Key Points and Summary – War in the Taiwan Strait wouldn’t yield a clean U.S. win. China’s missiles, submarines and proximity threaten carriers and forward bases.
-Taiwan is shifting to asymmetric defense—mobile missiles, hardened infrastructure, civil resilience—but the U.S. industrial base, munitions stocks and repair capacity lag.
-Likely phases: opening missile/cyber/space strikes; a brutal sea-denial fight against invasion convoys; possible blockades and urban combat if a beachhead forms, with nuclear risk overhead.
-The most plausible outcome is denial—China fails to conquer—but at staggering cost. To deter or prevail, Washington must surge production, harden bases, lock in allied access and prepare publics now.
A Taiwan War: Who Wins and At What Cost?
On any given day in the not-too-distant future, the Taiwan Strait could erupt in war. Missiles and aircraft could race across the Strait’s skies; warships and submarines could fight in its waters. And the world will ask: did America—and its friend Taiwan—have a fighting chance?
This question is not idle speculation. More than a year of stepped-up Chinese military exercises, an expanding Chinese submarine fleet, and accelerating defense reforms in Taiwan have given new urgency to the question.
The answer, uncomfortably, is that the United States can probably prevent a Chinese conquest of Taiwan. But it can do so only at far greater cost, risk, and uncertainty than most public debates suggest.
Preemptive Efforts
Deterrence is the best hope, but if deterrence fails, America will not “win” cleanly. Indeed, the most likely outcome is a bloody denial of Beijing’s objectives, one that depends on the industrial depth of the American and allied response and the strength of Taiwan’s asymmetric defenses.
Beijing has prepared extensively. Carrier strike groups that once symbolized unchallengeable dominance are now vulnerable to salvos of DF-21D and DF-26 anti-ship ballistic missiles. The PLA Navy is the largest in the world, while its rocket force and counterspace systems are designed to blind, disrupt, and overwhelm American power projection.
Geography compounds these challenges: Beijing fights on its doorstep with short supply lines and the ability to mass firepower quickly, while Washington would have to operate across thousands of miles, threading its way through missile envelopes and cyber disruption into a battlespace engineered to destroy it. The strategic balance has shifted because China has deliberately built the tools to tilt it.
Taiwan Bolsters Defences
Taiwan, aware of this shifting environment, has responded by moving away from overreliance on the promise of American rescue. In recent years, it has stood up a fourth Patriot missile battalion, begun receiving PAC-3 MSE interceptors, and tested its indigenous Tien Kung-IV air defense system. It has also created a Whole-of-Society Defense Resilience Committee to coordinate civil-defense training, secure critical materials, and harden infrastructure.
J-10 Fighter From China. Image Credit: Creative Commons.
Earlier this month, Taipei issued an updated handbook to prepare its citizens for disinformation and attack. These initiatives are not just about Taiwan’s self-defense; they are recognition that China’s buildup makes it impossible for the United States to guarantee salvation. Taiwan is preparing to fight because it understands that it may have to hold out on its own.
By contrast, the picture for the United States is more ambiguous. Washington still teeters uncomfortably on the knife-edge of “strategic ambiguity,” a policy that buys flexibility but invites doubt. On the one hand, the FY-2025 Pacific Deterrence Initiative allocates nearly ten billion dollars to improve logistics, forward basing, and allied integration. The Marine Corps has converted its Okinawa regiment into a Littoral Regiment designed to survive inside the PLA’s missile envelope. Access to nine Philippine bases has been secured, including northern Luzon sites positioned near the Taiwan Strait.
These are serious steps that respond directly to Chinese capabilities and Taiwan’s vulnerabilities. On the other hand, the US defense industrial base is fragile. Production of long-range anti-ship missiles, hardened aircraft shelters, and naval repair capacity lags far behind the demands of a major conflict.
Magazine stores are shallow, logistics are overstretched, and repair yards are inadequate. And while American access to bases in Japan and the Philippines enhances the ability of US forces to sustain their campaign, China’s opening salvos against these facilities might become the brutal prelude to a wider war.
Staged Conflict
The conflict itself would likely play out in several phases. The opening week would be defined by missile barrages aimed at Taiwan’s defenses and US forward bases, along with cyber and space attacks to blind command networks. Taiwan’s dispersal plans and mobile launchers would mitigate, but not eliminate, the damage.
The next phase would be the battle for sea denial. Submarines, mines, and long-range anti-ship weapons would be hurled against convoys carrying PLA troops and supplies across the Strait. Geography favors the defenders, but China’s proximity and numerical advantage mean some ships would get through. The outcome of this battle for sea denial would turn on whether enough could survive repeated strikes to sustain a lodgment.
If the lodgment falters under relentless attrition, America and its allies will have succeeded in denying conquest, though at staggering cost in lives, matériel, and economic disruption. If Chinese forces succeed in securing even a tenuous beachhead, the war would slide into urban combat, blockade, and prolonged attrition, with Taiwan devastated and America drained by the effort. Nuclear escalation would loom over every stage of the war, raising the risk that the conflict could spill beyond the conventional theater.
Outcome Factors
Factors decisive for the outcome of the conflict include industrial capacity, Taiwan’s asymmetric defenses, allied access, and public resilience. Industrial capacity remains the first. Without a dramatic surge in missile production, sustainment, and repair, America’s ability to outlast China in a protracted struggle is in doubt.
Taiwan’s asymmetric defenses are the second decisive factor. If its mobile missile batteries, hardened infrastructure, and civil defense systems perform as advertised, they could tip the scales in a drawn-out campaign. Allied access is the third. Basing rights in Japan and the Philippines could prove the difference between rapid reinforcement and dangerous delay.
Finally, public resilience matters. Taiwan has invested heavily in civil defense and social cohesion, but disinformation, bombardment, and casualties could erode morale. For America, the test would be whether its public would accept the scale of sacrifice required.
H-6 Bomber from China. Image Credit: Creative Commons.
The United States today could likely prevent Beijing from conquering Taiwan outright. The most plausible outcome is denial: Taiwan survives as a de facto independent polity, the PLA fails to consolidate control, and Beijing’s gamble ends in frustration. But this would be a pyrrhic success, with allied forces bloodied, Taiwan shattered, and America’s global posture degraded. A less frequent outcome is a contested stalemate: a campaign in which Chinese troops cling to a fragile beachhead.
The possibility of outright defeat—China achieving conquest while the US fails to dislodge them—remains low, but cannot be dismissed. In each case, the costs would be immense and enduring.
If Washington truly believes Taiwan is worth defending, it must act now. Industrial capacity must be expanded at speed and scale, especially in the realm of missiles, hardened bases, and sustainment. Allies must be clarified and commitments synchronized to eliminate the ambiguity that tempts aggression. Civil defense must be strengthened both in Taiwan and in the United States, where the public must be prepared for sacrifice if deterrence fails.
Deterrence will hold only if its credibility is real, and credibility does not rest on rhetoric but on readiness.
America could save Taiwan. But unless it sharpens its tools, steels its will, and invests now in the grim requirements of denial, it risks fighting not for victory but merely to stave off defeat.
About the Author: Dr. Andrew Latham
Andrew Latham is a Senior Washington Fellow with the Institute for Peace and Diplomacy, a non-resident fellow at Defense Priorities, and a professor of international relations and political theory at Macalester College in Saint Paul, MN. You can follow him on X: @aakatham. He writes a daily column for National Security Journal.
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Jim
September 12, 2025 at 8:33 pm
This kind of assessment can lead us out of the wilderness.
Isn’t obvious, the United States needs to make a deal with China over Taiwan.
And, we can get a good, actually better than you can imagine, deal.
China vacates all its claim to sovereignty over the South China Sea. (Which was illegally taken by soft conquest — building military fortifications without opposition, then claiming sovereignty.
And, anything in the East China Sea.
These are European cartographer’s descriptions from the 15th Century… they mean nothing today.
And, get the best possible constancy of the relationships of Taiwanese citizens with American citizens and a constancy of the duel nature of Taiwan in relationship to China: continue the Taiwan parliament as an autonomous governing body in consultation with China as a whole and recognizing China as sovereign in all international relations.
With a date-certain hand-off… that’s the hard part.
Better, a great deal we can get from China up front rather than the perils of war if we insist on going to war against China over Taiwan, which many analysts want to do.
Over a postage stamp 7,000 miles away (5,000 from Hawaii).
If China kills the goose that laid the Golden Egg (Taiwan) after the hand-off then we know were we stand.
Comprendi.
David Cain
September 13, 2025 at 1:39 pm
David P Goldman has previously suggested that China would not invade Taiwan but rather, at the time of its choosing, blockade the island using its dynamically growing naval power enhanced by its land-to-sea hypersonic missile superiority over the US Navy. Taiwan probably would be forced to surrender within a matter of weeks. Military invasion is an option for China but not the preferred one.
The author mention the factor of public resilience in the US. This country has punched itself stupid by fighting wars in SW Asia and on the Eurasian Steppe for the last 35 years. These wars have cost the American treasury an estimated 7-8 trillion dollars. This disastrous and unproductive squandering of national wealth is still not comprehended by many people. For America, a naval war off of China’s doorstep would be like the 1905 Straits of Tsushima Battle was for the Romanov Empire. Lose ca. 10,000 naval personnel in a day,, and that is the end of the American Empire since 1945.
Go ahead. Make my day.
David Cain
Swamplaw Yankee
September 13, 2025 at 1:54 pm
Comprendi? Nice that was asked as the lights are blaring out of the White House, but, it is now speculated more freely, there is zero capability at home.
The fella stopped touting F-35 purchases by Mexico to be so gentle with the inner beltway readers on their geopolitical problem they created in 1945. Who can see past those green coated aquarium glass walls?
The Truman Cabal betrayed their Han Chinese ally as Truman viciously pushed that no FREE ammo/hardware from Hitlers/Herohitos regime be donated to the USA ally, the ancient independent Chinese.
FDR, Truman just had it out for an independent China, stonewalling any free or even purchased at high overprice, NAZI/Jap ammo for empty guns.
The war annals are full of data how the Stalin butchers whispered “kitman” into Trumans ear while the Jap air and army hardware was exclusively shipped by the commies to the little vassal of Stalin’s Mao Tse-tung.
So, Truman, the USA is the actual second “Father” of the PRC CCP Han.
Now, the grown up Han Baby has turned against MAGA’s aging POTUS Trumpkins. Instead of Orwell, maybe we can work in some dusty Shakespeare plot with tense, but evolving, Father (USA) son (PRC) relationship. Do we all see a very convaluted, long Netflix series, that I just copyrighted. -30-
Jim Burke
September 13, 2025 at 5:22 pm
As a Vietnam era veteran who was stationed on Oahu, I would highly recommend that we withdraw from the “First Island Chain” (Korea- Japan- Taiwan- Philippines -Indonesia- Singapore) to the “Third Island Chain” (Alaska- Hawaii- Australia- New Zealand).
We cannot “win” a war China’s doorstep, China finds it intolerable that we have a close blockade on their country, ready to go at a moment’s notice. They will continue to build up their capabilities, and we may well be bankrupting ourselves trying to compete.
Articles such as this overstate Taiwanese enthusiasm for fighting their massive cousin. Their President favors separation from China, but the other two parties are actively halting any increase in their defense budget. The KMT wants a settlement with China, perhaps similar to Hong Kong.
Are we really willing to risk a naval defeat over lukewarm “allies”?
If we withdraw to the Third Island Chain, we can be virtually invulnerable to attack (the “tyranny of distance” would flip to our advantage), and we could safely slash our military budget, and no longer be required to wage wars far from home (like my war, Vietnam.)