What Happens to Netanyahu When the Hamas War Is Over?

Netanyahu’s Impending ‘Day After’ Reckoning: Benjamin Netanyahu, the Prime Minister of Israel, is surrounded by controversy due to domestic and foreign policies, which the Israeli-Hamas War now exacerbates. In the aftermath of the October 7th terrorist attacks by Hamas, Netanyahu immediately declared war and moved to a wartime cabinet.

Netanyahu has been criticized for the intelligence failures that enabled October 7th and his true objectives of the war in Gaza by not only his opposition but also allied partners and members of the Israeli security apparatus. As the war in Gaza winds down and a potential war against Hezbollah looms, Netanyahu’s ‘day after’ plan and security hearings will come under great pressure.

The backdrop of the 2023 Israel-Hamas War

The current Israeli-Hamas war is seeing Hamas’ capabilities being degraded, but at a major price. Israel is quietly losing the PR battle with a myriad of instances.

The conduct of the war is bringing criticism from not only human rights groups but also Israeli allies in America and Europe. Members of Netanyahu’s cabinet, such as Ben Gvir and Bizazel Smotrich, are coming under criticism at home and abroad due to their inflammatory remarks.

While support for Israeli defense remains popular in America, Netanyahu’s diplomatic dispute with the Biden Administration is causing a rift in American-Israeli relations at the wrong time due to regional tensions with a more emboldened Islamic Republic.

The ongoing war in Gaza and the growing shadow war between Israel and Iran is pushing the Middle East into a broader regional conflict, which major international players wish to avoid. While America backed Israel’s defense during the Islamic Republic’s missile and drone barrage and reportedly gave assurances if a war with Hezbollah breaks out, Washington is worried Netanyahu may abuse his authority and further rift the already fragile government in Jerusalem.

Growing Pressure over Clear, Hold, Build

One of Netanyahu’s main obstacles is the plan, or lack thereof, over a “day after” policy in the war in Gaza—something his opposition, military, and the United States are pressuring the Israeli Prime over.

The impending reconstruction plan in a post-war Gaza is causing a problem inside of Netanyahu’s cabinet. Fears the Israeli PM may not have a concrete plan for a post-Hamas government are at the forefront.

On Wednesday, June 19th, Israeli Defense Forces spokesman Rear Admiral Daniel Hagari stated the destruction of Hamas would be unattainable as the Gazan terrorist organization is an idea that is popular in the Palestinian Territories. Just military means might not be enough to eradicate the organization. Because of this, Israel must focus on groundwork to hinter and mitigate any renewed growth from Hamas in Gaza.

Rear Admiral Hagari also hinted that a moderate government alternative in Gaza would put further pressure on Hamas and mitigate a revival of the organization—but this would have to be a decision from the country’s political wing (Bibi’s wartime cabinet).

Reports have surfaced that some Arab nations could participate in post-war security, but this would ultimately be up to the Israeli government. The IDF, increasingly becoming overstretched due to the threats of war with Hezbollah in Lebanon and Syria, would find it difficult to administer a prolonged singular security in Gaza, and therefore, a coalition of friendly Arab states may need to suffice.

Friendly Arab countries with growing relations with Israel, such as the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and perhaps Jordan, can suffice in supplementing the IDF with security in such a clear, hold, build post-war reconstruction plan in the Gaza Strip.

Nevertheless, another potential war, one with Hezbollah and plans to push the Iranian-backed group beyond the Litani River, is once again raising questions on another post-war plan.

A war with Hezbollah is already estimated to be ‘unthinkable’ and a ‘nightmare’ due to the capabilities of the Israeli military and the Iranian-funded and armed militia. Suppose the IDF achieves the objectives of moving Hezbollah beyond the Litani River and establishing a security buffer/demilitarized zone. In that case, Netanyahu will have to think of an even bigger concrete day-after plan.

In 1982, Israel found itself with little to no plan during the Lebanese Civil War after ejecting the PLO from Beirut. Not having a true withdrawal plan or path to restore a friendly Lebanese government, the IDF instead became involved in their ‘Afghanistan.’

The perpetual occupation, particularly in Southern Lebanon, without a true community-building operation, only exacerbated tensions with the Shiites, which the Mullahs of Iran would take advantage of. Sending numerous IRGC advisors to Southern Lebanon, Hezbollah would be created from the powder keg under the IDF’s nose.

The backdrop of Hezbollah’s foundation only led to more IDF casualties, and as international pressure mounted, Israel was compelled to withdraw, and Hezbollah only became stronger and now the largest party in Lebanon. The plan of propping up the Southern Lebanese Army failed, and a chaotic retreat ensued soon after.

Hezbollah has more capabilities to rise if defeated than Hamas as the organization is far more popular among Lebanese Shiites than Palestinians think of Hamas. Suppose a war were to break out with Hezbollah. In that case, just destroying and degrading the organization will not be enough, but enhanced cooperation with more open-to peace talks groups in Lebanon can mitigate the Iranian paramilitary from coming back.

A Monumental Intelligence Failure Hearing Awaits

October 7th was not only the world’s most infamous terrorist attack since the activation of ISIS cells across Europe, but it was the biggest failure of national security not seen in Israel since the Yom Kippur War.

Hamas’ attack included sophisticated planning that included a mass rocket barrage, destruction of the barrier wall, paragliders targeting a highly important music festival, and thousands of foot soldiers pouring into Israel. An attack as coordinated as what Hamas planned would’ve taken several months or a year to come to fruition.

During the three Israel-Hamas Wars, reports have surfaced that Egypt sent warnings to the Israeli government, and junior security officers sent intelligence reports to higher echelons of command. In both instances, the reports were not taken seriously by Netanyahu’s administration due to negligence or self-arrogance.

Immediately when the war ends, Netanyahu and his defense cabinet will need to stand a public inquiry as to how and why a militant group was able to be one step ahead of one of the world’s top intelligence agencies.

Whereas Golda Meir and Moshe Dayan took responsibility for their security and intelligence failures during the Yom Kippur War, Netanyahu, so far, blames everyone except himself. It is unknown if he will step down from a national tragedy like Meir did after the 1973 war.

Israel’s Foreign Relations Future if Bibi Stays

Another major factor of the Israeli government’s ’after day’ preparations will be the foreign relations effect of Netanyahu’s policies. Bibi’s foreign policies have always been controversial due to close relations with war-mongering tyrants such as Vladimir Putin of Russia and Ilham Aliyev of Azerbaijan.

The Abraham Accords enhanced Israel’s foreign relations in the Middle East, especially with ever-increasing ties with an influential UAE. However, Hamas, willing to sacrifice its population, purposely conducted a brutal terror attack in hopes the IDF would unleash hell on Gaza to ruin Israeli relations—which for now remains to be known if it succeeded or failed.

Whereas Gantz and Lapid, the opposition, want to mend foreign relations better, Netanyahu is steadfast on one that may isolate the Israeli people in the future, at a time when the country’s public relations have taken a nosedive post-military action in Gaza.

The ICC also has an arrest warrant for PM Netanyahu and his Defense Minister, Yoav Gallant. As many of Israel’s allies have ratified the Rome Statute, both are acceptable to be arrested in a plethora of Western countries. The arrest warrant will affect essential travel for the Israeli PM, especially with European allies.

Netanyahu’s biggest obstacle will be relations with the United States government—particularly the current Biden administration. President Biden and PM Netanyahu have openly had a diplomatic conflict, which may exacerbate as America heads closer to the 2024 Presidential elections and Israel prepares for a looming war with Hezbollah.

Whereas Netanyahu and Biden disagree, former President and also current Republican nominee Donald Trump agrees with all aspects of Bibi’s policies and is close to the Israeli Prime Minister. Netanyahu may end up gambling towards a potential Trump administration to keep power and a major superpower to try to dissuade the ICC warrant.

Israel currently faces major challenges and security threats but will face even more complications with post-war consequences from negligence under the current government. Whereas Benjamin Netanyahu escaped corruption for decades, a major national security failure, disastrous public relations from his cabinet, and a lack of accountability and transparency will be things the Israeli Prime Minister cannot outrun.

About the Author: Julian McBride

Julian McBride is a forensic anthropologist, SOFREP contributor, and independent journalist born in New York. He reports and documents the plight of people around the world who are affected by conflicts, rogue geopolitics, and war, and also tells the stories of war victims whose voices are never heard. Julian is the founder and director of the Reflections of War Initiative (ROW), an anthropological NGO which aims to tell the stories of the victims of war through art therapy. As a former Marine, he uses this technique not only to help heal PTSD but also to share people’s stories through art, which conveys “the message of the brutality of war better than most news organizations.” McBride is also a Contributing Editor to this publication.