Israel’s Restrained Iran Retaliation is a Deadly Mistake

On October 26, 2024, Israel launched strikes on a security site in Tehran and on the Parchin and Khojir military bases, both allegedly involved in Iran’s covert nuclear program. As on April 19, 2024, when Jerusalem limited its retaliation for a multi-hundred missile and drone barrage against Israel to anti-aircraft batteries in Isfahan, Israel seems to prioritize restraint and demonstration of precision over effectiveness.

Israel’s Mistake

As Yorktown Institute analyst Shay Khatiri has repeatedly pointed out, this is a fundamental mistake. Khatiri, who grew up in Iran and understands the Iranian mindset better than most American analysts, is correct that to be effective, retaliation must be public and overwhelming.

First, the juxtaposition between the failure of Iran’s volleys and Israel’s precise response is deceptive. As my American Enterprise Institute colleague Frederick W. Kagan points out, a 99 percent interception rate is sufficient only if the missile that gets through does not carry a biological, chemical, or radiological warhead.

Second, as Khatiri notes, Khamenei cares only about the revolutionary youth who follow his word and embrace his worldview. The opinion of Iran’s other 80 percent are irrelevant to Khamenei: The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps exists to defend the revolution; it is their job to keep the remainder in check with the barrels of their guns.

If Israel wants to strike at the regime, they need to target the 20 percent. They believe Israel impotent and accept the pop history prevalent in regime circles that says Jewish kingdoms have never lasted 70 or 80 years in Palestine, and so Israel is doomed. Perception means more than reality. Because Iranian state media exaggerates the success of Iranian missiles but does not acknowledge the success of Israeli retaliation, Khamenei’s base believes they are winning. To convince them otherwise would require an attack at their heart—the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps headquarters, Khamenei’s palace, the nuclear program, or the elimination of top regime officials.

President Joe Biden demanded Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu omit Iran’s nuclear program from its retaliation. Privately, American officials also likely cautioned Israel not to attack the Kharg oil terminal through which Iran exports more than 90 percent of its oil for fear that the spike in world oil prices might upend the U.S. election. The U.S. also repeats de-escalation as a mantra.

The United States and Israel can look at their past for evidence that their current restraint will fail.

The North Korea Example

Biden should consider North Korea. President George H.W. Bush and his National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft prioritized diplomacy to counter North Korea’s growing nuclear threat. Kim Il Sung refused to abide by his own nuclear agreements and his saber-rattling increased as Bill Clinton took office. Clinton sought both restraint and to rally world opinion against Pyongyang as the North Koreans refused inspections and declared their looming exist from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

On November 7, 1993, Clinton declared, “North Korea cannot be allowed to develop a nuclear bomb” but, like Biden, Clinton was wary of coercion, fearing it could lead to war and, in juxtaposition to his rhetoric, began to appease. Much as Biden’s team engages in whispering campaigns against Israel, so too did Clinton’s aides slam the South Koreans for refusal to accept White House talking points downplaying the North Korean threat. Meanwhile, North Korea continued to advance its nuclear program.

Jimmy Carter, on a personal visit to Pyongyang, announced that he had won a breakthrough with Kim Il Sung to freeze North Korea’s nuclear program. Without authorization, Carter committed the United States to abandon sanctions. Joe Biden, then the ranking Democrat on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, was ecstatic.  “The results of this comprehensive and integrated engagement strategy have stunned even the most optimistic observers,” he declared. With military action off the table, North Korea accelerated its nuclear drive, testing a nuclear device just over a decade later.

The Clinton team had real reason to be concerned about the cost of military action. Seoul is within artillery range of North Korea that could lob rockets at its skyscrapers and kill tens of thousands, the ability that Iran today seeks to acquire with its presence in Lebanon and its efforts to gain a similar foothold in Jordan. Still, given North Korea’s acquisition of nuclear weapons and its ability today to strike Guam, if not Hawaii and California, American strategists should today lament their lost opportunity to nip North Korea’s development in the bud.

Israel, too, should recognize that ideological enemies never seek peace; they simply seek to regroup. The Israeli belief they could “cut the grass” in Gaza set the stage for the worst single-day massacre of Jews since the Holocaust. To mow the lawn of Iran’s nuclear program is to risk a disaster on par with the Holocaust itself. Khamenei’s psychology only heightens the risk: The 85-year-old ayatollah has dedicated his life to Israel’s destruction. As he recognizes his limited remaining time, he will stop at nothing to fulfill what he sees as his destiny.

Every day the Islamic Republic continues to exist is a day in which Israel is in existential danger. Netanyahu may seek to avoid short-term Biden or even Kamala Harris’ ire, but that is nothing compared to the long-term risk of Khamenei’s actionized antisemitism.

Israel can no longer afford nuance.

About the Author: Dr. Michael Rubin

Michael Rubin is a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute and director of policy analysis at the Middle East Forum. A former Pentagon official, Dr. Rubin has lived in post-revolution Iran, Yemen, and pre-and postwar Iraq. He also spent time with the Taliban before 9/11. For over a decade, he taught classes at sea about the Horn of Africa and Middle East conflicts, culture, and terrorism to deployed US Navy and Marine units. Dr. Rubin is the author, coauthor, and coeditor of several books exploring diplomacy, Iranian history, Arab culture, Kurdish studies, and Shi’ite politics. The opinions and views expressed are his own.