Putin’s Next Demand: Alaska?

Published on August 11, 2025, 8:23 am EDT – Key Points and Summary – The upcoming Trump-Putin summit in Alaska, aimed at securing a peace deal for Ukraine, is being framed as a dangerous strategic error.

-Legitimizing Russia’s territorial conquests would set a horrible precedent, repeating the mistakes of the 1939 Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and potentially inspiring future Russian revanchist claims on Alaska itself.

-Any agreement is likely to be meaningless, as Putin has no genuine interest in a lasting peace.

-However, Russia’s internal weaknesses following Putin’s departure may eventually offer Ukraine an opportunity to restore its territory, regardless of any deal made now.

Russia’s Next Demand: Alaska? 

President Donald Trump believes he is on the verge of a new peace deal between Russia and Ukraine.

He will meet Russian President Vladimir Putin on August 15, 2025, in Alaska.

Putin has signaled to Trump that he is willing to end the Ukraine war in exchange for recognition of Russia’s conquest of Crimea and eastern Ukraine.

It remains unclear if Trump will invite Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, who refuses to cede Ukrainian territory or to recognize Russian sovereignty over Crimea.

Why Ukraine Is Right To Stand Its Ground…

Legally, Zelensky is correct. In December 1991, as the Soviet Union collapsed, Russia and the other successor states signed the Alma-Ata Declaration that committed each state to “recognizing and respecting each other’s territorial integrity and the inviolability of the existing borders.”

Russia and Ukraine further agreed to the 1994 Budapest Memorandum in which Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States agreed to guarantee Ukraine’s security in exchange for its forfeiture of legacy Soviet nuclear weapons.

Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of 2025? 

The lesson today is that U.S. guarantees are empty; only foolish leaders would ever trust Washington or forfeit their weaponry in exchange for ephemeral promises. The Alaska summit is the 21st-century equivalent of the 1939 Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact in which Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union divided Eastern Europe into spheres of influence; two years later, Nazi leader Adolf Hitler betrayed Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin and invaded the Soviet Union.

The Alaska Question?

There should be lessons here for Trump. Whether Trump or Putin selected Alaska is unclear; either way, it is a choice replete with symbolism as it is also a former Russian territory.

Suppose Trump is going to justify territorial conquest and the mutability of borders between Russia and Ukraine. Why should Putin or the Russian nationalist successors he might inspire not make a revanchist claim to Alaska?

Like Greenland, Alaska is a resource-rich, sparsely populated, and increasingly strategic region. Russia never sent more than a few hundred settlers to Alaska. Still, Russian nationalists will nevertheless create a false narrative of Americans unfairly taking advantage of both Tsarist greed and exploiting Russian weakness after the Crimean War. Indeed, the choice of Alaska will be symbolic even to the ordinary Russians’ sense.

Nobel Prize Quest Means More War? 

Trump may not realize it, but his pursuit of a Nobel Prize sets the stage for future conflict. Trump fails to recognize that what matters is not the piece of paper, but rather the quality of the peace.

He makes the same mistakes as President Barack Obama did with Iran: He believes showmanship trumps substance, bad agreements are better than no agreements, and he believes his echo chamber. Forcing international processes to conform to American political timelines constantly undercuts international security.

Russians tell a joke about the difference between an optimist and a pessimist: The Russian pessimist says, “Things have never been so bad: war, economy, health, environment. They couldn’t possibly get worse.” The Russian optimist disagrees. “No, no, no. They can always get worse.”

Perhaps even with Trump affirming Putin’s vision that might makes right, Zelensky should not despair.

What Does the Future Hold for Russia?

Putin may believe he is riding high and that he can use the Trump-Putin Pact to pressure other neighbors—Kazakhstan, Moldova, and the Baltic States—to cede territory, if not sovereignty.

However, by opening a Pandora’s Box of territorial changes, any loss that Ukraine incurs in the future can be recovered. After all, neither American nor Russian guarantees or treaties have any meaning anymore.

If Putin can void the Alma-Ata and Budapest agreements, then Zelensky and his successors can shred the Alaska agreement.

When Putin dies, he will leave behind a country whose internal structures have crumbled. Dictators fear competition. They construct an illusion of strength by undermining the next generation’s capacity. A competition to claim Sunni power marked the chaos that followed Iraqi President Saddam Hussein’s fall. After all, Kurds had their warlords and Shi’a had ayatollahs around which to organize and rally, but the Sunnis had no leaders.

So, different claimant groups propelled insurgency to stake their claims to leadership. Similar dynamics—violent ambition for leadership—caused chaos following Libyan dictator Muammar Qaddafi’s fall. Russia is weak.

The demographic damage Putin has done will reverberate across generations. Russia is a prize that will be ripe for the picking. Even if Zelensky cannot stop Trump’s betrayal, he can set his sights on future restoration not only of Ukraine’s territory, but also Russian lands Ukraine should receive as reparation.

About the Author: Dr. Michael Rubin

Michael Rubin is a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute and director of policy analysis at the Middle East Forum. The opinions and views expressed are his own. A former Pentagon official, Dr. Rubin has lived in post-revolution Iran, Yemen, and both pre- and postwar Iraq. He also spent time with the Taliban before 9/11. For more than a decade, he taught classes at sea about the Horn of Africa and Middle East conflicts, culture, and terrorism, to deployed US Navy and Marine units. The views expressed are the author’s own.