Key Points – After the Soviet Union’s 1991 collapse, Ukraine inherited the world’s third-largest nuclear arsenal (appx 1,900 warheads, ICBMs, bombers).
-Despite desires by some to retain them for deterrence against Russia, Ukraine relinquished these weapons by 1994 under international pressure (nonproliferation concerns) and due to practical challenges: lack of funds, operational control (held by Russia), and maintenance expertise.
-In return, Ukraine received “security assurances” via the Budapest Memorandum from Russia, the US, and UK.
-However, these assurances proved insufficient, failing to prevent Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea and the 2022 full-scale invasion, highlighting the critical inadequacy of the agreement.
Ukraine: A Nuclear Weapons State?
It may be counterfactual history, but it is worth examining closer. I’m referring to the following question – what if Ukraine never gave up its nuclear weapons?
Keeping them may have prevented the Russian invasion of Ukraine, as Kyiv would have held a high level of deterrence against Moscow. The Ukrainians were persuaded to give up their nuclear weapons three years after the Soviet Union disintegrated in 1991. The international community, particularly the United States, considered this to be a critical effort of nonproliferation, and it was hailed as an absolute success from the American point of view.
Keep the World Safe from More Nuclear Weapons
Ukraine wanted to be an independent sovereign country, but its sizeable nuclear stockpile was problematic. At the time, the United States and Europe believed that “loose nukes” could fall into the hands of rogue countries and terrorists. NATO members decided that Ukraine needed to cease being a nuclear-equipped state, and they wanted no former Soviet republics with nuclear weapons after the empire broke up. A de-nuclearized Ukraine would be by the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I).
The Nuclear Arsenal Was Expensive and Difficult to Maintain
Nuclear weapons are costly to maintain and always need modernization. Ukraine, as a brand new democracy, was without the funding to keep them in a proper manner so that they could be stored and used in the decades after independence.
Moreover, keeping the weapons would have strained ties with the United States and Europe, endangering successful relations that were badly needed for economic aid to Kyiv.
A Huge Nuclear Stockpile for Ukraine
By 1994, Ukraine had the third-biggest stockpile of nuclear weapons. It was estimated it had 1,900 strategic warheads, 176 intercontinental ballistic missiles, and 44 strategic bombers. This massive arsenal would have made the Russians pause if Ukraine kept even half of this force intact into the 21st century.
Increase Power and Security Had Ukraine Kept the Devices
Belarus and Kazakhstan, which had smaller nuclear stocks, gave them up almost immediately after the Soviet Union died. However, some Ukrainian political leaders wanted to keep their nuclear weapons and delivery methods to ensure that Russia would not ever attack them.
Who Did the Nukes Belong To?
It was not clear who actually “owned” the weapons. Did they rightfully belong to the newly created Russian Federation, or should Ukraine have its bragging rights for ownership? This made the disarmament process difficult.
The Budapest Memorandum of 1994
Nevertheless, Ukraine finally agreed to give up the weapons for “security assurances” from leaders in Moscow, Washington, and London. The warheads were sent back to Russia and the missiles were taken apart and rendered to scrap metal. Ukraine joined the Budapest Memorandum of 1994 and hoped this agreement would maintain its sovereignty and secure its borders to protect against a future attack from Russia.
Ukraine Should Have Kept Its Nuclear Arsenal
But when Russia annexed Crimea in 2014 and established Donetsk and Luhansk as pro-Russian territories, Ukrainians grumbled that giving up its nuclear weapons was a mistake. This sentiment grew more strident after Russia’s invasion of 2022.
But This Was Not Feasible
However, there would have been problems with keeping nuclear weapons on Ukrainian soil. Russia held the upper hand. “Operational control to launch weapons remained in Russia. Moscow controlled the codes required to operate the weapons through electronic Permissive Action Links and the Russian command and control system,” according to King’s College London.
As mentioned earlier, maintenance and storage would have been a problem. Russia had the expertise of its nuclear engineers and technical specialists, while Ukraine had few of these personnel. The Ukrainian missiles were in bad shape and needed to be replaced. Ukraine did not have a specialized rocket force in its new military in the early 1990s.
Due to these reasons, even if the Ukrainians wanted to keep their nuclear weapons, they would not have been able to manage them or even launch them if needed. They also did not have the money in the budget to continue their upkeep.
Ukraine Got a Bum Deal
However, one thing negotiators in Kyiv did not realize was that the Budapest Memorandum was not strong. It only created security “assurances” and not “guarantees” from Russia, so it was not entirely legally binding. The Ukrainians should have bargained for a better and more comprehensive security deal. That was probably the biggest mistake, even though they had no means to keep the nuclear weapons.
Fate was against Ukraine from the very beginning of its independence from Russia. It started off knowing that Russia would be a threat to peace. Ukraine had a huge stock of nuclear weapons yet was forced to give them up due to funding and lack of technical control and maintenance. Ukraine could not have kept them even if they would have enjoyed the political will to do so. They needed bulletproof security guarantees from Russia and did not receive these stipulations. This led to the annexation of Crimea and the invasion of their country.
About the Author: Dr. Brent M. Eastwood
Brent M. Eastwood, PhD, is the author of Don’t Turn Your Back On the World: a Conservative Foreign Policy and Humans, Machines, and Data: Future Trends in Warfare, plus two other books. Brent was the founder and CEO of a tech firm that predicted world events using artificial intelligence. He served as a legislative fellow for U.S. Senator Tim Scott and advised the senator on defense and foreign policy issues. He has taught at American University, George Washington University, and George Mason University. Brent is a former U.S. Army Infantry officer. He can be followed on X @BMEastwood.
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