Iran’s Qatar ‘Missile Strike’ Was a ‘Performative Attack’

Key Points and Summary: Iran’s missile strike on Qatar’s Al Udeid Air Base on June 23rd was not a genuine military escalation but a calculated, “performative” act of retaliation straight from Supreme Leader Khamenei’s playbook.

This strategy, previously used after the 2020 Soleimani killing, involves public bluster followed by a telegraphed, limited strike on a pre-warned or evacuated target.

The attack on the largely empty Qatar base allowed Iran to save face with its hardline domestic audience while simultaneously signaling to the US that it does not seek a wider war.

This symbolic act likely marks the fever breaking, creating an off-ramp for de-escalation and a return to backchannel diplomacy.

Iran’s Revenge Attack Might Have Been ‘Performative’

Iran’s missile strike on Qatar’s Al Udeid Air Base on June 23rd was not a genuine military escalation but a calculated, “performative” act of retaliation straight from Supreme Leader Khamenei’s playbook.

This strategy, previously used after the 2020 Soleimani killing, involves public bluster followed by a telegraphed, limited strike on a pre-warned or evacuated target.

The attack on the largely empty Qatar base allowed Iran to save face with its hardline domestic audience while simultaneously signaling to the US that it does not seek a wider war.

This symbolic act likely marks the fever breaking, creating an off-ramp for de-escalation and a return to backchannel diplomacy.

Iran’s Qatar Attack Straight from Tehran’s Playbook: What it Means

Iran has launched several missiles that struck Qatar’s Al-Udeid Air Base which, until recently, was home to U.S. forces. The Pentagon quietly withdrew U.S. aircraft and most of its servicemen prior to then Israeli strike. Why then did Iran hit Qatar?

The move is straight from Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s playbook. To understand the Khamenei’s actions, it is important to recognize that he has two audiences: First, are his own hardline supporters. Revolutionary youth who believe what Khamenei says and suck on the teat of Islamic Republic propaganda from the day they are born to the moment they enter the paramilitary Basij until the day they then take a commission in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. His second audience are overseas leftists and professional anti-war protestors who will believe whatever Iranian diplomats spoon feed them. They are the 21st century equivalent of Cold War-era “useful idiots.”

The playbook is well-worn. Khamenei previously turned to it after the January 3, 2020 drone strike on Qods Force chief Qassem Soleimani.

First, Khamenei blusters and threatens. Warn that revenge will be so unprecedented, it will be like Armageddon. Accompanying Khamenei’s threats will be warnings that Americans, Israelis, and/or Jews will be unsafe, anywhere in the world.

Second, have diplomats quietly activate backchannels to try to mitigate risk. Explain to the Qataris, Omanis, or Kurds that it is necessary to save face and ask if they can convey to the Americans that Iran will limit its response. After Soleimani’s death, Iran retaliated against U.S. forces in Erbil and at the Al Asad Airbase in Iraq. Some Americans were injured, but the attack did not kill anyone. That was by design, as the Iranians made sure the Americans and Iraqis knew what was coming.

What Khamenei sought was not dead Americans, but rather a video he could show to his base, showing that he had struck a devastating blow to the Americans. His supporters know not to ask too many questions, nor would they ever question their marja’ at-taqlid, their source of religious emulation.

The attack on Qatar checks the same boxes. Qatar knew it was coming; they might not like playing the part, but they understood Iran’s need for a performative response. While Qataris still calculate the American presence to be in their interest, the attack can still support Iran’s efforts to suggest that U.S. presence in the region is the problem. The American anti-war left will embrace such messaging while other countries might simultaneously think twice about hosting Americans.

By participating in such a pantomime, Khamenei also plays into the U.S. desire for limitation of hostilities. He signals to Trump that he does not seek to escalate and disincentivizes Trump’s newfound consideration of regime change. Khamenei also avoids any sniping from his hardline base that might grumble that a lack of meaningful response means the old man has lost his edge.

The terrorism that the Islamic Republic sponsors is engrained deeply in its ideology. Khamenei may put the major revenge on hold, but he will nurture the grievance of the U.S. attack to trot out to justify further terrorism for weeks or months to come, as long as the international community allows him to get away with it. After all, he also understand how morally inverse if not racist much of the anti-war crowd is as well as European diplomatic culture. Both will blame the victims of terrorism, suggesting that they had it coming. They discount the agency of Iranians, Palestinians, or others who make a conscious decision to target civilians or engage in terror.

Is the conflict over? No, but the attack on Qatar is a sign that the worst is past. It is like the sweats marking the break in a fever. It signals the major turning point that must occur before de-escalation can begin, Expect backchannel diplomacy now to determine the nature of the offramp Iran takes, but take one it will.

The only remaining question is whether Khamenei is wise enough to realize he cannot then return to business as usual; he may still need to drink his chalice of poison and forfeit the Islamic Republic’s nuclear program.

As for Qatar, the attack could be a blessing, especially as suspicion of Qatar’s own actions builds in Washington.

Now, they cannot have the Iranian attack as a credential to suggest they do not want Iran to triumph, never mind what they think or say behind closed doors.

About the Author: Dr. Michael Rubin

Michael Rubin is a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute and director of policy analysis at the Middle East Forum. The views expressed are his own.

Russia’s Bomber Forces

Tu-22M3: The Bomber Ukraine Hit With Drones

Tu-95 Bear: This Might Be Russia’s Version of the B-52

Putin Could Soon Test a Tactical Nuclear Weapon