Did Israel Uphold the Nuclear Order by Striking Iran?

Key Points – Widespread, uniform skepticism from many Middle East experts questioning Israel’s recent strike on Iran is flawed and ignores the context of Tehran’s actions.

-These critiques often overlook that Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons, in violation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and its extensive state-sponsorship of regional terror posed a direct and existential threat, justifying a preemptive attack.

-Israel’s strike, much like its past actions against Iraqi and Syrian reactors, can be seen as strengthening the international non-proliferation regime by enforcing red lines that diplomacy failed to uphold.

-This context is crucial, as is understanding that war plans evolve and demanding a fixed “endgame” from Israel is unrealistic.

Forgetting Iran’s Role: The Flaw in Critiques of Israel’s Strike

It is no surprise that once Israel struck at Iran, members of the commentariat, in this case, many Middle East experts, rapidly appeared either on TV, social media, or in print to question the wisdom of Israel’s actions. To be sure, this is the nature of contemporary political discourse, and as a pundit myself (albeit in Russia), I have often found myself in a similar situation, having to opine about a rapidly changing situation with very imperfect knowledge.

Nevertheless, it is striking that most of these speakers have only expressed skepticism about Israel’s actions.

Israel’s Endgame

Allegedly, Israel should have given diplomacy a chance, or else it has no endgame. Its fundamental objective is regime change, and in any case, it cannot succeed because even if it did, Iran would rebuild nuclear weapons, etc. Although we, and presumably the Israeli leadership, must inquire about what the final objective and ”endgame” would look like and whether they have thought that through, this uniform skepticism is noteworthy.

But it also merits a dissent because such analyses are inherently flawed for three reasons. First, as students of war know, Clausewitz rightly called war a chameleon. He and many subsequent practitioners, if not theorists know all too well that, as Von Moltke said, “no plan survives first contact with the enemy.”

While Israel’s stated objective is the dismantling of Iran’s nuclear threat, developments during this war may force it either to expand or contract its goals. So, whatever its plans are, they are inherently subject to change. Therefore, the demand for public clarity on this point reveals that the pundit or newscaster in question has little understanding of the dynamics of contemporary war.

Second, in listening to these pundits, one hears the usual refrains, namely that it is unlikely that Israel can destroy Iran’s nuclear capability, that Iran will reconstitute its program as soon as it can and do so with greater determination, and that it is imperative that the US not be dragged into another “forever war.”

It is striking that nobody has asked why Iran needs a nuclear weapon in the first place. Since there is no military threat to Iran from anywhere, its pursuit of a nuclear weapon and simultaneous patronage of terrorism from Azerbaijan to Saudi Arabia as well as Israel—including the Houthis who prey on international shipping—represent a standing permanent threat to global security, the stability of these governments within Iran’s orbit, and the very existence of Israel.

Indeed, Iran’s nuclear program’s sole purpose is to threaten and then destroy Israel. Therefore, the mounting international evidence showing Iran coming ever closer to nuclear breakout in violation of the Nonproliferation Treaty is occurring alongside reports of a new plan with its proxies, Hamas and Hezbollah, to attack Israel surely justifies this attack. Moreover, just as in the cases of Israel’s strikes against the Iraqi and Syrian nuclear programs in 1981 and 2007, Israel has strengthened the international nuclear order and this treaty’s regime while defending itself.  For these reasons, the current strike on Iran deserves international support rather than equivocation.

US Involvement

Furthermore, whether Trump or Kamala Harris is the president, the US will not be dragged into a war to satisfy Israel or some other third party’s interest. Iraq was a war of our choice, and in Afghanistan’s case, the US was attacked.

Should a president decide to intervene directly in a war, the issue is whether we have a viable strategy for victory.  But whatever Trump decides, the issue here, as in Ukraine, is whether or not one state has the right to annihilate another one and, in Iran’s case, to upend international treaties. Iran, together with Russia and China, now apparently envision a new global order where they can threaten, support terrorism, brandish nuclear weapons, or even strike at states to annihilate them.

Ultimately, we can conclude that immediate and instant analyses are often incomplete. This point, while true, is insufficient. The uniform skepticism of too many of these analyses about Israel while glossing over Iran’s responsibility for this war reflects what appears to be an unexamined professional consensus about which we should be skeptical. Indeed, the world of Middle Eastern experts seems to be heavily weighted toward skepticism about Israel’s policies and interests.

And while it is dismaying that experts on proliferation apparently share this skepticism, it is not surprising given the existence of this anti-Israeli consensus.

Therefore, we must ask again why this skepticism about the genuinely existential threat to Israel and a concomitant threat to all our partners and allies from Azerbaijan to Saudi Arabia, if not Egypt, does not seem to evoke a deeper or different insight from these commentators.

Immediately before this strike, Iran clearly remained determined to pursue a nuclear weapon, had irrevocably broken the Nonproliferation Treaty, and is supporting international terrorism while also seeking to dominate its neighbors and destroy Israel. In the talks with the US, it was equally clear that they were demonstrating bad faith.

Therefore, on what basis can we assume that still more negotiations are to dismiss Israel’s legitimate preventive strike or assume a priori that it will not work?

Surely, we should demand more experts than these kinds of conclusions.

About the Author: Dr. Stephen Blank 

Dr. Stephen J. Blank is a Non-Resident Senior Fellow in the Foreign Policy Research Institute’s Eurasia Program. He has published over 900 articles and monographs on Soviet/Russian, U.S., Asian, and European military and foreign policies, testified frequently before Congress on Russia, China, and Central Asia, consulted for the Central Intelligence Agency, major think tanks and foundations, chaired major international conferences in the US and in Florence; Prague; and London, and has been a commentator on foreign affairs in the media in the US and abroad. He has also advised major corporations on investing in Russia and is a consultant for the Gerson Lehrmann Group. He is the author of Russo-Chinese Energy Relations: Politics in Command (London: Global Markets Briefing, 2006), and Natural Allies? Regional Security in Asia and Prospects for Indo-American Strategic Cooperation (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 2005). Dr. Blank is also the author of The Sorcerer as Apprentice: Stalin’s Commissariat of Nationalities (Greenwood, 1994); and the co-editor of The Soviet Military and the Future (Greenwood, 1992).

Iran War 

30,000 Pound Bunker-Buster Bombs Might Not Be Able to Destroy Fordow 

Iran Has Hypersonic Missiles 

Iran Still Flies the F-14 Tomcat