Russia Will Suffer a Humiliating Defeat in Ukraine

It’s quite possible that Russia is one to two years away from a humiliating battlefield defeat in Ukraine. The end may come sooner or a bit later, but come it shall. And not because it’s a case of “magical thinking” that wishes will become reality, but because the coming reality just happens to be the most wished-for outcome.

Ukraine War: Why Russia Should Be Worried

In a word, Russia’s war against Ukraine is not “never ending,” as Senator J.D Vance would have us believe. Nor is it a permanent stalemate. Current appearances are not future projections, and it would be foolish to assume that what is must be and will be. A closer look at Russia shows clearly that time is running out for Putin’s rickety realm.

If the West remains committed to a Ukrainian victory for at least a few more years—and all indications, even a Trump-Vance victory in November, point to this conclusion—Russia will encounter a perfect storm consisting of the following components.

First, Russia is already using dwindling numbers of ancient tanks and artillery systems. As The Economist, CUNY Emeritus Professor Rajan Menon, and Ukrainian military analyst Yevhen Dykyy independently point out, Russia’s capacity to meet its needs for heavy weapons will reach a dead end within the next six to 24 months. When that happens, Russia will be unable to launch significant attacks and be hard-pressed to sustain its defenses.

Second, as both Russian opposition economists Vladimir Milov, Mikhail Krutikhin, and Igor Lifsits point out—and as Russian officials indirectly substantiate—Russia will face a full-blown economic crisis very soon. Inflation is going through the roof, the increasingly militarized economy is depressing productivity and efficiency across the board, the labor deficit is severe and not getting any better, the Kremlin’s bad-weather fund is running out of money, and major tax hikes are in the works. Living conditions will deteriorate for much of the population at precisely the time that the war will go increasingly badly.

Third, Russia’s rate of daily casualties is unsustainable. The Ukrainians are killing or wounding some 1,000 Russian soldiers per day. That amounts to the number of monthly recruits, which is to say that the Ukrainians are decommissioning Russians as soon as they hit the front. There are already many reports of desertion and insubordination. They will only increase as the war turns even worse for Russia.

Fourth, Ukraine is progressively degrading Russia’s energy infrastructure and isolating Crimea. Sooner or later, the Kerch Bridge will fall, supplying the soldiers amassed in southern Ukraine will become even more difficult, and Russia will have experienced a major strategic defeat. Nuclear saber-rattling won’t convince Russian soldiers not to hightail it from the peninsula or desert, especially during the coming winter months when conditions on the front will get even more intolerable.

Add up these four factors, and they amount to dire circumstances for Russia and Putin. Russia’s self-declared president will be in especially hot water, as his comrades increasingly conclude that his policies are destroying their homeland. It’s then perfectly possible for an informal coalition of disgruntled secret police agents, generals, and economic oligarchs to take action against Putin in about a year. Don’t expect them to form a revolutionary organization in the underground. As usually takes place during regime breakdowns, “bad stuff” happens in an unpredictable fashion and counter-elites unexpectedly emerge and take charge. Russia’s 1917 revolution is a case in point. The war was going badly, the economy was near collapse, the peasants were rebelling, and the soldiers were deserting. Who expected loyal aristocrats and officers to convince the Czar to abdicate in February of that year?

Ukraine Must Continue to Fight

To be sure, the picture is not entirely rosy for Kyiv. Desertions are on the rise, as is popular willingness to surrender some land for peace. And the energy infrastructure has been shattered, foreboding very difficult conditions this coming winter. That said, all Ukraine needs to do is stick it out, which, given the remarkable resilience of its population and the lack of realistic alternatives, is a near certainty. In contrast, Russia needs to win—which it can’t and won’t. And when the perfect storm strikes, the creaky edifice that is Putin’s army will come tumbling down.

These considerations have several non-magical implications:

First, there is little reason to fear that Western assistance to Ukraine will dry up. It makes no sense whatsoever, even for MAGA Republicans, to halt supplies of weapons and ammunition at precisely the time that Ukraine is so close to victory. Why lose Ukraine and be scandalized for the next four years when you can win it with just a little bit of effort?

Second, it’s just possible that the Russian tyrant knows the mess he’s in. Putin lives in a make-believe world consisting of bunkers, exceedingly long tables, body doubles, and filtered information. If anyone is out of touch with reality, it’s he. And yet, some comprehension of the untenability of Russia’s position may be seeping into his solipsistic brain. How else explain his repeated offers of negotiations, ceasefires, and peace? It would be too bizarre to assume that he’s sincere. But it wouldn’t be too bizarre to assume that he’s grasping for straws, suspecting that things can only get worse for Russia.

Remember: Putin actually claimed at the recent St. Petersburg Economic Forum that Russia was the fourth richest country in the world. An experienced liar would say something so obviously out of touch with anyone’s definition of reality. But an even minimally sober human being couldn’t possibly be so daft as to believe such nonsense. Neither could such a person not appreciate that Russia’s casualties are high, well over half a million by latest estimates. Putin surely doesn’t care, but it’s hard to believe that he thinks of mass deaths as a sign of resounding victory.

Third, it follows that Ukraine and its allies should drive an extremely hard bargain if and when they decide to negotiate. They hold the better cards, and their cards will only get better. Time is on their side. There’s no reason to make concessions now when the Russians will be forced to make deeper concessions one year from now.

About the Author: Dr. Alexander Motyl

Dr. Alexander Motyl is a professor of political science at Rutgers-Newark. A specialist on Ukraine, Russia, and the USSR, and on nationalism, revolutions, empires, and theory, he is the author of 10 books of nonfiction, including Pidsumky imperii (2009); Puti imperii (2004); Imperial Ends: The Decay, Collapse, and Revival of Empires (2001); Revolutions, Nations, Empires: Conceptual Limits and Theoretical Possibilities (1999); Dilemmas of Independence: Ukraine after Totalitarianism (1993); and The Turn to the Right: The Ideological Origins and Development of Ukrainian Nationalism, 1919–1929 (1980); the editor of 15 volumes, including The Encyclopedia of Nationalism (2000) and The Holodomor Reader (2012); and a contributor of dozens of articles to academic and policy journals, newspaper op-ed pages, and magazines. He also has a weekly blog, “Ukraine’s Orange Blues.”