North Korean Supreme Leader Kim Jong-un has just expressed his willingness to meet United States President Donald Trump. Kim even says he has ‘fond memories’ of talking with Trump during his first presidency, smartly catering to Trump’s craving for attention and approval. This is notably more flexible than North Korea’s approach toward South Korea. Despite a progressive Southern president interested in détente, the North has brusquely rejected all outreach.
North Korea Won’t Talk Nukes—Make These Demands Instead
The North has also insisted that a Trump-Kim summit not discuss North Korea’s nuclear weapons. But that, of course, is the one North Korean issue everyone cares about. We have only vague estimates of North Korea’s arsenal and doctrine for use, and there is widespread anxiety that North Korea would use a nuclear weapon in a second Korean conflict—if only to equalize the massive South Korean-American conventional advantage.
It is hard to imagine what issues Trump would raise in a summit if not this very issue. And Trump would face crushing domestic criticism if he passed over the world’s single most significant concern regarding North Korea. Still, Trump loves summits and proved, in his recent meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Alaska, that he is willing to gamble on meetings with little advance work or a pre-set agenda.
So if Trump did meet Kim, here are areas where he could demand significant North Korean concessions to counter-balance giving Kim’s nukes a pass:
North Korean Conventional Power
Most of the discussion of North Korea’s threat to northeast Asia focuses on its unchecked nuclear and missile program. But the North Korean People’s Army (KPA) poses a major conventional threat to South Korea as well. South Korea’s capital, Seoul, is just twenty miles from the border with North Korea, and the KPA is positioned along that border to move quickly against Seoul in case of a war.
North Korea also stations thousands of artillery pieces near Seoul. This entrenchment undergirds North Korea’s long-standing threat to turn Seoul into a ‘sea of fire.’ Even if the KPA could not take the city in a conflict, it could devastate it.
One apparent concession Trump could demand is that Kim reduce the size of the KPA on the border and reduce its artillery threat to Seoul. This would not be as valuable as reducing the nuclear missile threat to South Korea, Japan, and the US. However, it would represent a significant improvement in South Korean security.
North Korean Human Rights
North Korea is notorious for its extreme human rights repression. The country is literally Orwellian. The United Nations conducted a wide-ranging survey of human rights in North Korea and found it akin to the Nazi concentration camp system, and then found, ten years later, that almost nothing had changed.
This reality is another obvious area where Trump could demand significant concessions if he must pass over the nuclear program. Much of what makes North Korea’s possession of nukes so frightening is the totalitarian manner of its governance. If North Korea were more normal, less extreme, and less brutal, its nuclear program might be more acceptable. Serious movement on human rights could signal that North Korea is willing to liberalize—at least a bit—to improve the acceptability of its nuclear program.
Trump Needs to Get Something—Or He Should Not Go
A meeting with the US President is a win in itself for dictators, especially of small rogue states like North Korea. Frequently, these states are viewed as illegitimate by many wealthier and more normal states. North Korea, for example, is widely considered to be the failed Korea; the ‘real Korea’ is the South. If Korea is one day reunified, it will likely be on terms favorable to the South, just as West Germany led the unification of Germany.
So for a failed, isolated state like North Korea, a meeting with the US president is a gain. A summit suggests that North Korea is not just a nuclear troublemaker, but an accepted member of the international system. This is especially valuable since the North wants no discussion of its nukes, which implies Trump’s and America’s acceptance of them.
This is quite controversial. It is still the allied position that North Korea must denuclearize. Thus, if Trump meets Kim without nukes on the agenda, he must demand serious counter-concessions. If those are not forthcoming, he should husband the symbolic capital of a summit until Kim is willing to deal.
About the Author: Dr. Robert Kelly, Pusan National University
Dr. Robert E. Kelly is a professor of international relations in the Department of Political Science and Diplomacy at Pusan National University in South Korea. His research interests focus on Security in Northeast Asia, U.S. foreign policy, and international financial institutions. He has written for outlets including Foreign Affairs, the European Journal of International Relations, and the Economist, and he has spoken on television news services including BBC and CCTV. His personal website/blog is here; his Twitter page is here.
More Military
Russia Now Has a Death Star Battlecruiser
France’s Charles de Gaulle Aircraft Carrier Has a Message for Any Navy on Earth
Russia’s Last Aircraft Carrier Might Soon Be Headed to the Grave
Bankotsu
September 24, 2025 at 2:45 am
Israel is conducting genocide in Gaza and waging war on all the countries surrounding it, should Israel give up its nuclear weapons?
Don’t joke lah Robert kelly.
Kim Jong Un already said that he has given up ambitions to unify with south Korea so North Korea no longer has issue to attack or invade South Korea while Israel is opening calling for greater Israel.
Don’t come and talk cock Robert kelly.
Don’t talk cock.
This guy is the biggest clown here.
Jim
September 24, 2025 at 11:27 am
I appreciate the author’s take: the first step is to move past denuclearization as the be all end all of relations with North Korea.
(Yes, as the author states, it’s still a very important issue, central in many ways, and, thus, there are many items on the nuclear checklist needed to be tackled. But, also, serious issues exist regarding the DMZ and the force posture of the two respective sides.)
Many people still hold the idea that if we can’t get North Korea denuclearized, then we should eternally “freeze out” the North with no relations whatsoever and, if anything, a saber rattling policy of permanent hostility bordering on a permanent state of crisis on the Korean Peninsula.
I think the author of the article has come to the conclusion the “freeze out” policy isn’t tenable or compatible with long-term goals of lowing tensions on the Korean Peninsula.
Which should be the objective of U. S. foreign on the Korean Peninsula. (Yes, through the years I always supported efforts to keep North Korea from going nuclear and later to denuclearize North Korea… but I’ve come to the conclusion straight up denuclearization isn’t feasible without incurring unacceptable risks for the Korean Peninsula, Japan, our regional allies, and ourselves, as well.)
North Korean Supreme Leader Kim Jong-un, as the author notes, doesn’t want to interact with South Korea, probably because he and his circle perceive the United States as being the real authority they have to deal with…
… that’s where diplomacy plays a major role: how do we start the process, but swing a large portion onto South Korea because ultimately it’s North and South Korea who have to get along on the Korean Peninsula? But we can help and facilitate a dialogue between the two.
It’s time for trust-building steps or confidence-building steps, i.e. each side agrees to take an action and follow through on the commitment to that action and upon each side taking those actions, each side sees those actions resulting in a positive outcome.
Confidence: the idea actions agreed to will be carried out by the respective parties upon agreement to take such actions. And, then an assessment of how the process worked and whether the actions had the intended & desired result. If so, hopefully that process builds confidence between the two parties… and further steps and cooperation can happen between the parties.
We’ll see how it works out, if at all.