The Ukraine War Could Go Nuclear

Key Points and Summary: While Russia possesses the world’s largest arsenal of tactical nuclear weapons and maintains an intentionally ambiguous doctrine, the actual use of these weapons in the Ukraine war remains unlikely. But it is still possible.

-Russia’s nuclear threats are primarily coercive tools designed to deter direct NATO intervention, not signal an imminent strike.

-The potential for severe international backlash, even from allies like China, the uncertain military effectiveness, and the high risk of a massive conventional NATO retaliation serve as powerful constraints.

-Despite the ongoing war of attrition, US and NATO intelligence have not detected any significant changes in Russia’s nuclear posture that would indicate preparation for use.

The Ukraine War: A Nuclear War? 

In 2022, when Russia launched its full-scale invasion into Ukraine, one of the most prominent fears analysts had was the possibility of the war going nuclear.

Moscow retains an immense stockpile of tactical nuclear weapons and uses an intentionally vague doctrine allowing for atomic strikes at Putin’s discretion.

Thankfully, no nuclear weapons have been used in Ukraine as of writing this, but the threat of nuclear escalation grows with each passing day the war continues.

It is unlikely that Russia will use nuclear weapons based on the current trajectory of the war; however, the risk is still present and should always be considered by Western decision-makers.

Russia’s Nuclear Doctrine

Russia maintains the world’s largest nuclear arsenal, which includes a substantial number of non-strategic or tactical nuclear weapons. These are designed for battlefield use and typically have lower explosive yields than strategic nuclear weapons.

As of 2024, Russia was estimated to possess around 1,558 tactical nuclear warheads. The country’s nuclear doctrine, updated in 2024, outlines four primary scenarios under which nuclear weapons might be used: in response to a ballistic missile attack on Russia or its allies, the use of weapons of mass destruction against Russia or its allies, an attack on critical government or military infrastructure, or conventional aggression that threatens the existence of the Russian state.

However, this doctrine is intentionally ambiguous, which allows the Kremlin to use nuclear threats as a strategic tool to deter Western involvement in Ukraine.

There are several theoretical scenarios in which Russia might consider using tactical nuclear weapons in Ukraine. One such scenario involves battlefield desperation. If Russian forces were to face a catastrophic defeat or collapse, tactical nuclear weapons might be viewed as a last resort to halt Ukrainian advances and force negotiations.

This would align with what some analysts describe as an “escalate to de-escalate” strategy, where limited nuclear use is intended to compel adversaries to back down. Another possibility is strategic signaling.

In this case, Russia might conduct a nuclear demonstration, such as a test detonation in an uninhabited area, to intimidate Ukraine and its Western supporters without causing direct casualties. A third scenario involves deterrence failure. If NATO were to intervene directly or if Ukraine were to strike deep into Russian territory, such as Moscow or key military installations, Russia might perceive this as an existential threat and consider nuclear retaliation.

Why Russia Does Not Want to Use Nukes in Ukraine

Despite these scenarios, there are powerful constraints that make the actual use of tactical nuclear weapons unlikely. One of the most significant deterrents is the potential for international backlash. The use of nuclear weapons would almost certainly provoke global condemnation, including from countries that have maintained relatively neutral or supportive stances toward Russia, such as China and India.

China, in particular, has repeatedly emphasized the importance of avoiding nuclear escalation. Another constraint is the limited military effectiveness of tactical nuclear weapons. Their use could contaminate territory that Russia seeks to control and might even endanger its own troops. Moreover, the strategic advantage gained from such a strike is uncertain and could be outweighed by the consequences.

A further deterrent is the risk of NATO retaliation. While NATO is unlikely to respond with nuclear weapons, a Russian nuclear strike could provoke a massive conventional military response targeting Russian forces and infrastructure. This would significantly escalate the conflict and could lead to broader war. Additionally, there are domestic considerations. The use of nuclear weapons could be perceived as a sign of desperation, undermining President Vladimir Putin’s image of control and strength. It could also alienate segments of the Russian elite and military leadership, potentially destabilizing the regime from within.

Current intelligence assessments from the United States and NATO indicate that while Russia continues to use nuclear rhetoric as a means of deterrence, there is no evidence of imminent nuclear use. The 2025 U.S. Annual Threat Assessment notes that Russia’s nuclear threats are primarily coercive tools rather than indicators of actual intent. NATO intelligence has similarly reported no significant changes in Russia’s nuclear force posture. Analysts from institutions such as the Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Center for a New American Security argue that Russia’s nuclear threats are designed to manipulate Western decision-making rather than signal a genuine willingness to use such weapons. However, they also caution that miscalculation remains a risk, especially as the conflict evolves and red lines become harder to discern.

Russia Does not Need to Use Nukes for Now 

President Putin’s statements provide some insight into the Kremlin’s current thinking.

In May 2025, he publicly stated that there had been “no need” to use nuclear weapons in Ukraine and expressed hope that such weapons would not be required. While these statements are part of broader strategic messaging, they suggest that nuclear use is not currently being seriously considered.

Analysts have outlined several plausible escalation pathways. One involves the use of tactical nuclear weapons on the battlefield to halt a Ukrainian breakthrough, possibly in contested regions like Donbas or Crimea. Another involves a demonstration strike, such as a detonation over the Black Sea or in an uninhabited area, intended to signal resolve without causing casualties. A third scenario involves strategic miscalculation, where a misunderstood NATO move or a Ukrainian strike on Russian soil could trigger a disproportionate response.

Each of these scenarios carries immense risks and uncertain outcomes, making them unattractive options unless Russia perceives an existential threat. The use of nuclear weapons would fundamentally alter the nature of the conflict and could provoke a global crisis.

It would also likely fail to achieve Russia’s strategic objectives, as it would galvanize international opposition and potentially lead to direct military intervention by NATO.

About the Author:

Isaac Seitz, a Defense Columnist, graduated from Patrick Henry College’s Strategic Intelligence and National Security program. He has also studied Russian at Middlebury Language Schools and has worked as an intelligence Analyst in the private sector.

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