The Tragedy of Interwar Thinking

A notable global trend is influencing national mindsets. There seems to be a sense of invulnerability—perhaps a natural aspect of human psychology—that fosters an excessive optimism about the chances of positive events over negative ones, especially concerning war. This attitude is known as ‘interwar thinking.’

Interwar thinking conveys the notion that any forthcoming war will be unlike those of the past. Common bias suggests that future wars will be short, sharp, conducted at ever-increasing distances, and fought everywhere but on the land. It is common to perceive new technologies as possible ‘silver bullets’ that can insulate us from the historical horrors and costs of war. This interwar thinking is historically commonplace when a peace dividend is available, allowing nation-states to redirect funds to economic and social programs due to the perceived lack of war.

(Aug. 8, 2017) The Nimitz-class aircraft carrier USS George H. W. Bush (CVN 77) at sea during exercise Saxon Warrior 2017, Aug. 8. Saxon Warrior is a United States and United Kingdom co-hosted carrier strike group exercise that demonstrates allied interoperability and capability to respond to crises and deter potential threats. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Theron J. Godbold /Released)

This article delves into the concept of ‘interwar thinking’. It examines its emergence as a prominent perspective among nation-states and societies regarding the next war, and how to overcome it. It will argue that, to move beyond interwar thinking, nations must create a cycle of adaptability, innovation, technology, flexible governance, and a constructive yet realistic trust in a nation’s determination and abilities.

The ‘short war’ fallacy and the technological ‘silver bullet’

Policy makers frequently demonstrate an optimism bias, believing that any forthcoming war will not happen or will be brief, and that their country has, or can develop at the point of crisis, the capabilities to address potential adversaries. History highlights a prevalent misconception: that war can be limited in both scope and duration, often referred to as the ‘short-war’ fallacy.

In truth, short wars are far more of an exception than the norm. The clear historical pattern, from the Crimean and Boer Wars, to the First and Second World Wars, and through to the recent Iraq and Afghanistan Wars, is that fighting usually lasts longer and incurs increasing costs—in terms of both lives and resources.

The British, for example, predicted that their 2006 incursion into Helmand would last three years, and cost £808 million.  When they left fifteen years later, the cost was thirty-three times as much. States that strategise for quick wars with their available resources often discover themselves embroiled in prolonged fights that result in disastrous consequences and considerable financial pressure. The belief in short wars is deeply rooted in the character of interwar thinking.

Lieutenant General Simon Stuart, the Chief of the Australian Army, has emphasised this in his speeches at the ANU National Security College and the Lowy Institute. He remarked that the ‘siren’s song of interwar thinking is enticing’—meaning that nation-states may fall into this thinking and, as such, fail to prepare adequately or to innovate and adapt to changing global currents appropriately. The persistent and uncontrollable nature of war ensures that a battle in the Indo-Pacific between major powers will not be clean, quick, fought from afar, or away from land and populations. A potential war in the region, whether concerning Taiwan, another regional dispute, or a proxy conflict, is likely to be expansive and protracted, and to have profound effects on multiple countries.

A significant concern about interwar thinking is the assumption that advanced technology will easily open up the battlespace, swiftly deciding the outcomes of wars while reducing human losses. We are in a time where debates about information superiority persist, treating ongoing surveillance and precise weaponry as the ‘silver bullet’ that could deter or win wars. This is particularly evident in conversations about AI, hypersonic missiles, and drones, which are predicted to take the place of tanks, aircraft, surface ships, and ground troops. We must, however, be wary of declaring a new revolution in military affairs. While technology can change the conduct of war, it does not alter its fundamental nature.

A U.S. Army M1A2 SEPv2 Abrams assigned to Alpha Company, 1st Battalion, 67th Armor Regiment, 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 1st Armored Division prepares to move off the live fire range after completing the day portion of Table VI Tank Gunnery conducted at McGregor Range, New Mexico, Sept. 29, 2023. Gunnery Table VI evaluates crews on engaging stationary and moving targets while utilizing all weapons systems in offensive and defensive positions, ensuring our crews are trained and ready for any mission. (U.S. Army photo by Spc. David Poleski)

The rise of drone usage has particularly ignited conversations about the potential redundancy of ground troops, aeroplanes, tanks, and even ships. However, as Stephen Biddle points out, Ukraine’s situation has developed to mirror that of the First and Second World War, where soldiers are entrenched in mud, tanks navigate city streets and artillery shells hit critical targets.

Despite the significant losses experienced by tanks and aircraft in Ukraine, Biddle references a historic precedent: in 1943, ‘the German Wehrmacht lost 122% of the tanks it initially had,’ while the German Luftwaffe suffered a ‘loss of 250% of its aircraft that year.’ However, no one argued that planes and tanks had become outdated after World War II, even with the advent of precision missile technology in the 1950s. Likewise, although drones have played a significant role in the Russo-Ukrainian war, and may still be providing an advantage, they are not proving to be fundamentally decisive; if they were, the war would have likely ended by now. Put, drones and long-range missiles cannot seize and hold physical terrain: the most categorical way of ending a war.

Relying on advanced critical technology as a last resort in a potential war carries an extremely high risk, unlike spreading risk across various alternatives. Critical technology may provide a disproportionate advantage, yet it can quickly become obsolete.

Peter Singer notes, ‘while there is a danger in putting all your bets on the best of the last generation, there is also danger in embracing too closely the first generation of the new.’ Technology plays a vital role in achieving success in war and must evolve, but it is only one factor influencing outcomes in real warfare.

Relying on technology as a quick fix is unrealistic, and history indicates that technology does not always guarantee success in fighting the short war, and even more importantly, the long, protracted one.

Moving beyond Interwar thinking 

Nation-states globally remain lured by interwar thinking, except those who are experiencing the visceral realities of war. Breaking free from this mentality is not difficult: it simply requires a shift in thinking and assumptions. Decisive policy actions and transparent communications, which are crucial, can then follow. Planning for future conflict must match the realities of the potential for long war, rather than the optimism of the short war fallacy. Critical technology must evolve quickly to provide a strategic advantage, accompanied by an adaptable and innovative cycle.

Technology should not be seen as a means to swiftly resolve wars without incurring human or financial costs; this is simply ahistorical. For technology to be effectively utilised, adaptability is essential, along with sufficient national/military production capacity and significant reserves.

A soldier from the Idaho Army National Guard, Charlie Company, 2-116th Combined Arms Battalion, 116th Cavalry Brigade Combat Team makes Idaho National Guard history with the first firing of a Javelin anti-tank missile.
In a historic moment of training for the Idaho Army National Guard, soldiers from Charlie Company, 2-116th Combined Arms Battalion, 116th Cavalry Brigade Combat Team, fired the FGM – Javelin portable anti-tank missile on Sunday while conducting a series of field training exercises scheduled for the week on the Orchard Combat Training Center ranges.

This means coordination between defence, industry, universities, and research organisations to identify, develop, and integrate innovative solutions to future challenges. Moreover, there is a need to reinforce a realistic trust in a nation’s determination and abilities to overcome interwar thinking.

Mark Twain noted, ‘History does not repeat itself, but it does rhyme.’ Today, we observe striking similarities to the eras of the 1890s and 1930s, characterised by tariffs, trade disputes, and political unrest, all set within the arc of a larger historical context. In the midst of all these challenges, nation-states must shake off their interwar thinking and gear up to effectively confront the possibility of war in the coming decades. In our interconnected world, assuming that the next war will be short-lived is a mistake, as every nation-state will be impacted, whether directly or indirectly. The wars in Ukraine and the Middle East will matter to the Indo-Pacific, as they affect trade, migration, and international norms. War’s nature is to escalate, and any expression of political violence has the potential to be prolonged and extensive.

Crucially, we need to ensure that we have learnt from past mistakes in not preparing adequate, credible, and relevant military capabilities, and we must be equipped to understand the patterns and rhythms of future events. This includes having effective responses to any potential ‘black swan’ events that may arise on the horizon. Now is the time to see the world as it is, not as we might wish it to be. Undeniably, this is indeed an interesting time to be alive.

About the Author: Dr. Iain MacGillvray 

Dr. Iain MacGillivray is an analyst, researcher and speechwriter for the Chief of the Australian Army. He was also a founding member and geopolitical analyst at the first Australian think tank in the US, the Australian Strategic Policy Institute in Washington, DC (ASPI DC). Moreover, Iain was formerly a US and UK adviser at the Australian Department of Prime Minister & Cabinet, a 2021-2022 Yale Fox International Fellow at Yale University, and lecturer at the University of Melbourne. His areas of specialisation include Australian land and military power and Australian foreign and defence policy. He is also an expert in the international affairs in the Indo-Pacific region, US politics and security, and Middle East and Turkish politics. All views and discussions in this piece represent the personal opinions of the author and are not representative of the Chief of the Army or the Australian Army. 

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