PUBLISHED on August 10, 2025, 08:34 PM EDT – Key Points and Summary – A recent Government Accountability Office (GAO) report has revealed a “dangerously high dependency” on China for materials used in critical U.S. weapon systems.
-The investigation found that current procurement systems provide limited visibility into the origin of components, allowing Chinese-made materials to infiltrate the supply chain.
-This was starkly illustrated when production of the F-35 was halted after the discovery of Chinese-made magnets.
-The report also highlights a critical shortage in domestic titanium casting, vital for submarine construction, underscoring a significant national security vulnerability that the DoD has been slow to address.
How Chinese Parts Shut Down the F-35 Production Line
WARSAW, POLAND – According to a recent report by the US Government Accountability Office (GAO), the US defense industrial base and all branches of the US military have a dangerously high dependency on materials produced by the People’s Republic of China (PRC).
Those materials are used to manufacture and then operate critically important weapon systems, which creates serious national security risks, reads the report.
What We Know
The US Defense Department DoD buys from and depends on a global network of over 200,000 suppliers for many of its weapon systems and many military equipment items.
The DoD, in theory, is not supposed to be utilising China-sourced inputs, as all purchases that support the Department’s programs are processed through the Federal Procurement Data System database.
That database is supposed to be red-flagging any components or other inputs whose country of origin is a nation with policies and interests hostile to the US.
However, the system, which is a government-maintained database, is somewhat less than foolproof, according to the GAO document. One of its major faults is that it only “provides limited information about the countries of origin,” the 24 July report’s investigators discovered.
Additionally, federal contractors are not contractually mandated to disclose to DoD the origin of the manufacturing components they purchase from specific nations.
Some Scary Conclusions
Not surprisingly, the GAO team found that of the over 99 materials identified by the DoD as being in short supply for fiscal 2023, none came from the US. This has created a dangerous dependency for the US defense firms and their military customers.
A significant number of components used in critical weapon systems and military equipment are manufactured by companies in China. A considerable number are also produced in nations that take an aggressive or adversarial stance against the United States.
What If They Cut Us Off?
At any time, “these suppliers may cut off US access to critical materials or provide ‘back doors’ in their technology that serve as intelligence pathways,” the GAO document said.
This is a serious concern, given the PRC’s significant role as a global supplier of critical mineral components used in microelectronics and battery production.
The risk of depending on the PRC for so many of these inputs was exposed in 2024 when Beijing imposed export restrictions on gallium and germanium. These are two minerals that GAO described as “critical for military-grade electronics.”
The F-35 Challenge
In another example listed by the GAO, the manufacture of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter was halted when it was discovered that many components made in China were used during the production of the stealthy aircraft.
The fighter aircraft is being jointly manufactured with at least seven allied nations that are partners in the program, which are also sourcing materials from offshore.
Those nations include the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and several European Union (EU) countries. Unfortunately, the GAO investigation revealed that magnets used in production and assembly processes in these nations, which are then incorporated into the aircraft’s configuration, originate from China.
“The F-35 ‘s prime contractor, Lockheed Martin, had identified forbidden Chinese magnets in the F-35 program’s supply chain and had duly notified the DoD in 2023 and 2024. The Pentagon subsequently shut down manufacturing for several months to identify alternative suppliers,” according to the report.
Other Programs Also Affected
The US naval shipbuilding industry, and in particular submarine production, also suffers from unknowingly sourcing from hostile foreign supplies, according to the GAO. Submarine production is a specific worry in that it requires titanium casting for some of the more critical vessel components.
However, the US cannot currently cast titanium due to limited supply and outdated equipment that limits its ability to forge it into weapon systems.
“The U.S. has only one foundry that can produce large titanium castings required for some key weapons systems,” the report noted. Before the Ukraine war, US aerospace firms depended on Russia, which has a competitive advantage in titanium products, to supply several products in this area, including castings. The current sanctions regime now forbids these purchases.
DoD has long recognized the risk of dependency on foreign suppliers, according to the GAO, but has taken inadequate to no action to implement any of the recommendations for improving current processes.
One of the action items on the list is to overhaul the database systems and procedures for working with suppliers. Specifically, this would mean “more detailed and transparent tracking of the country of origin of critical military components.”
“One untested approach that DoD officials stated could give DoD more visibility into foreign dependency risks is to contractually require suppliers to provide the information,” the report said. “While some DoD officials assert the information is readily available, others stated this approach may be too costly or that suppliers may not be willing to provide information.”
About the Author: Reuben F. Johnson
Reuben F. Johnson has thirty-six years of experience analyzing and reporting on foreign weapons systems, defense technologies, and international arms export policy. Johnson is the Director of Research at the Casimir Pulaski Foundation. He is also a survivor of the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. He worked for years in the American defense industry as a foreign technology analyst and later as a consultant for the U.S. Department of Defense, the Departments of the Navy and Air Force, and the governments of the United Kingdom and Australia. In 2022-2023, he won two awards in a row for his defense reporting. He holds a bachelor’s degree from DePauw University and a master’s degree from Miami University in Ohio, specializing in Soviet and Russian studies. He lives in Warsaw.
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