F/A-XX, Explained: The F/A-18E/F Super Hornet has served as the mainstay of the US Navy’s carrier-based fighter/attack fleet for the last twenty-five years, and is expected to continue in that role into the next decade. But the Super Hornet is growing long in the tooth, both in terms of its design (from the 1970s) and in that even the most recent airframes will approach the ends of their nature lives in the 2030s.
The F-35C Lightning II has begun to replace earlier F/A-18 Hornets in service and can perform many of the missions associated with the Super Hornet. However, the Navy has long known that it wanted to push forward with a more advanced fighter project, a sixth-generation fighter that could compete with the Air Force’s Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) program.
This project, the F/A-XX (reflecting the fact that it is intended to replace the F/A-18) has been on the books since early last decade. But much as with the NGAD, there is trouble in paradise. The Navy has delayed funding of the project in preference for other priorities, potentially putting the entire concept at risk.
This delay reflects not only immediate funding priorities but also concerns about the strategic purpose of the fighter fleet.
F/A-XX: Summary of Program
The F/A-XX program is intended to develop a carrier-based sixth-generation fighter that can conduct the same missions as the Super Hornet but that also enjoys supercruise, stealth characteristics and that can operate as the communications hub of a system of manned and unmanned systems.
The F/A-XX is a conceptual cousin of the NGAD program, but the projects have been kept at arm’s length, probably because of concerns over a replay of the F-35 program. Although the F-35 program eventually produced variants for the Navy, the Air Force, and the Marine Corps, the pursuit of commonality resulted in much confusion and not much cost savings.
Like the NGAD, the F/A-XX is expected to pair with the Collaborative Combat Aircraft, an unmanned aerial vehicle that will carry weapons, fuel, and sensors to support a broad, networked operation. Also, like the NGAD, the F/A-XX program is supposed to pursue an “open architecture” approach, allowing the integration of future technologies and alternative mission sets over the aircraft’s lifetime.
Trouble in Paradise
But now the Navy is hesitating to invest development funds in the F/A-XX. Beset by a bewildering array of priorities and concerned about recent, massive procurement failures, the Navy quietly cut back on F/A-XX funding.
At roughly the same time, the Navy determined to cease acquiring new Super Hornets. This has left observers of the service in a quandary: If the F/A-XX is delayed or canceled, and the Super Hornet is pushed slowly into retirement, how does the Navy plan to equip its latest class of nuclear supercarriers for their projected fifty-year lifespans?
There is no question that the Navy faces a difficult financial future. The Columbia class ballistic missile submarines, replacement of the long-serving Ohios, have taken and will continue to take a gigantic bite out of the service’s budget. Other surface and submarine procurement projects also have huge budgets (and sometimes huge budget overruns).
However, the aircraft carrier fleet (and the jets that this fleet requires) is the crown jewel of the US Navy, representing a physical and doctrinal reality that the Navy cannot easily part with.
Future of the Aircraft Carrier
The elephant in the room regarding the F/A-XX is whether the aircraft carrier has a future.
The Russia-Ukraine War offers limited lessons for thinking about the future of air and naval warfare. Still, as the only large-scale, high-intensity conflict of recent history, those limited lessons must be respected.
On the land fronts, manned aviation has failed thus far to have a decisive impact, mainly because the density of air defense networks has made certain operations nearly suicidal. In the Black Sea, Ukrainian air and naval drones have exacted a terrible toll on the Russian fleet.
Questions about the future of the aircraft carrier have dogged the platform since, literally, 1920, but they seem particularly acute in the context of a conflict in which a) manned aircraft have had a minimal impact and b) surface ships have displayed serious vulnerabilities. If aircraft carriers have a limited future, then advanced, expensive sixth-generation manned fighters designed to take off from aircraft carriers also have a limited future.
What Does This All Mean?
Uncertainty about the future is dangerous to the success of a major military procurement program. No one wants to spend billions of dollars on a jet that may struggle to find a mission, much less one specialized to fly off ships that may struggle to keep their missions. This is particularly true in the context of the Navy’s recent ship procurement struggles, with projects like the Zumwalt class destroyer, the Littoral Combat Ship, the Ford-class carrier, and the Constellation class frigate struggling.
Nevertheless, the giant aircraft carriers that the Navy continues to build will need new advanced aircraft to maintain a strategic edge. Nagging questions aside, it is doubtful that the Navy will give up on its aircraft carriers. Three Ford-class carriers are currently under construction, with the last projected to enter service in 2032 and leave service in 2082. It will need something like the F/A-XX to replace the Super Hornets and supplement the F-35C. Whether that means an advanced, manned stealth fighter or something quite different, like the unmanned CCA, remains to be seen.
About the Author: Dr. Robert Farley
Dr. Robert Farley has taught security and diplomacy courses at the Patterson School since 2005. He received his BS from the University of Oregon in 1997, and his Ph. D. from the University of Washington in 2004. Dr. Farley is the author of Grounded: The Case for Abolishing the United States Air Force (University Press of Kentucky, 2014), the Battleship Book (Wildside, 2016), Patents for Power: Intellectual Property Law and the Diffusion of Military Technology (University of Chicago, 2020), and most recently Waging War with Gold: National Security and the Finance Domain Across the Ages (Lynne Rienner, 2023). He has contributed extensively to a number of journals and magazines, including the National Interest, the Diplomat: APAC, World Politics Review, and the American Prospect. Dr. Farley is also a founder and senior editor of Lawyers, Guns and Money.
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Matthew Schilling
July 26, 2024 at 11:38 am
More F-35C’s seems like the likely, near-term solution.
The fruit of the AETP engine work should be applied to F-35’s! Those engines would greatly enhance F-35’s in virtually every vital metric.
But that would work against NGAD, wouldn’t it? But that’s a lousy excuse. Improve the fleet soon while working to improve it even more later!
bobb
July 26, 2024 at 12:16 pm
Seems that people (humans) still can’t see beyond the tip of their nose.
Why the addiction to (more) fighters and jets and penetrating assets.
THE coming world war three (ww3) will be fought with nuclear blunderbusters.
Like 360kt and 480kt thermo bombs/warheads and global nuclear winter will finish off the survivors.
DP
July 26, 2024 at 3:48 pm
Good reason not to hopefully assume no will fight it and risk suicide, then?
Buy F-35C, upgrade the engines, and gradually transition to first naval “loyal wingmen” then increasingly capable autonomous drones.
Mike stephani
July 26, 2024 at 10:50 pm
Oh Blobb, you’re such a pessimist…. We should be building hypersonic nukes, stealth cruise missiles to air launch, sea launch, and ground launch; we should be building regional ballistic nukes and oh, yeah, bulk up on the ABM network to protect the homeland. It won’t be perfect, but the next war will be o er in hours, not years, so we need to knock down as many as we can while counterpunching effectively while you hide in your basement in a fetal position sucking your thumb.
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M Lund
July 27, 2024 at 1:50 pm
“open architecture” approach, allowing the integration of future technologies and alternative mission sets over the aircraft’s lifetime” Where have I heard that before? OH yeah, the F22. that was one of the reasons?excuses they got the contract………..AND the reason they now say it needs replaced. IMHO the reason they are looking to get a new design is for the senators/congressmen to pay the military-industrial complex back for buying them their seats.
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Jacksonian Libertarian
July 27, 2024 at 10:17 pm
Cheap, long-range, runway-independent, attritable, drones are replacing all these obsolete Industrial Age dumb weapons.
The Navy suffers from the most obscene case of “Sunk Costs Fallacy”, anyone has ever seen.