Key Points – The recent ceasefire deal, brokered after US and Israeli strikes crippled Iran’s nuclear and military infrastructure, presents Tehran with an opportunity to abandon its long-held ambitions for regional hegemony.
-For years, Iran successfully projected power through its “axis of resistance,” a network of proxies in Lebanon, Yemen, Iraq, and Syria.
-However, this network has crumbled over the past year with the weakening of Hezbollah and the fall of the Assad regime.
-The recent war exposed Iran’s conventional military vulnerabilities, forcing it into a face-saving, limited missile strike on Qatar.
-This ceasefire could be a turning point, compelling Iran to scale back its costly foreign interventions.
The Decline of Iran’s Proxies: How Tehran’s Regional Power Crumbled
On June 23, Iran launched a ballistic missile attack targeting the US Al-Udeid base in Qatar. The United States was well prepared for the attack. The State Department had urged Americans to shelter in place, and US Central Command coordinated closely with the Qataris to intercept the threats.
Iran carried out the attack in response to the US airstrikes on three Iranian nuclear sites on June 22.
Axis of Resistance in the Region
Iran’s attack appears to have been limited and intended to secure the ceasefire that President Donald Trump announced several hours after the missiles were intercepted. With no one killed in Qatar, it was easier to enable de-escalation.
Trump urged Israel to end its attacks on Iran, which began on June 13, and Doha urged Iran to stop its attacks on Israel. The ceasefire deal commenced on June 24. With the shaky agreement in place, the region can breathe a sigh of relief.
Now, the deal may pave the way for changes in the Middle East. A new trajectory could emerge, enabling Iran to scale back its regional ambitions and reduce conflicts in various regions.
Iran’s ambitions have led to conflict in many areas of the Middle East. Iran has portrayed itself as leading an “axis of resistance” to the US and Israel in the region. It has funded and backed numerous armed proxy groups.
These groups include Hezbollah in Lebanon, as well as the Houthis in Yemen. In addition, Iran has backed Palestinian groups such as Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. It has also backed militias in Iraq. Before the fall of the Assad regime on December 8, 2024, Iran also backed militias in Syria that helped prop up the Assad regime.
If one looked at a map of the Middle East over the last decade, it was clear that Iran’s influence and power were growing.
For instance, the Houthis not only grew in power in 2014 and 2015, but they also began to be able to target shipping in the Red Sea and built a ballistic missile and drone program that could target large parts of Saudi Arabia. In Iraq, the Popular Mobilization Forces of Shi’ite militias helped defeat ISIS.
However, they then stayed in power in parts of Iraq and began targeting US forces in 2019, including the Kurdistan Regional Government in northern Iraq. Hezbollah also grew beyond Lebanon’s borders to play a key role in the Syrian civil war.
Iran’s power grew to such an extent in the Middle East that it controlled a swath of the region. By 2018, a member of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps could drive from Tehran to Baghdad. They could then drive west to the border with Syria and cross at Albukamal, where Iranian-backed Kataib Hezbollah had a headquarters. From there, they could drive to Lebanon and link up with Hezbollah. If they preferred the maritime route, they could leave from Iran by boat and reach Yemen.
This route was a testament to Iranian influence in the region, an arc of unprecedented regional hegemonic power. Iran wasn’t the only power in the region, but the weakness of countries such as Iraq had enabled Iran to spread its wings in various directions.
Most Arab countries, such as Jordan or Egypt, were busy with internal affairs. Iran was projecting power.
Projecting Power
This power projection led to increasing conflicts. Iran targeted Saudi Arabia with cruise missiles and drones in 2019. Its backing of Hamas also likely led the group to gamble with the massive attack on Israel on October 7, 2023.
Hamas was likely convinced, via meetings with Hezbollah and other elements of the Iranian proxy network, that a multi-front war would defeat Israel. Israel wasn’t defeated. Instead, Israel clawed its way back, weakened Hamas, and forced Hezbollah into a ceasefire by November 2024. By December 8, 2024, the Assad regime had also fallen. Iran rapidly saw the region slip from beneath its feet.
The weakness of the Iranian proxies enabled the Israeli attack on June 13. Iran was exposed. Iran invested a lot in the proxies and did not invest as much in its air defenses and systems to deal with Israel’s 5th Generation aircraft, such as the F-35I Adir.
Iran likely had no way to defend against these aircraft, but Tehran didn’t calculate this challenge. Instead, it continued in the spring of 2025 as if things hadn’t changed. This arrogance and hubris in Tehran led it to take a drubbing in a war that began on June 13. It also encouraged Trump to carry out the strikes on June 22.
Now Iran has a chance to reverse course. Qatar, a major non-NATO ally, has played a key role in facilitating the ceasefire deal. Iran could now choose a new course. The nuclear weapons program has become a sunk cost.
Fordow, Isfahan, Natanz, Arak, and other nuclear program sites are damaged. A huge investment is lost. Iran has also lost many ballistic missiles. Iran’s drones, which it launched in the hundreds between June 13 and June 24, did not penetrate Israel’s air defenses.
Iran must re-think its defense doctrine and strategy in the region. Most countries did not have sympathy for Iran because of its past behavior in the region. Even friends of Tehran, such as Moscow and Beijing, did not step up.
Tehran can use the ceasefire to climb down from its past drive for regional hegemony.
About the Author: Seth Frantzman
Seth Frantzman is the author of The October 7 War: Israel’s Battle for Security in Gaza (2024) and an adjunct fellow at The Foundation for Defense of Democracies. He is a Senior Middle East Analyst for The Jerusalem Post. Seth is now a National Security Journal Contributing Editor.
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doyle-1
June 24, 2025 at 1:45 pm
Unlikely. The June 2025 twelve-day attack by the Terrible Duo will stiffen Tehran’s resolve.
Iran will grow closer to Moscow and Pyongyang.
And away from the arabs and xi jinping’s China. To hell with the belt and road nonsense.
Pyongyang especially, has the haeil technology, or underwater torpedo drone system. This system has the immense power to drown the Arabs and their brother xi jinping.
Also, north Korea’s hwasong rockets today have a great impact on global battlefields.
Very likely, the Koreans will one day develop a hwasong FOBS rocket. Or a hwasong FOBS glider.
It’s clear iran knows the enemy only understands the language of violence and force.
The language of rockets and torpedo drones. And FOBS.
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DOYLE 2
June 24, 2025 at 8:47 pm
Now that the smoke has cleared, iran must assessed who its real friends are.
Iran’s real friends are Russia, north Korea, Pakistan and India.
Other nations like Qatar and china and Saudi Arabia, at best, are fair weather friends.
The others, like Germany, Ukraine, US and EU and IAEA are wolves in sheep’s clothing.
Israel on the other hand, is the mortal enemy. THE ENEMY which must be held to full account for outright slaughter in Gaza and Iran. And in Lebanon, yemen and Syria.