Key Points – China’s J-20 “Mighty Dragon” is not a flawed F-22 knockoff but a strategic rebuttal to decades of American air power complacency.
-It’s a true fifth-generation fighter, now equipped with indigenous WS-15 supercruise-capable engines, designed specifically for a “counter-intervention” role in the Indo-Pacific.
-Its primary mission is not to out-dogfight US fighters, but to threaten and destroy the critical American support assets—tankers, AWACS, and fourth-generation aircraft—that enable the US way of war.
-As the aerial tip of a layered A2/AD system, the J-20 signals the end of uncontested US air dominance in the region.
J-20 Fighter in 3 Words: No F-22 Copycat
Let’s get one thing straight: the Chengdu J-20 is not a Chinese knockoff of the F-22. That cliché belongs to a bygone era – the lazy trope of Western superiority cloaked in techno-racist smugness. Nor is it merely a symbol of Chinese ambition. It is something far more consequential: a blunt, roaring, high-altitude challenge to America’s illusion of uncontested air dominance in the Indo-Pacific. The J-20 is what happens when a great power – long dismissed as a copycat – decides to build something not just for show, but for war.
Since its first public unveiling at Zhuhai in 2016, the J-20 has undergone a transformation far more rapid and ambitious than most in the West expected. Initially powered by Russian engines, the aircraft was mocked as an airframe still tethered to Soviet-era propulsion. Not anymore. The WS-15 – China’s indigenous, supercruise-capable engine—is now in active deployment. That changes everything. It means range, speed, and sustained stealth at altitude. It means Beijing now fields a true fifth-generation fighter – less agile perhaps than the F-22, less versatile than the F-35, but tailored for a different mission entirely: denying the United States and its allies air superiority in the skies over Taiwan, the South China Sea, and beyond.
What’s remarkable about the J-20 is not its performance specs. It’s the strategic context in which it has emerged – and the doctrinal shift it reflects. American planners still think in terms of “penetrating” enemy airspace, “kicking down the door,” and dominating from the air in all phases of conflict. China has flipped that script. The J-20 is not a first-strike weapon – it’s a counter-intervention weapon. Its job isn’t to patrol the globe or bomb desert airfields. Its job is to kill American enablers: tankers, AWACS, and vulnerable fourth-gen fighters that operate at the edge of American logistics chains. It’s built not for expeditionary warfare but for strategic denial. It’s a tool of anti-access, area-denial (A2/AD) – but with fangs and stealth.
For years, Western analysts downplayed the J-20. Some still do. They’ll say it’s too big. That its canards compromise its radar cross-section. That its radar and data fusion are inferior. But those critiques miss the point. The J-20 doesn’t have to be a better dogfighter than the F-22. It doesn’t have to match the F-35’s electronic warfare capabilities. It only has to do two things: survive in a contested battlespace and threaten the assets that keep the American way of air war functioning. In that mission, it is increasingly well-suited. And that should give us pause.
The evolution of the J-20 also exposes something deeper – something structural. America once defined the bleeding edge of military aviation. But the Chinese, in less than two decades, have closed a technological gap that once seemed insurmountable. They’ve done it not through innovation alone, but through strategic patience, state-directed research, and industrial discipline that the United States – hamstrung by endless procurement dysfunction and the myopic demands of profit-maximizing contractors no longer seems capable of replicating.
This is not just a story about jets. It’s about grand strategy. It’s about a revisionist power weaponizing time, geography, and defense-industrial coordination to tilt the balance of power in the Western Pacific. The J-20 doesn’t exist in a vacuum. It’s part of a layered system of systems: long-range missiles like the PL-15, which may already outrange America’s AMRAAM; an expanding constellation of satellites; and a growing drone and electronic warfare ecosystem designed to blind, jam, and overwhelm. The J-20 is the tip of a spear aimed at America’s assumption of air supremacy. And it is sharpening fast.
Nowhere is this more significant than Taiwan. In a fight over the island, the J-20 wouldn’t need to dominate the skies outright. It would only need to hold U.S. forces at bay long enough for the PLA to flood the Taiwan Strait with missiles, ships, and paratroopers. If American tankers can’t get close enough to fuel F-35s, if AWACS can’t see clearly through jamming and harassment, and if fourth-gen jets are picked off from range, the U.S. loses its edge – and perhaps the fight.
Some American defense analysts dismiss this scenario. They point to pilot quality, networked warfare advantages, and U.S. combat experience. Fair enough. But ask yourself this: when was the last time the U.S. faced an enemy with aircraft as stealthy, fast, and long-ranged as its own? When was the last time the U.S. faced a power that could shoot back at 1,500 kilometers and launch saturation strikes across all domains simultaneously?
The truth is that the U.S. is not prepared – not doctrinally, not industrially, and certainly not psychologically – for peer-level air combat. Our fighter force is aging. Our industrial base is brittle. Our assumptions remain rooted in the unipolar illusions of the post-Cold War era. The J-20 is not just a challenge to our aircraft – it’s a challenge to our entire theory of victory.
And here’s the kicker: China’s not done. The J-20 is already being produced in numbers far beyond the F-22, and closing fast on the F-35A in some metrics. Its twin-seat variant – rumored to be a force-multiplier for drone coordination and electronic warfare – is already flying. Its avionics are evolving rapidly, as are the pilot training regimes that once lagged far behind. The pace is relentless—and intentional.
This brings us to the most important point. The J-20, like everything else in China’s military modernization, is not about prestige. It’s not about showboating. It is about preparing for war. And unlike Washington, Beijing isn’t confused about what war it’s preparing for.
The American defense establishment needs to stop viewing the J-20 as a flawed imitation or a regional nuisance. It is the aerial embodiment of a new geopolitical logic – one that prizes denial over dominance, disruption over perfection, and tempo over legacy. It reflects a worldview in which the skies over the Western Pacific will no longer be ceded to American power uncontested. That world is already arriving.
So no, the J-20 doesn’t need to “beat” the F-22 or F-35 in a dogfight. That’s a Cold War fantasy. What it can do—already—is force the U.S. to think twice, fly farther, and operate less freely. In strategic terms, that’s victory.
The J-20 is not a symbol. It’s a signal.
A signal that air superiority can no longer be taken for granted. That the United States must finally reckon with a peer competitor capable of challenging it in the skies— – nd, if necessary, shooting it out of them.
The question is not whether the J-20 is a threat.
The question is whether we’re willing to admit that our monopoly on airpower is over.
And whether we’re ready to fight – and win – in a world where someone else has learned to fly just as high, just as fast, and just as well.
About the Author: Dr. Andrew Latham
Andrew Latham is a non-resident fellow at Defense Priorities and a professor of international relations and political theory at Macalester College in Saint Paul, MN. You can follow him on X: @aakatham.
Military Matters
Russia’s Su-57 Felon Stealth Fighter Is a Waste of Rubles
