Iran never aimed to close the Strait of Hormuz, Dr. Andrew Latham argues. Tehran built something far more useful — permanent uncertainty. Mines, shore-based anti-ship missiles, fast attack craft, and cheap drones make every transit a calculation rather than a routine. Global oil inventories dropped 250 million barrels across March and April. The U.S. Strategic Petroleum Reserve stood at roughly 384 million barrels in early May. The IEA projects Q2 drawdowns averaging 8.5 million barrels a day. China takes 90% of Iran’s exported crude and routes 45% of its own crude imports through Hormuz. Beijing already has the leverage Washington does not — without sending a single warship to the Gulf.
Iran’s Real Strait of Hormuz Playbook
Iran’s missile capabilities. Image Credit: Creative Commons.
The Strait of Hormuz is not closed. A closed Strait is a problem Washington has a playbook for. Iran understood that and built something different: not closure, but permanent uncertainty.
Iran Never Aimed at Closure of Hormuz
Iranian leaders are ideological. They are not reckless. They understand what a genuine attempt to stop Gulf traffic would invite from the Fifth Fleet.
What they built instead was a threat architecture suited to a chokepoint sitting directly beside Iranian territory. Mines. Shore-based anti-ship missiles. Fast attack craft. Drones cheap enough to replace and numerous enough to overwhelm point defenses. None of this wins a naval war with the United States. It was not designed to. The objective is to make every transit a calculation rather than a routine.
Defeating that through naval power alone is considerably harder than defeating a blockade.
The Question With No Military Answer
Global inventories fell 250 million barrels across March and April. The Strategic Petroleum Reserve stood at roughly 384 million barrels in early May — already well below pre-crisis levels, and still falling. The IEA projects second-quarter drawdowns averaging 8.5 million barrels a day, with the steepest draws arriving now.
Washington keeps having the wrong argument. Whether Iran can close the strait entirely has a clear answer — it cannot, and Tehran knows this. The question without a military answer is different: can the commercial assumptions governing Gulf transit before February 28 actually be rebuilt?
Around 25% of the world’s seaborne crude moves through Hormuz. Prices do not wait for a blockade. A warning, a boarding, a reported mining — any of these moves the insurance market before a diplomat has finished his statement. That has been the operating reality since February 28.
ANDERSEN AIR FORCE BASE, GUAM — F-16 Fighting Falcons, F-18 Hornets and a B-2 Spirit, line the Andersen flight line during Exercise Valiant Shield, 22 June, 2006. Valiant Shield 2006, the U.S. Pacific Command exercise, which runs June 19 to 23, will be conducted in the vicinity of Guam. Valiant Shield focuses on integrated joint training and interoperability among U.S. military forces while responding to a range of mission scenarios.
(U.S. Air Force Photo/Staff Sgt Bennie J. Davis III)
The Adjustment Nobody Has Announced
The framework being worked through Pakistani intermediaries reportedly leaves “who controls the strait going forward” as a deferred question. The deferral is telling. Once something has settled in incrementally, reversing it is harder than any negotiating document suggests.
Gulf monarchies are maintaining their security relationships with the United States and hedging their diplomatic bets at the same time. Shipping companies reprice Gulf routes after every incident — not waiting for resolution. Underwriters have moved. Energy ministries in Tokyo and Seoul have quietly revised their procurement assumptions.
No government has formally acknowledged Iranian influence over the strait. Every government is already operating as though it exists.
The shift does not require an announcement. It only needs time.
What China Doesn’t Need to Do
The Washington-versus-Tehran frame misses the actor best placed to benefit from a Hormuz that stays expensive and unsettled.
China has no PLAN warships near the Gulf. It does not need them. The 2021 Comprehensive Strategic Partnership locked in a 25-year economic framework between Beijing and Tehran. China takes roughly 90% of Iran’s exported crude — a buyer relationship Tehran has no realistic path to replacing. Iranian oil has continued to reach Chinese ports since February 28 through transit arrangements neither government has publicly described.
The 2023 Saudi-Iran normalization was brokered in Beijing. China closed a Gulf diplomatic deal the United States had not attempted — no casualties, no naval deployment.
USAF Maj. Samuel “RaZZ” Larson, F-22 Raptor Aerial Demonstration Team pilot and commander, performs at the 75th Annual Toronto Air Show. The F-22 Raptor Demo Team performed alongside the RCAF CF-18 Demo Team, RCAF Snowbirds, and RAF Red Arrows.
Roughly 45% of Chinese crude imports transit Hormuz. A strait that stays open but is costly serves Chinese interests. It raises competitors’ costs and deepens Iran’s dependence on Chinese buyers. Beijing gains informal influence over access conditions without a single warship in the region.
The call that might actually move Tehran is the one Beijing can make and Washington cannot. Iran’s economic survival runs through Chinese demand.
No carrier deployment changes that arithmetic.
Terms that lock in Iranian control without accounting for China’s economic position inside Iran hand Beijing an advantage it never had to fight for.
What Reversing This Actually Takes
Reopening the Strait militarily and restoring the pre-February commercial order are not the same problem.
American forces can still push ships through. Whether the assumptions governing commercial traffic before February 28 can be rebuilt is harder — and not ultimately a military question. Insurance markets, shipping firms, and energy buyers do not reset because a ceasefire was signed. Once they have restructured around chronic Gulf instability, the psychology outlasts the fighting.
Any serious framework has to do three things that it currently does not. IRGC posture in the strait must be addressed directly — not deferred to a second negotiation that will face the same pressures at higher stakes.
Sanctions relief cannot ignore China’s economic footprint inside Iran without ratifying what Beijing has already built. And American red lines need to be stated explicitly. In this environment, vagueness is read in Tehran as a space for maneuver.
The Answer Nobody Wants to Give on the Strait of Hormuz
Could America and the West accept Iran’s de facto control of the Strait of Hormuz?
Acceptance is not a word any Western government will use. The process is quieter. Markets adjust. Insurers reprice. Shipping firms reroute. Governments follow, slowly, calling it something else.
The West will not accept Iranian control of the strait. It will simply find itself having adjusted to it before anyone named the transition.
Tehran may not need to win. It may only need to wait. Beijing has understood that for some time.
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About the Author: Dr. Andrew Latham
Andrew Latham is a professor of international relations and political theory at Macalester College in Saint Paul, MN. You can follow him on X: @aakatham.
