Key Points – The U.S. Army has canceled the M10 Booker armored vehicle program, just two years after its unveiling, in a move to cut ineffective systems under its new Army Transformation Initiative.
-Army Secretary Daniel Driscoll admitted, “We got the Booker wrong,” explaining that the vehicle, intended to be a lightweight, air-droppable tank to support light infantry, became a 42-ton vehicle that was too heavy for airdrops and even some Army base bridges.
-This failure is attributed to a flawed requirements process (“requirements creep”) that created a “Frankenstein” vehicle the Army didn’t need, making its cancellation a necessary, albeit costly, course correction.
The M10 Booker Is No More
The United States Army spent well over a billion dollars on a light tank, but the Army is now terminating the program just as it was slated to enter full-rate production. The program was formerly known as the Mobile Protected Firepower (MPF) program.
The cancellation was announced as part of a broader Army modernization and acquisition reform effort, according to the US Army and Defense News. The decision was driven by concerns about the vehicle’s weight, logistical challenges, and the high cost of the program.
The M10 Booker was going to be the first new combat vehicle to enter the force in four decades.
“In response to current world events and in support of the strategic objectives outlined in the Army Transformation Initiative, the U.S. Army has issued a termination for convenience of the current low-rate initial production of the M10 Booker combat vehicle and will not enter into full-rate production as originally planned,” the Army said in a released statement.
“Although M10 Booker production will conclude, the Army appreciates the efforts of the team and Soldiers from the 82nd Airborne Division who worked on the program,” the Army added.
In an intriguing move, the Army will not abruptly halt low-rate production. “There are a number of M10 Bookers currently in the final stages of production that will be accepted by the Army,” an Army spokesperson said.
Too Many Cooks Stirring the Pot
The US Army began developing an armored vehicle to support light infantry forces in 2013. Mobile Protected Firepower, the competition to create a new light tank for the US Army, was continually handed additional requirements, leading to the selection of a tank that did not meet the conceptual initial requirements and, therefore, was not needed by the Army.
The result was the M10 Booker, and despite early optimism, the results left the Army with a light armored vehicle that has become a textbook example of a requirements process badly in need of revamping—one more concerned with checking boxes than actually evaluating the Army’s needs.
The M10 Booker was intended as a lightweight, C-130 airdroppable “light tank” to support airborne and light infantry units; successive requirement additions (“creep”) resulted in a 42-ton vehicle that was too heavy for airdrop and even some base infrastructure, such as bridges at Fort Campbell.
The M10 was too heavy for eight of the 11 bridges at Fort Campbell, where the 101st Airborne Division, which was slated to receive the tanks, is stationed.
Background on the Fiasco That Was The M10 Booker
The 82nd Airborne Division recognized a need for armor support for the troops after the retirement of the M551 Sheridan. It requested a replacement from the Army. One requirement was the ability of the new vehicle to be airdropped from a C-17 or a C-130.
The M10 was designed to equip airborne and air assault troops with limited armor protection. It was to serve as a weapon that could effectively engage enemy strongpoints and armored vehicles. The airborne insertion would enable rapid deployment in battle after airborne infantry troops jumped in or air assault troops who were infiltrated by helicopter.
But by the time the Army finished adding all of the M10 Booker’s extra requirements, it weighed 42 tons—far too heavy to drop from a C-130. Then, in a further snafu, the Air Force stated that although they had initially planned to load two M10 Bookers on a C-17, the aircraft could only load one.
Instead of stopping the order and re-evaluating the M10, the Army pushed forward with the project. The Army Requirements Oversight Council reviewed the 2015 requirements submission and said it doesn’t need to be loaded onto a C-130 or airdropped. The Joint Requirements Oversight Council agreed.
Acquisition Run Amok
“This is not a story of acquisition gone awry,” Alex Miller, the Army’s chief technology officer, said. “This is a story of the requirements process creating so much inertia that the Army couldn’t get out of its own way, and it just kept rolling and rolling and rolling.”
Miller added, “As soon as you remove the requirement for airdropability, you’re no longer actually helping infantry. You are just as maneuverable as a main battle tank at that point, which means you are less maneuverable.”
“This concept of sunk cost fallacy, it is a thing that human beings generally struggle with, which is if you’ve invested a lot in the past, and we do this in our personal lives, you get anchored to things that are suboptimal for the future,” Army Secretary Daniel Driscoll said to Defense News.
The M10 Booker was “intended to be a light tank that served all of these new purposes,” he said. “It ended up medium. I don’t think the manufacturer liked it all that much, and we, the Army as a customer, kind of helped create this Frankenstein that came to be.”
Driscoll said that in the past, the Army would have continued production despite being unhappy with the tank. “We would have just made it work.”
M10 Booker And Other Programs To Go
Secretary Driscoll and Gen. Randy George, the Army’s chief of staff, announced that under the new Army Transformation Initiative would include the elimination of unnecessary programs to instead “ruthlessly prioritize fighting formations to contribute to lethality directly.”
The Army will eliminate the production of the AH-64D Apache attack helicopter in favor of the more modern AH-64E, end the Gray Eagle drone program, and halt procurement of several tactical vehicles, including the decades-old Humvee and the newer Joint Light Tactical Vehicle, as well as the M10 Booker.
“We got the Booker wrong,” Secretary Driscoll said. “We wanted to develop a small tank that was agile and could do airdrops to the places our regular tanks can’t.”
The Army had accepted about 80 M10 Bookers from General Dynamics before Driscoll decided to kill the program. It isn’t yet known what the Army will do with the M10 Bookers that are already built.
About the Author:
Steve Balestrieri is a National Security Columnist. He served as a US Army Special Forces NCO and Warrant Officer. In addition to writing on defense, he covers the NFL for PatsFans.com and is a member of the Pro Football Writers of America (PFWA). His work was regularly featured in many military publications.
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