The Russian Military Is In Crisis

Key Points and Summary – Russia’s defense industry is buckling under war demands and sanctions. Big-ticket programs—Su-75, Su-57, T-14 Armata and PAK DA—keep slipping while factories scramble for chips, cash and skilled labor.

-Mobilization has drained the workforce; morale is low; and Soviet-era inefficiencies persist, from dispersed plants to phantom quotas.

Su-57. Image Credit: Creative Commons.

-Oil softness and ballooning wartime costs squeeze budgets, forcing triage across army, navy and air force needs.

-With parts routed through gray markets and lines idled or slowed, Moscow refurbishes old gear instead of fielding next-gen systems. Result: fewer exports, missed timelines and fading deterrence—for years to come. Recovery will be slow at best.

Why the Russian Defense Industry Is Failing

The Russian military has problems with its defense acquisition programs. Vladimir Putin and his generals and admirals often overpromise and underdeliver. The Russians have obviously struggled in the war against Ukraine and are having difficulty delivering the “super weapons” that Putin holds so dear.

Russia first struggled with the end of the Soviet Union. Money became scarce, and military necessity suffered as a result. The government was seriously disorganized, and emphasis was placed on giving life support to a fledgling free market economy and other domestic political concerns.

This resulted in cancellations and delays for various aircraft and ship-building programs. It took years for the defense industrial base to recover.

Prestige Projects Are Suffering

Now, with the war in Ukraine, Russia must again recalibrate its defense acquisition efforts on high-priced and ambitious programs, such as the Su-75, Su-57, T-14 Armata, and PAK DA. The Su-75 Checkmate stealth fighter jet is not being produced in numbers and hasn’t sold well on the export market.

The same applies to the Su-57, which is also not enjoying a stellar combat record in the skies over Ukraine. The T-14 Armata main battle tank is costly and overrated. Russia has faced difficulties in getting it into serial production.

T-14 Armata Tank Russia. Image Credit: Creative Commons.

T-14 Armata. Image Credit: Creative Commons.

This may be a failed program that could get cancelled. The PAK DA next-generation bomber has also been delayed with ample stops and starts. It is unclear when this stealth strike airplane will come into active duty. The Russian Navy also lacks a functioning aircraft carrier, which is another disappointment.

Low Morale Workers Cannot Pump Out the Weapons Systems

One big problem is morale. The Russians are shocked at the difficulty they encountered against Ukraine’s defense forces and the unbelievable amount of casualties and destroyed equipment. The workers in various defense agencies are likely wondering if they will retain the same level of national pride and prestige they enjoyed before the war.

Sanctions Have Disrupted High-Tech Features

Also, international sanctions have hurt the defense supply chain. The rate of technological innovation has been rendered ineffective. Production lines are idled, and workers are left holding the bag without meeting quotas.

There are no microprocessors from the United States, Europe, or Japan. The only way the Russians can proceed with building advanced weapons systems is to depend on a second-rate list of countries that supply some parts despite the sanctions. These components are of lesser quality and are often delayed if they reach Russia at all.

It Is Time to Prioritize

Russia also has too many weapons systems in operation simultaneously, and priorities are often confusing. Should it focus on the army, where new tanks and armored personnel carriers must be replaced quickly?

What about the navy and its need for new ships to restore those that have been destroyed, like the Black Sea flagship Moskva, which was considered one of its best vessels? Meanwhile, the air force has significant needs with the development of Su-57s and Su-75s, as well as the PAK DA, all of which are being built simultaneously.

Su-57 and Su-75. Image Credit: Artist Rendering/Creative Commons.

Su-75 Checkmate. Image Credit: Creative Commons.

There is not enough time, money, and resources to go around. The Russians depend on the price of oil to bolster their revenue dedicated to warfighting and defense acquisition. However, the price of crude has dropped this year, down 18 percent year-to-date.

Russia is relying on China to purchase its hydrocarbons, but these purchases may not be sufficient to provide the necessary funds for the defense industry.

A Well-Trained Work Force Is Dying in Ukraine

Can Russia continue to invest in a quality workforce? There needs to be an emphasis on recruiting and retaining highly skilled workers to build the military hardware. But with the war, able-bodied young men who may have supplied labor to the defense industry are fighting and dying in Ukraine.

That leaves older workers who may not have the stamina for physically demanding jobs. The war would have to end, and a new generation of workers would be trained and prepared for military manufacturing work.

Russia may not be able to invest the funds required to sustain all these programs. It needs trillions of rubles to meet wartime demand.

“Production of ‘fabricated metal products,’ which surged 26.4 percent in 2023 and 31.6 percent in 2024, dropped 1.6 percent year-on-year in September after growing 21.2 percent in August,” according to the Moscow Times.

Manufacturing growth is slowing across the board, and there may be even more delays for the big-ticket items.

“The Russian Academy of Sciences’ Institute of Economic Forecasting reported that 18 of 24 manufacturing sub-sectors, which together produce nearly 80 percent of the country’s goods, are now in recession,” the Moscow Times also noted.

The Russian government will have to run even higher budget deficits to fund the war on the combat side, and there may be shortages of funds in the defense acquisition sectors.

This is all bad news for Putin. Plus, the defense industry still has remnants of the Soviet system. Quotas are likely to be fabricated to satisfy the “Dear Leader.”

PAK DA Stealth Bomber. Image Credit: Creative Commons.

This has hurt the creation of new production techniques. Factories are dispersed throughout the country, which creates problems with efficiency and economies of scale.

Research and development are not geared to the level that will bring Russian defense industries into the 2030s. Remnants of the Soviet-era “just good enough” mentality are still present. The Kremlin needs to spur dual-use research output from universities, but there are few technology-production hubs led by college scientists, unlike those in the United States.

Russia has its work cut out for it. As the war begins its fourth year with no end in sight, and defense workers focus on older model tanks and armored personnel carriers, the new military hardware falls behind. Supply chains are a challenge, and manufacturing rates have slipped.

Young, eager workers who would typically supply the defense industry are either at the front or killed or wounded in action. This will rob the Russians of a generation of workers.

There will be no let-up in sanctions, and funds will be short as long as the war of attrition continues. The defense industry is running out of steam, and Putin will wonder if his super weapons can be produced in sufficient numbers to alter the war’s outcome.

The Russian arms production will take years to recover, and that is just fine with Ukraine, the United States, and NATO, which hope to keep the pressure on Putin and hobble his country’s means of production.

About the Author: Brent M. Eastwood

Brent M. Eastwood, PhD is the author of Don’t Turn Your Back On the World: a Conservative Foreign Policy and Humans, Machines, and Data: Future Trends in Warfare, plus two other books. Brent was the founder and CEO of a tech firm that predicted world events using artificial intelligence. He served as a legislative fellow for US Senator Tim Scott and advised the senator on defense and foreign policy issues. He has taught at American University, George Washington University, and George Mason University. Brent is a former US Army Infantry officer. He can be followed on X @BMEastwood.

More Military

Europe’s New 6th Generation GCAP Stealth Fighter Looks Unaffordable

49 ‘New’ M1A1 Abrams Tanks Were Sent to Ukraine by Australia and America Doesn’t Approve

The U.S. Marine Corps Is Facing a Tough Drone Reality

‘300 Percent More Lethal’: The U.S. Army Is Putting China and Russia on Notice