Ukrainian special operations forces say they destroyed a Russian Su-24M strike bomber at Saky Air Base in occupied Crimea using two upgraded Hornet strike drones after a three-week planning effort.
Ukraine says the bomber was preparing for a combat sortie when it was hit.

Tu-95. Image Credit: Creative Commons.

Tu-95 Bomber Russian Air Force. Image Credit: Creative Commons.
The incident provides yet another example of Ukraine’s increasingly sophisticated deep-strike capabilities, demonstrating the vulnerability of Russian air bases and assets behind the front.
And once more, the incident illustrates how effectively an inexpensive drone can be against a multi-million-dollar asset—in this case, a fighter-bomber.
Hornet Strike
The strike, conducted by Ukraine’s Omega Special Purpose Center, took three weeks of preparation and was coordinated with the Ukrainian Air Force and the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU).
Mission planners verified the aircraft wasn’t an inflatable decoy, studied the routines, selected approach routes, and developed contingency plans.
For the strike itself, Ukraine used two upgraded Hornet fixed-wing drones.
The first drone struck the Su-24M’s nose section, likely destroying the cockpit and avionics.
The second drone impacted near the fuel tanks, triggering a catastrophic fire. The aircraft was reportedly completely destroyed before taking off.
Notably, the sequencing suggests deliberate target planning rather than simply attempting to hit the aircraft at any location.
Targeting the Su-24M
The Su-24M is a Soviet-designed variable-sweep wing strike bomber. Introduced during the Cold War, the Su-24M conducts missions comparable to those of the retired US F-111, i.e., low-level penetration, precision strike, and all-weather attack.

F-111B. Image Credit: U.S. Military.
Still widely used by Russia, the Su-24M frequently launches glide bombs, precision-guided munitions and conducts tactical strike missions against Ukraine.
Even though the aircraft is a Cold War relic, it remains an important part of Russia’s tactical strike fleet. And despite being decades old, the Su-24M is significantly more sophisticated than the Hornet drone.
Releasing the Hornet
Public reporting suggests that the upgraded version of the Hornet features a fixed-wing configuration, extended operational range, autonomous navigation, improved resilience against electronic warfare, and relatively low production costs.
Fixed-wing drones are especially helpful for Ukraine’s purpose, providing greater endurance, longer range, and higher cruise efficiency than quadcopters—thereby facilitating strikes deep into Russian territory.
According to Ukraine, the Su-24M strike represents the first operational use of the upgraded Hornet variant over such distances.
Penetrating Russian Air Defenses
Saky is reportedly protected by electronic warfare systems and mobile air-defense teams.
Yet Ukraine says planners succeeded through careful route planning, surprise, and intelligence preparation.
The takeaway here is that while modern air defenses remain highly capable, defending every single aircraft parked across a sprawling air base against a small, low-flying drone is roughly impossible.
And that’s one of the primary benefits of emerging drone technology: it is exceedingly difficult to defend against.
Asymmetric Costs
The reported cost of a Hornet strike package is about $10,000, about the same as a used Toyota Yaris. The destroyed Su-24M, meanwhile, is worth many millions of dollars, comparable to a fleet of Toyota F1 race cars.
But low-cost autonomous systems are increasingly being used to threaten expensive legacy platforms. This is becoming one of the defining characteristics of modern warfare.
And even the lingering threat of drone attack, whether executed or not, forces Russia to increase security around parked aircraft at air bases far removed from the front.
This imposes additional manpower, financial, and psychological costs on Russia, which accumulate over time—all owing to a $10,000 drone system produced and deployed at scale.
Strategic Implications
Crimea becomes less secure. Saky has long served as a key Russian aviation hub. Repeated successful strikes may force Russia to disperse aircraft, relocate bombers deeper inside Russia, and invest additional resources in protecting rear-area airfields.
This, in turn, reduces Russia’s sortie generation rate; moving aircraft farther from Ukraine means longer transit flights, higher fuel consumption, a greater maintenance burden, and ultimately, fewer missions per day.
Forcing Russia to fly hundreds of miles farther than before reduces operational efficiency.
This is all a demonstration of how effective Ukraine’s evolving deep-strike campaign is becoming. Increasingly, Ukraine appears to be focused on airfields, logistics hubs, fuel depots, command centers, and, in this case, a parked Su-24M.
This campaign won’t take Russia out of the fight, but it will force Russia to devote increasing resources to defend infrastructure that had, until recently, been relatively secure.
About the Author: Harrison Kass
Harrison Kass is a writer and attorney focused on national security, technology, and political culture. His work has appeared in Tablet, City Journal, The Hill, The Spectator, and The Cipher Brief. He holds a JD from the University of Oregon and a master’s in Global & Joint Program Studies from NYU. More at harrisonkass.com.
