Key Points and Summary – Recent analysis suggests that while Russia is not completely out of tanks, its staggering losses in Ukraine have crippled its ability to conduct large-scale, rapid armored maneuvers.
-With an estimated 10,000 to 20,000 armored vehicles lost since 2022, Russia’s production and refurbishment of older Soviet-era tanks cannot keep pace with battlefield attrition.
-This has forced a tactical shift towards slower, infantry-heavy assaults with limited armored support. While this prevents Russia from being decisively defeated, it also means the days of its large “big arrow” offensives are likely over, leading to a grinding war of attrition.
Russian Armor Is in Big Trouble in Ukraine
A recent article published by Trench Art, written by David Axe, made an interesting claim: Russia is fundamentally out of armored vehicles. When I first read this, I was adamantly quite dismissive.
I’ve grown quite numb to articles claiming that the Russians have run out of things, people have been insisting since 2022 that Russia is running out of missiles, for example. However, as I continued reading, the point wasn’t to claim that the Russians had run entirely out of vehicles; rather, the claim is that the Russians cannot maintain an armored fleet large enough to make rapid maneuvers.
Measuring Russian Losses
Assessing Russian tank losses is difficult to do as casualty estimates range all over the place. Some casualty estimates claim as many as 20,000 tanks and other armored vehicles have been lost since 2022, with more conservative estimates sitting at around 10,000.
The types of tanks lost span a wide range of models, from the older T-72s and T-80s to the more advanced T-90Ms. As the war has dragged on, Russia has increasingly relied on outdated and refurbished tanks, including T-62s and even T-55s, some of which were first introduced in the 1950s.
This reliance on older models underscores the depth of Russia’s attrition and the challenges it faces in maintaining a modern, effective armored force.
Industry to the Rescue
Russia’s ability to replace these losses is constrained by both industrial limitations and economic pressures. In 2024, Russia reportedly produced or refurbished around 1,500 tanks, while losing approximately 1,400 in the same period. This near one-to-one replacement ratio is unsustainable in the long run, especially as the quality of replacements continues to decline. This year, Russian state reports (which should be taken with a huge grain of salt) claim that production has nearly doubled from last year. Russia has also taken steps to further ramp up production, expecting to produce several thousand tanks a year by 2027. These measures have helped soften the impact of tank casualties, but as of now, as Axe writes, it cannot field a large enough force to make large gains on the battlefield.
A critical factor in Russia’s ability to sustain its armored forces has been its vast reserves of Soviet-era tanks. However, these stockpiles are rapidly depleted. Reports from Ukrainian intelligence and independent analysts suggest that Russia has already tapped deeply into these reserves, and the remaining vehicles are often in poor condition. Refurbishing these tanks is a complex and costly process, requiring extensive overhauls of engines, electronics, and armor. As the quality of available stock declines, the battlefield effectiveness of these refurbished tanks diminishes accordingly.
Russia Forced to Change Tactics
Russia has been forced to adapt its battlefield tactics, increasingly relying on infantry, artillery, and drones, with tanks playing a more limited role. This shift reflects both necessity and adaptation to Ukraine’s effective use of anti-tank weapons, including Western-supplied Javelins, NLAWs, and drone-based munitions. The degradation of Russia’s armored forces also has long-term strategic consequences. Western intelligence assessments suggest that the war has set back Russia’s military modernization efforts by up to two decades (I take this with a grain of salt as war is the mother of innovation).
The question of how long Russia can sustain this level of attrition is complex and depends on multiple factors, including economic resilience, industrial capacity, and political will. Some estimates suggest that Russia can maintain its current level of military operations through at least 2026 or 2027.
NATO assessments indicate that Russia could continue the war effort at current levels until 2027, assuming continued economic sacrifices and no major escalation.
However, other analysts warn that Russia could run out of usable tanks by 2026 if current loss rates persist and if refurbishment of older models becomes unfeasible. While Russia may be able to suppress domestic dissent and continue fighting, the opportunity costs —economic, political, and military —are mounting.
Russia is Advancing, but Very Slowly
I don’t want to be too dismissive of the Russians. The Russian Army is still a formidable fighting force and is still capable of making gains on the battlefield. In my mind, many western analysts are too dismissive of Russia’s current capabilities and have a tendency to downplay any Russian gains.
That being said, I do believe Axe has a point as well. The Russians are unlikely to run out of armored vehicles anytime soon. However, at its current rate of production and attrition, they cannot field a large enough force to make large sweeping gains like they did in the early months of the war.
Part of this is explained by the proliferation of drones, another is also explained by the large front line that Russia has to keep equipped and supplied. Either way, do not expect any big arrows anytime soon.
In essence, while Russia may be able to continue the war for several more years, doing so will come at increasingly unsustainable costs. To mitigate this, Russia has attempted to increase its industrial output and change tactics in favor of light infantry with minimal heavy armored support.
As a result, tank casualties have decreased, but this comes at the cost of operational tempo. Ukraine, for its part, is in a bad spot. Even with Russia’s slow tempo, Ukraine faces a chronic shortage of manpower, artillery, and equipment.
At this rate, Russia does not need to make significant sweeping gains; it only needs to put pressure on the frontline until the AFU eventually collapses.
About the Author:
Isaac Seitz, a Defense Columnist, graduated from Patrick Henry College’s Strategic Intelligence and National Security program. He has also studied Russian at Middlebury Language Schools and has worked as an intelligence Analyst in the private sector.
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