Credit: Creative Commons.

Kilo-Class Submarine. Image Credit: Creative Commons.

On the naval side, Russia sold Kilo-class submarines and Sovremenny-class destroyers. The subs were quiet, and the destroyers offered ready-made surface-strike capability. These purchases allowed China to jump-start aspects of its naval doctrine.

Was It a Mistake?

Beijing learned fast, copied, and reverse-engineered many Russian technologies—leading to reduced dependence.

Russia arguably helped accelerate a future competitor that now challenges Russia in third-party export markets. Arms sales improved China’s ability to contest regional dominance—so Russia indirectly strengthened a major revisionist power. Over time, the relationship became asymmetric, in that China gained tech while Russia gained cash but lost bargaining power.

Rational Argument

Russia’s alternatives were limited in the 1990s, and the defense industry needed foreign orders to survive.

Russia did not have the luxury of being picky, and China was a large, reliable customer. Arms trades bought Russia political influence and strategic alignment, at least initially, with a rising global power.

But the extent to which Russia facilitated China’s maturation is likely overstated. Beijing would have modernized regardless, even without Russia, sourcing tech, talent, and designs from somewhere else along the way.

And fortunately for Russia, the country still retains decisive deterrence mechanisms—nuclear weapons and strong homeland defense systems—so arms sales did not compromise their domestic security.

Good Deal at the Time

In the future, Russia will likely be more cautious about selling cutting-edge tech to China. Meanwhile, China will focus on developing indigenous systems, buying selectively only where they see a gap. The long-run relationship will probably feature Russia as a selective resource supplier, while China takes on a prominent manufacturing stance.

So, the sales were not a categorical mistake. They were a pragmatic exchange. Russia got revenue and alignment. China got a modernization shortcut. In hindsight, the exchange may feel strategically awkward, but it was never irrational.

About the Author: Harrison Kass

Harrison Kass is an attorney and journalist covering national security, technology, and politics. Previously, he was a political staffer and candidate, and a US Air Force pilot selectee. He holds a JD from the University of Oregon and a master’s in global journalism and international relations from NYU.