Canada’s Real F-35 Fighter Problem

Canada finally did the right thing when it committed to buying the F-35. After a decade of dithering, political cowardice, and unserious flirtations with inferior alternatives, Ottawa reversed its 2010s-era backpedaling and announced in 2022 that it would acquire 88 of the fifth-generation stealth fighters.

But here we are in May 2025—and the deal, like too many others in Canadian defense policy, is at risk of unraveling before it delivers anything of substance. Only 16 aircraft are under firm contract. The remaining 72 are caught in political limbo.

If Prime Minister Carney’s government backs away now, it won’t just be making another procurement blunder—it will be gutting Canada’s credibility at precisely the moment it needs to show it can finally deliver on defense.

The Real F-35 Problem

Let’s be clear: the F-35 is not a luxury or a vanity project. It is the price of admission to serious participation in North American and North Atlantic security.

Without it, Canada’s air force will slide from obsolescence into outright irrelevance. The CF-18s are beyond worn out. Every year of delay increases the risk that Canada will be unable to meet even the most basic NORAD and NATO operational requirements. And while there are other jets on the market, there is only one aircraft that ensures full-spectrum interoperability with our closest allies across the missions that now define the strategic environment—especially in the increasingly contested air and maritime spaces of the Arctic, the North Pacific, and the North Atlantic.

Critics love to point out that the F-35 is expensive, complex, and heavily reliant on U.S. support. And all of that is true. But so is every system that operates at the cutting edge of modern warfare. The real question isn’t whether the F-35 is perfect—it isn’t. The real question is whether Canada can afford to opt out of the operating environment its allies are already moving into. And the answer is no. To turn away from the F-35 now would be to lock Canada out of the future of airpower, to signal unreliability to Washington and Brussels, and to abandon any pretense of sovereignty in the skies.

But here’s the problem—one that isn’t being talked about nearly enough. Buying the F-35 was the right move. But it isn’t enough. And without serious follow-through on basing, infrastructure, training, and doctrine, it could easily become a hollow gesture—one more performative act in a long line of Canadian defense optics.

The fighter jet itself is only one node in a much larger system. If we want these aircraft to operate in the North, we need reinforced runways, hardened shelters, and reliable logistics chains in places like Inuvik, Yellowknife, and Goose Bay. If we want to retain pilots, we need to revamp our recruitment and training pipeline, now facing historic attrition rates. If we want to contribute to NATO air policing or Pacific deterrence, we need to sustain operational readiness levels that far exceed anything the Royal Canadian Air Force has achieved in the last twenty years.

Strategy Time for This Stealth Fighter

In short, we’ve bought the jet. Now we need to build the air force around it. That’s the real challenge. And it’s one that no Canadian government—Liberal or Conservative—has yet shown the will to confront.

The Carney government, to its credit, has not yet canceled the deal. But the fact that it’s openly reviewing the remaining 72 aircraft—amid rising U.S. protectionism and its own desire to look fiscally prudent—should set off alarm bells. Washington is watching. So are our NATO allies. But more importantly, so are Canadians who still believe this country can and should maintain sovereign control over its airspace, defend its approaches, and contribute to the collective defense of the democratic world.

To back away from the F-35 now, after already signing on and touting the benefits, would not just be embarrassing. It would be dangerous. It would signal to the United States that Canada cannot be counted on to fulfill even the most basic promises in its NORAD modernization plan. It would tell our allies that when push comes to shove, Ottawa’s word is worth less than a Treasury note. And it would tell Canadians—especially those who still wear the uniform—that we are not serious about rebuilding the military, no matter how many press releases say otherwise.

The Trudeau government got a lot wrong on defense. But the decision to finally go forward with the F-35 was not one of those mistakes. What would be a mistake—and a fatal one—would be to repeat the same cycle of posturing and paralysis that has defined Canadian military procurement for a generation. That cycle ends here, or it doesn’t end at all.

To be clear, buying the F-35 won’t magically fix Canadian defense. The RCAF is understaffed. The Arctic lacks infrastructure. The CAF as a whole is underfunded, overstretched, and years behind where it needs to be. But abandoning the fighter program mid-stream would make things worse, not better. It would send a signal to adversaries and allies alike that Canada is incapable of sustaining any long-term defense commitment, even when its security depends on it.

The F-35 should be understood not as the final solution to our defense woes, but as the beginning of a long-overdue restoration of Canadian military seriousness. It should force the government to confront the full spectrum of what it takes to operate at the level of its allies. It should drive investment in northern infrastructure, radar coverage, pilot retention, and integrated air defense. It should pressure Ottawa to treat airpower as a sovereign capability, not a symbolic one. And if it doesn’t—if we treat the F-35 as a procurement trophy to show off rather than a foundation to build on—then we will have squandered not just money, but the last real opportunity to put the RCAF back on a viable footing.

Canceling the F-35 would be a step backward. But failing to capitalize on it would be a strategic tragedy. The jet is here. It’s the right platform. Now we need to prove we’re the right country to fly it.

About the Author: Dr. Andrew Latham

Andrew Latham is a non-resident fellow at Defense Priorities and a professor of international relations and political theory at Macalester College in Saint Paul, MN. You can follow him on X: @aakatham.