A U.S.-China Detente in the Arctic?

The Arctic ice cap is melting much sooner than expected, with important environmental and geopolitical consequences, not the least of which could be a Sino-American détente directed against Russia.

Attention has generally been focused on the potentially disastrous impact on the global climate. Less attention had been devoted to the fact that the open Arctic Ocean will make new Atlantic-Pacific sea routes possible much sooner than expected, enabling commercial and military ships to shorten transit from Asia to Europe by some 3,000 miles.  This change will have major consequences for the world’s economy and security and not just the environment.

The latter has understandably attracted the most attention. As Arctic Ocean sea levels rise, they contribute to increased water circulation and an exponential melting of the ice cap. Greater expanses of already melted Arctic waters absorb more sun, which was previously reflected by ice, adding to further accelerated melting. This effect contributes to the Arctic warming four times faster than the rest of the planet.

In fact, the Arctic ice cap is melting so rapidly that previous models that predicted an ice-free Arctic Ocean no sooner than 30 years from now are being revised to a considerably earlier date. A recent publication indicates that the  Arctic Ocean will already be ice-free in the summer of 2030!

When that occurs, new attractive navigation routes will become a reality. There are three principal anticipated such routes: the Northwest Passage going along the coast of Canada and the United States; the Transpolar Sea Route going over the North Pole; and the Northern Sea Route (NSR) that passes next to Russia.

Today, only one of these routes is already open part of the year for certain classes of ships: the NSR. The problem with this route, however, is that it passes close to the Russian landmass for a major part of the journey.  This route has been contentious for some time, but Russia’s recent decisions have brought things to a head. In December 2022, Vladimir Putin signed a new law that refers to the NSR, previously regarded as a route having international rights, as a “historically emerged national transportation route of the Russian Federation.” This August, Putin signed a decree establishing a Maritime Collegium, with the main purpose of “making Russia a great naval power again” as well as securing the NSR. Russia, unsurprisingly,  is investing heavily in Arctic infrastructure, natural resources exploration, and Arctic military capabilities.

Lacking a viable alternative in the near future, China has decided to cooperate with Russia rather than challenge its attempts to dominate Arctic shipping.  Thus, China and Russia agreed this July to start the development of an infrastructure project called “Arctic Express,”  which involves the development of part of the NSR to connect Shanghai and Ningbo with Arkhangelsk, where the cargo would continue by rail to Moscow.  But cooperation on this segment of the NSR  is primarily bi-lateral and does not solve China’s problem of access to European ports.

According to Putin, the Chinese and Russian partnership will only grow, by implication in the Arctic as well. However, such a conclusion is premature, as Moscow has not been coy about its broader ambitions to expand the Russian empire and potentially challenge China’s aspirations for regional hegemony. Does China, which needs to reach European markets via unimpeded Arctic routes, really want Russia to be the dominant power in the region, with control of sea routes critical to China’s interests? Is there an alternative to the NSR?  The answer is yes—and it involves the United States.

The emerging reality of a much earlier timeline of an ice-free Arctic will likely change the security calculus involving Russia, China, and America. Opening the Arctic Ocean waters would allow shipping to stay farther off Russia’s coast, using the Northwest Passage route, or going over the North Pole via the Transpolar Sea Route. When the Arctic Ocean shipping routes become a reality, tremendous cost savings would result for not only the United States but also for all its allies and friends. Much shipping would no longer need to go through the Taiwan Strait, and then all the way around the Horn of Africa, or through the Suez or Panama canals resulting in major economic and environmental benefits.

China is not unaware of this. It has shown a major interest in developing good relations and infrastructure in Iceland, which is an Atlantic Ocean gateway to the Arctic routes. Already in 2013 it signed a mutual free trade agreement with the island country, surely not because of market opportunities with Iceland’s almost 400,000 inhabitants. China has also declared itself to be a “near Arctic state.”

Given the likely disharmony between Russian and Chinese interests and hegemonic aspirations in the Arctic, geopolitical and economic logic dictates that the United States and its allies will have a common cause with China in confronting Russia. Arctic trade routes could save weeks at sea for goods to Europe, North America, and other parts of the world.  Keeping them accessible for international shipping should be as important to China as to the West.  The impending melting of the Arctic polar cap may be a disaster environmentally, but it could very well lead to a renewed anti-Russian détente between the United States and China. Since the ice cap may become a distant memory in a few years, Washington and Beijing would be well advised to consider the benefits of their emerging partnership sooner rather than later.

About the Authors

Vitalij Garber is a former Deputy Undersecretary of Defense (International Programs and Technology) and Assistant Secretary General, NATO (Defense Support).  He received his PhD in physics from the University of Alabama, and performed research on a Post-Doctoral Fellowship Award at Harvard University.

Dr. Alexander Motyl is a professor of political science at Rutgers-Newark. A specialist on Ukraine, Russia, and the USSR, and on nationalism, revolutions, empires, and theory, he is the author of 10 books of nonfiction, including Pidsumky imperii (2009); Puti imperii (2004); Imperial Ends: The Decay, Collapse, and Revival of Empires (2001); Revolutions, Nations, Empires: Conceptual Limits and Theoretical Possibilities (1999); Dilemmas of Independence: Ukraine after Totalitarianism (1993); and The Turn to the Right: The Ideological Origins and Development of Ukrainian Nationalism, 1919–1929 (1980); the editor of 15 volumes, including The Encyclopedia of Nationalism (2000) and The Holodomor Reader (2012); and a contributor of dozens of articles to academic and policy journals, newspaper op-ed pages, and magazines. He also has a weekly blog, “Ukraine’s Orange Blues.”