America Needs a New National Strategy for Irregular Warfare

In 1982, President Ronald Reagan signed National Security Decision Directive 32 (NSDD-32), which outlined a comprehensive strategy for countering Soviet expansionism and influence worldwide. This directive provided clear guidance on employing all elements of national power – diplomatic, informational, military, and economic – to advance U.S. interests and counter Soviet aggression.

Today, the United States faces a similarly complex global security environment, with challenges ranging from great power or strategic competition to transnational terrorism.

To effectively navigate these challenges, the U.S. needs a new national strategy for irregular warfare (IW) that builds on the legacy of NSDD-32 while adapting to 21st century realities.

A M1 Abrams Main Battle Tank in 1st Battalion, 18th Infantry Regiment, 1st Infantry Division fires at a prop target during a live fire exercise on Feb. 17, 2023 in Petrochori Training Area, Greece. American armored units along with Greek armored units spent the past couple days training force-on-force and other combat simulation exercises.

The need for a comprehensive IW strategy has become increasingly apparent in recent years. In their recent article, Thomas Marks and David Ucko lament that there is struggle for an IW strategy. The revisionist powers of China and Russia are employing their own forms of political warfare and hybrid approaches through the “Little Green Men” and “Unrestricted Warfare.” The rogue and revolutionary powers of Iran and North Korea conduct their own unique forms of unconventional and political warfare. These adversaries are adept at operating in the “gray zone” between peace and open conflict, using a range of irregular approaches to advance their interests while avoiding direct military confrontation with the United States.

A New National Strategy for Irregular Warfare, Explained

A Reagan-like NSDD for irregular warfare would provide several key benefits. First, it would clearly articulate U.S. policy and objectives related to IW, providing strategic guidance to the entire national security apparatus. LTG (RET) Charles Cleveland, et. al., notes, “There is no overarching U.S. government policy or strategy for irregular warfare.” A new directive could fill this gap, aligning efforts across the government and with international partners.

Second, an IW-focused NSDD would help institutionalize irregular warfare capabilities and mindsets throughout the U.S. national security enterprise. Despite two decades of counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations, the U.S. military and other agencies still struggle to fully embrace IW concepts. Again, LTG (RET) Charles Cleveland, et. al., notes “The U.S. military has failed to master irregular warfare above the tactical level.” A high-level directive would signal the importance of IW and drive institutional change.

Third, a new NSDD could provide a framework for integrating IW with other elements of national power. NSDD-32 emphasized the need to employ all instruments of national power in a coordinated manner. A modern IW strategy, also perhaps echoing George Kennan in 1948, should similarly outline how diplomatic, informational, military, and economic tools can be leveraged synergistically to achieve U.S. objectives in competitive environments short of conventional war.

Fourth, an IW-focused directive could help balance the current emphasis on preparing for large-scale combat operations. While conventional deterrence and warfighting capabilities remain vital, the 2022 National Defense Strategy acknowledges that most competition and conflict occurs below the threshold of traditional warfare. A national IW strategy would ensure appropriate attention and resources are devoted to operating effectively in this critical space.

Fifth, a new NSDD could provide guidance on ethical and legal considerations in irregular warfare. As IW often involves working “through, with, and by” partner forces and operating in legally ambiguous environments, clear policy direction on these issues is essential.

To be effective, a modern NSDD for irregular warfare should incorporate several key elements:

-A clear articulation of U.S. interests and objectives related to IW, including countering malign influence, supporting resistance movements, and building partner capacity.

-Guidance on roles and responsibilities across the interagency, including lead and supporting relationships for different IW activities.

-Direction on developing and maintaining critical IW capabilities, including in emerging domains like cyber and information operations.

-A framework for assessing and mitigating strategic and operational risks associated with IW activities.

-Guidance on strengthening alliances and partnerships to conduct effective IW globally.

-Direction on resourcing and institutionalizing IW capabilities for long-term competition.

Critics may argue that a high-level directive is unnecessary or that IW should remain the purview of special operations forces. However, the complex nature of modern conflict demands a whole-of-government approach to irregular warfare. The necessary ability to solve complex political-military problems through unconventional means – should inform U.S. strategy and operations across the board.

In conclusion, a Reagan-like NSDD focused on irregular warfare would provide the strategic guidance and institutional impetus needed to compete in today’s security environment effectively. By clearly articulating U.S. policy, aligning interagency efforts, and institutionalizing IW capabilities, such a directive could significantly enhance America’s ability to advance its interests and counter adversary aggression across the spectrum of conflict.

As the United States navigates an era of renewed great power competition and persistent irregular threats, a comprehensive national strategy for IW is not just desirable but essential.

About the Author: David Maxwell

David Maxwell is a retired U.S. Army Special Forces Colonel who has spent more than 30 years in the Asia Pacific region. He specializes in Northeast Asian Security Affairs and irregular, unconventional, and political warfare. He is Vice President of the Center for Asia Pacific Strategy and a Senior Fellow at the Global Peace Foundation. Following retirement, he was Associate Director of the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University. He is on the board of directors of the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea and the OSS Society and is a contributing editor to Small Wars Journal.